

**NEGOTIATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST: CAMP DAVID AND OSLO  
A COMPARATIVE STUDY**

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## DEDICATION

To my loving husband Majeed...

For all your support and great efforts to make this dream come true,

To my lovely baby Naya...

For adding to my life joy and purity,

To my parents, Awni and Haifa', and sisters, Majd, Lujain, and Mariana...

For all what you did, are doing, and will do for me,

**I dedicate this work**

## ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

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### List of Abbreviations

<b>PCG</b>	Chapter 1	Perceived Common Ground
<b>KSA</b>	Chapter 2	Kingdom of Saudi Arabia
<b>PLO</b>	-	Palestine Liberation Organisation
<b>PM</b>	-	Prime Minister
<b>SNT</b>	-	Single Negotiation Text
<b>UN</b>	-	United Nations
<b>USA</b>	-	United States of America
<b>USSR</b>	-	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
<b>AIPAC</b>	Chapter 3	American-Israeli Public Affairs Committee
<b>DOP</b>	-	Declaration of Principles
<b>GDP</b>	-	Gross Domestic Product
<b>UAE</b>	-	United Arab Emirates

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# NEGOTIATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST: CAMP DAVID AND OSLO A COMPARATIVE STUDY

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## ABSTRACT

Negotiations in the Middle East were marked for a long time with the famous conflict of Arabs and Israelis, and all diplomatic efforts by parties to the conflict and other international parties were aiming at finding a settlement to the conflict, mainly the negotiations at Camp David between Egypt and Israel in 1978, and negotiations at Oslo between the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) and the Israelis, too.

The objective of this comparative study is to find out whether negotiating in both cases was a good method to reach a solution for the conflict or not, and which side's performance –Egyptian or Palestinian- was better, after defining what negotiation means and its strategies, studying and analyzing both Camp David and Oslo negotiations, and then comparing the results to reach the conclusion.

By considering data collected from primary and secondary resources about each negotiation, information was processed by using descriptive, analytical, and then comparative techniques to reach the conclusions.

Although both agreements shared some general similarities, it is worth mentioning that each agreement was marked by special characteristics that made it a special case in itself. After comparing the differences and similarities between both agreements in the scopes of political circumstances, the agreements and their articles, the third-party role in the agreements, and the impact of the personal aspect, the study resulted in concluding that neither agreement was able to find a solution for the conflict as whatever they have reached to was only partial settlements in that they only managed to create a state of temporal peace

regarding some issues while leaving other important issues unresolved. The study demonstrates such similarities and differences and reached the aforementioned conclusion.

The hypothesis which says that Camp David and Oslo settlements were successful in achieving the goals of the Egyptian and PLO sides did not prove true, as not all goals of the Palestinians and Egyptians were achieved but some of them, and created restrictions on both sides in the Israeli favour. As A result, neither agreement was 100% successful.

## Introduction

Since long history, negotiation has been a method many people followed to solve or settle their conflicts and fights over whatever caused them to fight. By time, negotiation has proved to be a good solution to bring points of view closer when they seem divergent.

Long time ago, the Middle East was considered a very sensitive geographical area that represented a point of attraction for many international powers because of its strategic location, natural resources, and the superpowers' imperial ambitions.

Nowadays, the situation is not too different. The Middle East becomes the focus of the world's attention because in the Middle East lays one of the most important conflicts which made the world busy for long decades. It is the Arab-Israeli conflict which has made the region exposed to many wars and clashes since the establishment of the State of Israel.

Arab-Israeli conflict roots go back in history to the second half of the nineteenth century when the Jewish journalist "Theodore Hertzl" wrote his book *The Jewish State* in 1896, in which he laid down the theoretical bases for the Hebrew State and its foundations<sup>1</sup>. Since then, Jews from all over the world were invited to immigrate to Palestine, their "Jewish State", and establish a nation in the middle of the Arab World, neglecting by that thousands and thousands of Palestinians who were evacuated and forced to immigrate from their lands, in addition to others who died or were killed defending their homes. All these long years have represented agony and pain for the Palestinians in their daily struggle for their lives wherever they were and caused the Israelis huge amounts of money, lives, and

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<sup>1</sup> Al Farra, Mohammad Ali, (2002). Assalam Al Khadi': Ila Ain?. In: Naf'a, Hassan (Ed.), **Intifadat Al Aqsa.. Wa Qarn Min Assira'**. 1<sup>st</sup> ed. (pp. 235-266). Amman: Dar Al Shurook. p. 263

peace of minds. Thus, both the Palestinians and the Israelis have experienced a long history of fighting with each other: the Israelis occupying lands and killing people and Palestinians defending their lands against that flow of Jewish immigrants from all over the world and the oppressive ways the Israeli used in their relations with the Palestinians specifically and the Arabs generally.

In addition to all wars which marked the Arab-Israeli history, peaceful methods were approached to settle the conflict with the help of a third party through negotiating the conflict. A lot of time and effort was given by international parties to find a solution for such conflict. These international efforts varied between direct and indirect negotiations, secret and public talks, and international peace conferences which all aimed at resuming the peace process in the Middle East.

Among these efforts were the Camp David Negotiations in 1978 between Israel and Egypt and the Oslo Negotiations in 1993 between Israeli Government and the PLO. Both negotiations were a hallmark in the history of the Arab-Israeli conflict as both produced peace settlements and found a framework to regulate the relation between Israel and Egypt on the one hand and the Palestinians on the other.

What this study tries to figure out is how negotiating with Israel produced peace by studying and analyzing Camp David and Oslo negotiations. Comparing the results of the analysis will lead to finding out which side – the Palestinians or the Egyptians - have played the game better in negotiating with Israel, the hard negotiator, and achieved its goals or at least some of them.

- **Importance of the Study:**

The study is concerned with negotiation as a peaceful means to solve or settle the Arab-Israeli conflict. By studying two important agreements between Israel and Egypt, one of the strongest Arab countries, and the Palestinians, the study analyzes the aspects which surrounded each agreement and the third-party role in making the enemies meet at the negotiating table and reach a peaceful settlement.

The importance of the study lays in that it addressed the most important negotiations between the Arabs and the Israelis in a comparison that tries to know which negotiation could help better in creating peace in the region. Thus, it gives a comprehensive idea about the peace process in the Middle East within the framework of bilateral peace treaties between Israel and Egypt in Camp David and Israel with the Palestinians in Oslo.

- **Problem Definition:**

The problem of the study can be concluded in considering negotiations as the appropriate and final solution for conflicts like the Arab-Israeli conflict and peace in such cases is final and full. However, studying the negotiations of Camp David and Oslo proved that negotiations did not lead to a full peace nor could put an end to that conflict. The study will concentrate on comparing the performance of the Egyptians and the Palestinians in negotiating with Israel to figure out what kind of peace was reached in Oslo and Camp David.

- **Objectives of the Study:**

The study aims at achieving the following objectives:

1. Defining what a negotiation and a negotiating strategy means.
2. Studying and analyzing the Camp David Negotiation within the perspectives of the political circumstances, the agreement reached, the third-party role, and the impact of personal aspect.
3. Studying and analyzing the Oslo Negotiation within the perspectives of the political circumstances, the agreement reached, the third-party role, and the impact of personal aspect.
4. Comparing both treaties and by showing similarities and differences between them in the previous perspectives.
5. Finding out which agreement was more successful in creating peace between the Egyptians and the Israelis on the one hand and the Palestinians and the Israelis on the other.

- **Hypotheses of the Study:**

The study aims at testing the following hypothesis: **the Camp David negotiations and the Oslo negotiations were successful in achieving all the goals of the Egyptian and the Palestinian sides and thus, created peace and found a settlement to the conflict.**



- **Questions of the Study:**

The study tries to answer the following questions:

1. By studying the PLO-Israeli Government negotiations in Oslo and Camp David, can negotiation be considered a final and decisive solution for the conflict?
2. Have settlements like Camp David and Oslo achieved all the goals of the parties involved?
3. Which party – the Palestinian or the Egyptian- was successful in reaching its goals?
4. How did the third-party role affect the negotiations?
5. How could the personal aspects influence the negotiations?

- **Literature Review:**

What differentiate this study from others is that it is the first study that combines two main peace treaties in the Arab-Israeli conflict in a comparative study by studying and analyzing every aspect and circumstance related to the issue.

Unlike other studies which tended to study and analyze each agreement by itself, comparing both negotiations within the scopes of the political circumstances, the third-party role, and the personal impact on the negotiation allows reaching a comprehensive understanding of the nature of the Arab-Israeli conflict in peace and war and allows forming a personal view of the Palestinian and Egyptian performances in negotiating with Israel.

The topic of the Arab-Israeli conflict is considered a new-old issue which was studied and analyzed through history. Many researches and studies have addressed directly and indirectly the peace treaties between the Arabs and the Israelis, especially the Oslo and the Camp David Agreements.

Below are some of the previous studies that treated the main subjects of this study: negotiations, the Camp David Accords, and the Oslo Accords.

**1. Al Masalha, Dr. Mohammad, (2005). The Negotiating Diplomacy in the Jordanian Experience. Amman, the Parliamentary Studies Center:**

In this study, the researcher treated the subject of negotiation as a tool in the international relations by defining negotiations and their conditions, stressing on the important elements that must exist during the negotiation process to make it successful. Moreover, the study addressed the Jordanian diplomacy and the peace initiatives in the Middle East after 1967, mainly the Jordanian role in the Madrid Conference 1991 and the Washington Negotiations which lead to Oslo. Also, the study addressed on the Jordanian-Israeli Peace Treaty and the Wadi Araba Negotiations in 1994, focusing on the negotiating rounds and then the signing of the peace treaty.

**2. Iklé, Fred Charles, (1964). How Nations Negotiate. New York, Harper & Row Publishers:**

The main concern of this study was to deal with the negotiation as a field of science through defining the negotiations as a process and analyzing all the aspects that are considered inputs in that process, like strategies, objectives, and

negotiating skills. Also, by revising the chapters of the study, it concentrates on giving tips on how to negotiate successfully by being aware of the process through understanding the process very well and how to evaluate positions skillfully.

**3. Barston, R. P., (1988). Modern Diplomacy. London, Longman:**

Generally, this study talked about diplomacy in all its relative aspects like, trade, security, international treaties, and diplomatic styles and methods. In addition, it treated the topic of negotiations in a separate chapter which included definitions, objectives, and the stages of the negotiating process.

**4. Naf'a, Dr. Hassan, (1984). Egypt and the Arab-Israeli Conflict. (First ed.) Beirut, the Center of Arab Unity Studies:**

That study gave a comprehensive idea about the situation in Egypt since the pre-revolution stage, reaching Nasser's era and the development of the conflict and its dimensions. The concentration was on Sadat's era and how the political situation at that time led the Egyptian leader to seek peace with Israel and then sign the Camp David Agreement. Moreover, the author analyzed the Camp David Accords and the Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty, and studied how peace with Israel can be marketed.

5. **Khoury, Tariq, and Bermamt, Mohammad, (1979). From the Initiative to the Treaty. (First ed.). Amman, Al Rai Press:**

This study tackled all the political events which have taken place since the Egyptian President Anwar Al Sadat started the initiative of negotiating peace with Israel and accepted Begin's, the Israeli Prime Minister, invitation to visit Israel. Between reactions, announcements, suggestions, conferences, and meetings, the study focused on the political details which surrounded the negotiations of Camp David, paying extra attention to the Arab leaders' reactions to Sadat's behaviors, mainly the Baghdad Summit which resulted in suspending Egypt's membership in the Arab League and moving the Arab League's headquarters from Egypt to Tunisia. The study ended by showing the reactions to the signing of the Camp David Accords and the Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty.

6. **Jad, Dr. Emad, (1999). Palestine.. The Territory and People. Cairo, the Center for Political and Strategic Studies:**

This study revised the history of the Arab-Israeli conflict, concentrating on the period since 1967 War till Oslo 1993. By explaining the aspects of the regional ambience in the Arab World during the peace process, it reaches the Madrid Conference and the Oslo Agreement as main advancements on the way to peace between the Palestinians and the Israelis. In addition to the regional ambience, the study focused on the international ambience at that time which was marked by important political events, like the Second Gulf War and the collapse of the former USSR. Moreover, it proceeded to tackle the unjust consequences of the

Oslo Agreement on the Palestinian people represented in ignoring the Palestinians' rights.

**7. Nofal, Mamdouh, (1995). The Oslo Story. (First ed.) Amman, Al Ahliya Publishers:**

The main concern of this study was to write down the minutes of the secret negotiations that took place between the Israelis and Palestinians in Oslo, Norway, in 1992 and 1993. This study aimed at telling what had happened in Oslo and showing the internal interactions of what was being cooked there. In its parts, the study has approached the Oslo Accords since the way was paved to secret negotiations with the Israelis through citing all the details of the negotiations starting from accepting to negotiate secretly in Oslo and ending with the signing and the mutual PLO-Israeli recognition.

- **Methodology of the Study:**

- Sampling Design and Research Methodology:**

Once data are collected, the information gathered either from primary or secondary resources will be analyzed and validated through many techniques: historical, descriptive, analytical, and comparative analysis by describing the events, analyzing them, then comparing the main perspectives of each negotiation to reach a conclusion that supports or is against the hypothesis.

**-Data Collection Method:**

Two main sources of data collection will be used to reach the expected result of the study:

1. **Primary sources** through main references to get the information needed like the texts of the two settlements, books, articles, and previous studies in the same field.
2. **Secondary sources** through using many references that treated the main topics of the thesis (negotiations, the Camp David and Oslo Accords) like books, magazines, articles, and websites which treated the main topics of the thesis directly and indirectly to identify the main concepts of the study.

## Chapter I: Negotiations

Since the creation, people have had many conflicts and fights over thousands and thousands of issues, some of which were solved peacefully, while others were solved violently. Others were never solved, may be left for time to cure it.

From the daily experiences, it is realized that solving conflicts peacefully is the best and most desired way, as everyone seeks to achieve his/ her goals without being harmed, and in some cases, with the minimum losses possible. Such point is accomplished through only one method that proved its efficiency through history. It is through the negotiations.

“Negotiation” in simple words is the art of getting what you want from someone who has the power to give it to you<sup>1</sup>. Nevertheless, negotiation as a concept has been dealt with by many scholars who gave it so much space in their writings, talking about its meanings and importance, strategies and styles which are known in the negotiation field for negotiators.

In part I, the concern will be defining negotiation as the core of diplomacy.

The following parts will tackle the negotiation process and strategies.

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<sup>1</sup> Western Organization of Resource Councils. (1998). **How to Negotiate**. (No. 16). Washington D.C.

### Part I: Definitions and Concepts

Long time ago, many scholars realized the importance of the negotiation as a peaceful means to solve or settle conflicts. One of them is Iklé (1964), who defined negotiations as “*a process in which explicit proposals are put forward ostensibly for the purpose of reaching agreement on an exchange or on the realization of a common interest where conflicting interests are present.*”<sup>1</sup>

Barston (1989) sees the negotiation as “*an attempt to explore and reconcile conflicting positions in order to reach an acceptable outcome...the purpose of negotiation is the identification of areas of common interests and conflict.*”<sup>2</sup>

Steven P. Cohen (2004) visualizes the negotiation as “*episodes of fruitful collaboration or partnership*”<sup>3</sup>: “*Negotiation is often a series of episodes, which means that considering your counterpart as a partner or a collaborator is the foundation of trusting and fruitful –and ongoing– negotiation. How the game is played matters more than who wins.*”

The Political Dictionary defines negotiations as one of the diplomatic methods to conclude a friendly settlement between two states or more by exchanging opinions to reach a solution upon which all parties participating in this negotiations agree ... comprehensively, negotiations are conducted between states primarily to organize any legal relation between them, even if there is no precedent conflict that requires a settlement or solution<sup>4</sup>.

Hassan Al Hassan (1993) sees the negotiation in means of dialogue and discussion. He says that negotiating over something is the dialogue and discussion between two parties about a specific topic to reach an agreement<sup>5</sup>, and that negotiating is to be involved in a dialogue or

<sup>1</sup> Iklé, Fred Charles, (1964). **How Nations Negotiate**. New York: Harper & Row Publishers, p. 3.

<sup>2</sup> Barston, R. P., (1989). **Modern Diplomacy**, (2<sup>nd</sup> ed.). London: Longman, p. 75.

<sup>3</sup> Cohen, Steven P., (2004). Negotiation is not a Competitive Sport. **Ivey Business Journal**, 68, (6), 1-6.p. 1.

<sup>4</sup> Atiyyat Allah, Ahmad, (1968). **Al Qamoos Assiyassy**. (1<sup>st</sup> ed.). Cairo: Dar Annahda Al Arabiyya. p. 1201.

<sup>5</sup> Al Hassan, Hassan, (1993). **Attafawod wa Al Alaqat Al Amma**. (1<sup>st</sup> ed.). Beirut: Al Moassasa Al Jami'yya Lil Dirasat. p. 11.



a discussion with a party or more in order to reach an agreement satisfying to all negotiating parties, and guarantee the minimum acceptable level of gain.<sup>1</sup>

For Masalha (2005), negotiating is an active expressive situation existing between two parties or more over an issue, through which viewpoints are proposed, exchanged, brought closer, made suitable, and adapted, and through which all methods of convincing are used to maintain the existing interests, or getting a new benefit by forcing the opponent to do or not to do something within the frame of the relationship between the parties and the negotiating process toward themselves or toward the other<sup>2</sup>.

Najee Mu'alla (1992) denies the negotiations to be restricted to diplomatic fields only, but it includes the whole aspects of life. He says that many people think negotiations present a concept only applicable on international or industrial relations... the concept of negotiation covers all our life as each one of us makes a dialogue and negotiate in different positions. In reality, the dialogue is the essence of our life. It is the interaction and adaptation that add to our life as humans the context and the human sense<sup>3</sup>.

Generally, considering the previous definitions of negotiation, the following points can be deduced:

1. Negotiation is **not restricted** to any field; it can not be only used in diplomacy, but also in other fields of social life.
2. A great importance is given to the **partners** in the negotiations.
3. Negotiation is a stage on the way to **solving or settling** a conflict.

<sup>1</sup> Ibid, pp. 11+12

<sup>2</sup> Al Masalha, Mohammad, (2005). **Adiplomassiya Attafawodiyya fi Attajriba Al Urdoniyya**. (1<sup>st</sup>. ed.) Amman: the Parliamentary Studies Center. p. 21

<sup>3</sup> Mu'alla, Najee, (1992). **Attafawod: Al Estratijiyya Wa Al Asaleeb**. (1<sup>st</sup> ed.), Zahran Publishing. p. 1+2

4. What is wanted after negotiation is to reach an **acceptable outcome** for all parties involved.
5. It is a method to show what a party has in a **peaceful way**, listen to others, and take the action which seems suitable.

More specifically, all the previous definitions share some important components of the negotiating process. Without such components, the process can not go on or even start.

They are:

- 1) All the definitions agree on the idea that there must be an issue to negotiate for or about, or in other words, a point where interests of the parties involved come across, either by being common interests, or by being issues of conflict<sup>1</sup>.
- 2) Having the “will” to negotiate is very important. Willingness of the parties to negotiate is the motivator for the negotiating process as it maintains a desire to push the process forward to achieve its goals. Masalha puts it in the following equation<sup>2</sup>:

$$\boxed{\text{Willingness}} + \boxed{\text{Negotiator's Special Ability}} = \boxed{\text{Special Negotiating Performance}}$$

- 3) There must be a strategy or method negotiators or parties involved follow in order to play their role in the negotiation process successfully. The negotiation strategies are the concern of Part III.
- 4) Reaching an outcome with the minimum losses and maximum benefits is the objective of the negotiation process. Parties go for negotiation as they wish to reach

<sup>1</sup> Iklé, Fred Charles, (1964). **How Nations Negotiate**. Op.cit, p. 2

<sup>2</sup> Al Masalha, Mohammad, **Adiplomassiya Attafawodiyya fi Attajriba Al Urdoniyya**, Op.cit, p. 23

the point where they feel they are satisfied with the outcome, pushed and motivated by the willingness and the determination to do so.

After revising the definitions, it is vital here to study why negotiation is sought by negotiators to solve or settle a conflict, and to know the reasons to why we need o negotiate in our daily life.

## Part II: Why to Negotiate?


Why to negotiate is a topic that implies the following question: why is negotiation important? In answering that, Charles Iklé in his book How Nations Negotiate gives a big space to talk about relating the negotiation process to the outcome by stressing the two elements which “must normally be present for negotiation to take place.” Accordingly, the reasons for negotiation can be both: **common interests** (to negotiate for), and **issues of conflict** (to negotiate about). In this sense, it is important to distinguish between **identical common interests** and **complementary interests** as two different kinds of common interests. Iklé explains<sup>1</sup>: *“In the identical common interests, the parties want to share the same object or benefit from the same arrangement, which however, they bring about only by joining together.”*

In complementary interests, interests of parties complement each other, and this means they can not obtain them unless they grant them to each other. Negotiation here is the key.

In identical common interests, parties have to agree on the characteristics of the object they want and discuss the costs and gains. This can not be done but through negotiation. In the same manner, negotiation functions as an excellent way to expose what a party has, exchange what it needs, and then leave with satisfaction. What is left to say, however; is that most negotiation may involve a combination of identical common interests and complementary interests. The reasons to negotiate are demonstrated in figure 1.1:

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<sup>1</sup> Iklé, Fred Charles, **How Nations Negotiate**. Op.cit, p. 2



**Figure 1.1: Reasons for negotiation according to Iklé**

In a simple way, the main reason for why to negotiate is to get some or all what is wanted – to get concessions from a decision-maker, and to make a deal<sup>1</sup>.

More specifically, Iklé goes further by classifying the aims or objectives of government in international negotiation into five types<sup>2</sup>:

- a. Extension agreements: to prolong existing arrangements which are acceptable to the parties involved- as in extension of tariff agreement. **Example**: Renewal of cultural exchange agreements between the United States and the Soviet Union.
- b. Normalization agreements: to terminate the abnormal or to formalize arrangements arrived at- as stop fighting through a cease fire or truce, to reestablish diplomatic relations, or to end a temporary occupation in exchange of a military alliance and regularize other post-war uncertainties through a peace treaty. **Example**: Negotiations between Egypt, Israel, and UN mediators on the armistice of 1949.

<sup>1</sup> Western Organization of Resource Councils. (1998). **How to Negotiate**, Op.cit.

<sup>2</sup> Iklé, Fred Charles, **How Nations Negotiate**. Op.cit, p. 26

- c. Redistribution agreements: these agreements are characterized by a demand of an offensive side for a change in its favor at the expense of a defensive side. The change consists of a new distribution of a territory, political influence, institutional powers and rights, economic, and military assets. So what the offensive side gains, the defensive loses, hence the offensive side couples its demands with a threat to causing worse consequences if the demand is refused. **Example:** The Munich agreement and its sequel in March 1939, when the President Hácha of Czechoslovakia was forced to surrender the rest of his country to Hitler.
- d. Innovation agreements: to deal with the setting up of new relations or obligations between the parties with the founding of new institutions, or with a new arrangement for controlling objects and areas. The change works to the advantage of all parties concerned (unlike redistribution) though not necessarily to equal advantage. **Example:** Treaties of Rome to set up the Common Market.
- e. Side Effects: these are interested in results such as propaganda, intelligence, or dissuading the opponent from the use of force. The very process of negotiation can have important effects which do not concern agreements. These “side effects” may be one of the reasons –or the only reason- why governments engage in diplomatic talks. It may provide the motive –not only to go on with the negotiation started by others, but even to initiate negotiations. **For example**, the negotiation process can launch propaganda, produce intelligence, or modify political attitudes of non-participants. They also may arise either by accident or by design of one party or all parties involved. These side effects have six types as follows<sup>1</sup>:
1. A main type is to keep in touch with the opponent (maintaining contacts).

<sup>1</sup> Ibid, p. 43

2. Another is substituting the violent action. It makes the violent party think that violence will cause the opponent to break off the talks, and that continued talks are more profitable than making gains through the use of force.
3. Intelligence. The process of negotiation may be used to gather information about the opponent. In some cases, the information obtained can be more important than the way under which the issues are settled.
4. Deception. It is the opposite of intelligence. Here we have to distinguish deception as a technique from deception as a side effect:
  - Deception as a technique is unavoidable in certain negotiation when your opponent offers you some good terms so that you would rather accept them than be without agreement. Here, if you still want your opponent to make you a better offer, you may have to deceive him/her into believing that you would prefer having no agreement to accepting his/ her offer.
  - Side effect of negotiation may serve other foreign policy objectives or military moves. It may have the opposite aim: instead of gaining time to prepare one's own use of force, such deception may have the purpose of diverting another country from using force until the opportunity has passed.
5. Propaganda. Like intelligence and deception in being either a technique to get good terms of agreement or a side effect of negotiation which serves other foreign policy objectives, propaganda has three aspects<sup>1</sup>:

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<sup>1</sup> Ibid, p. 52

- a) Negotiating to have a sounding board: it mainly occur at high level conferences and summit meetings to publicize government's views and policy goals.
  - b) Negotiating to gain prestige or publicity: some governments feel that their policies and names will be enhanced by attending international conferences or summit meetings, even though nothing of substance is decided. In this case, negotiation is thought to be desirable not only because it may prevent conflict by producing an agreement, but because the process of negotiation is believed to help maintain contact and provide a substitute for violent action, if agreement is in sight.
  - c) Negotiating to show rectitude: such aspect presents the wish of some governments to sound or appear good by engaging in a good activity.
6. Impact on third parties. Ongoing negotiations between two powers that belong to opposing alliances can have an impact on other allies who feel left out. Even though there is no agreement, the very face that negotiation takes place may be enough to stir up fears among some allies that a "deal" might be made at their expense.

As previously said, negotiation is seen as the only way to bridge the gap between the parties in reaching their identical common interests, and/ or realizing their complementary interests. From this point, the importance of negotiation springs to assure that parties, in order to reach their goals, should negotiate, and without it, no outcome is peacefully reached.



### Part III: Negotiating Strategies

In order to negotiate effectively, there must be a strategy the negotiator follows to plan her/his actions and try to “win” by accomplishing his/ her party’s goals (or some of them). According to this, how would a strategy be defined?

The Political Dictionary<sup>1</sup> says that “strategy” is a word of Greek origin that means the art or science of general leadership at war, i.e. all the requirements necessary to achieve victory.

A strategy can also be defined as a “*long-term action plan for achieving a goal*”<sup>2</sup>. Another definition implies a long- term plan of actions “*designed to achieve a particular goal, as differentiated from tactics or immediate actions with resources at hand*”<sup>3</sup>.

Al Hassan agrees that a strategy is a major need in any project related to certain goals. He says that the word "strategy" was used in every project related to reaching certain aims. In other words, a strategy is the means that depends on the correct harmonization and appreciation of the goal and the available means, as it is necessary to have the goal in harmony with the means, and also, every means is used to reach minor goals should be in consistence with these goals<sup>4</sup>.

Generally, a strategy can be defined as a plan to be followed in order to achieve a certain point wished to be reached to through negotiation, taking into consideration that this plan or method is the way to reach the aims, which, if applied correctly in accordance with the aim, the atmosphere, parties, and circumstances of the negotiation, may guarantee reaching the wanted goals.

<sup>1</sup> Atiyyat Allah, Ahmad. **Al Qamoos Assiyassy**. Op.cit, p. 54

<sup>2</sup> Words' definitions. Retrieved June 17, 2006, from <http://www.investorwords.com/4775/Strategy.html>

<sup>3</sup> Words' definitions. Retrieved June 17, 2006, from <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Strategy>


<sup>4</sup> Al Hassan, Hassan. **Attafawod wa Al Alaqt Al Amma**. Op.cit, pp. 28+29

In this sense, Najee Mu'alla<sup>1</sup> differentiates between strategies and goals by connecting strategies with the means, and linking goals to the final points (endings), therefore; mixing between goals and means will lead to mixing between strategies and ends, and could eventually lead to a misbehavior and wrong decision-making. He ends to say that a strategy is a means to fulfill the goals, and it is not the goal itself. It signals the way(s) to achieve the goal, keeping in mind that clear well-defined goals and good analysis of the situation are not sufficient to replace an effective strategy through which accomplishing the goals and turning them into real would be possible.

It is important when talking about strategies to understand why a strategy is needed in negotiations, and how a strategy is selected to be adopted during the course of the negotiating process. Thus, to understand that, we need to know the following:

◆ The Advantage of Having a Strategy:

There are four concerns that could be termed as the strategic issues in the discipline of strategic planning. These concerns can also be defined as the elements that have a major impact on the strategy being adopted<sup>2</sup>:



**Figure 1.2:** Elements affecting the choice of a strategy

<sup>1</sup> Mu'alla, Najee. **Attafawod: Al Estratijiyya Wa Al Asaleeb**. Op.cit, p. 74

<sup>2</sup> Lewicki, Roy J., Hiam, Alexander, and Olander, Karen, (1996). **Think Before You Speak**. New York: J. Wiley, p. 34

In building up a strategy for negotiation, one of the important elements which must be taken into consideration is how much information is available. This can make a big difference in the sense that the negotiation process per se is a vehicle for obtaining information about the other side, its goals, constraints, strategies, and perceptions. The question here is: how can we plan for negotiations and gather information about the other side?

In their book *Think Before You Speak*, Lewicki et al. (1996) set five important requirements to plan strategically for negotiations<sup>1</sup>:

- 1) Know your goals by clarifying them.
- 2) Anticipate the other party's goals.
- 3) Do your homework.
- 4) Understand the negotiation process.
- 5) Design a strategy to manage the negotiation process and reach a resolution.

What the authors want to say here is that these strategic issues are answered differently each time, the thing that requires having a different strategy each time because applying the same approach all the time and in every case can not be really sufficient. The approaches must vary as required by the circumstances so as to optimize the personal performance in all negotiations. The key word here is flexibility. Choosing the right strategy will make a big difference.

It is important for anyone who is getting ready to negotiate to know that success in any negotiation depends on planning the strategy ahead of time with everyone who will be in the same team negotiating. Moreover, it is important to be prepared with the facts and logic

<sup>1</sup> Ibid, p. 5

as they are necessary elements in preparing for the negotiation and choosing the suitable strategy<sup>1</sup>.

◆ Selecting a Strategy:

The process of selecting a suitable strategy to negotiate is a very important one. Although it may be lengthy, the preparations allow negotiating strategically<sup>2</sup>. If people skip these preparations, the result will be failure. Thus, a primary goal of negotiation strategy is to strengthen one's bargaining position<sup>3</sup>.

As mentioned earlier, choosing the appropriate strategy varies, depending on the positions of the parties and context of the negotiation. That is why dealing with different cases must be one by one, as what applies to one may not be necessarily applicable to the other. In this sense, and after assessing the one's position and the other parties' position, there are two main factors which determine how to choose the strategy in accordance with Lewicki et al.<sup>4</sup>:

- 1- The relationship concerns (the relationship with the other party).
- 2- The outcome concerns (of the negotiation itself).

By determining which concern is more important, one would be choosing a suitable strategy for the negotiated case. Chances of a good outcome are better if both parties agree to play the same rules.

1) Relationship Concerns:

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<sup>1</sup> Western Organization of Resource Councils. (1998). **How to Negotiate**, Op.cit.

<sup>2</sup> Lewicki, Hiam, and Olander, **Think Before You Speak**. Op.cit, p. 54

<sup>3</sup> New York Comptroller G Bulletin, (1987). **Arts and Techniques of Negotiation**. (No. G-68). New York.

<sup>4</sup> Lewicki, Hiam, and Olander, **Think Before You Speak**. Op.cit, p. 54

The importance of a relationship between all parties will be affected by:

- Whether there is a relation at all.
- Whether the relationship is negative or positive.
- Whether the future relationship is desirable.
- The length of the relationship and its history (if existed).
- The level and the commitment to the relationship.
- The amount and extent of free open communication between the parties.

2) Outcome Concerns<sup>1</sup>:

There are five different strategies that emerge in relation to the different levels of concern and for the relationship and the outcome:

- a) **Avoiding** (lose-lose): this is either by withdrawing from active negotiation or by avoiding negotiation entirely. This is used when neither outcome nor relationship are important to pursue the conflict further.
- b) **Accommodating** (lose to win): this is used when the importance of the relationship is high and the outcome is low. One party intentionally loses to win the relationship dimension.
- c) **Competitive** (win to lose): this is used when there is a high concern for the outcome and a low one for the relationship. A party must win at all costs and does not care for the future of the relationship.
- d) **Collaborative** (win-win): there is a high concern of both the outcome and the relationship. A party must try to maximize the outcome while preserving and enhancing the relationship.

<sup>1</sup> Ibid, p. 56

- e) **Compromising** (split the difference): this is used when the parties can not achieve a good collaboration but still want to achieve some outcomes and/ or preserve relationship, in addition, when parties are under time pressure element and need a resolution quickly.

The following table shows the connection between the relationship and outcome concerns with the strategies:

Table 1.1 “The relation between the concerns of outcome and relationship with strategic choice”

Strategy	Concerns		
	Outcome	and/ or	Relationship
Avoiding	Low	and	Low
Accommodating	Low	and	High
Competitive	High	and	Low
Collaborative	High	and	High
Compromising	High	or	High

However, Pruitt (1991) sees the case a bit differently. In his article *Strategic Choice in Negotiation*<sup>1</sup> Pruitt discusses four basic negotiation strategies, factors which affect the choice of a strategy, and how the choice of that strategy affects the negotiation’s outcome.

The four basic strategies are:

1. Problem solving.
2. Contending.

<sup>1</sup> Pruitt, Dean, (1991). Strategic Choice in Negotiation. In: Breslin, J. William, and Rubin, Jeffery Z., (Eds.), **Negotiation Theory and Practice**, (pp. 27-46). Cambridge: The Program on Negotiation at Harvard Law School. p. 27

3. Yielding.
4. Inaction.

Pruitt's four basic strategies are almost similar to those of Lewicki, Hiam, and Olander's as the problem solving meets with the collaborative strategy; the contending meets with the competitive; and yielding meets with the accommodating. Pruitt, however, sees a withdrawal strategy as a fifth strategy, while Lewicki, Hiam, and Olander see a "no strategy" as a sixth choice among their suggested strategies.

To explain more, it is necessary to know when to use or apply each strategy. According to Lewicki, Olander, and Hiam in *Think Before You Speak*, the strategies are used as follows<sup>1</sup>:

- The Avoiding Strategy: this strategy can be applied when:
  1. Negotiation can be costly in time, money and relationships, and in some cases it is better off if parties leave the whole process.
  2. A party can pursue a very strong alternative outcome.
- The Accommodating Strategy: this strategy is used when:
  1. Parties care about the relation more than the outcome.
  2. Parties may want something else in the future (a short-term loss is exchanged with a long-term gain).
  3. Parties want to encourage a more inter-dependent relationship or improve the existing relationship.
  4. Pursing the outcome is likely to create too much tension.

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<sup>1</sup> Lewicki, Hiam, and Olander, *Think Before You Speak*. Op.cit, p. 58

o The Competitive Strategy:

In such a strategy, the outcome of the negotiation is more important than the relationship, as the outcomes are seen as finite and limited in amount or size. The result would be having the party involved in this strategy wanted to get as much of those outcomes as possible. The strategy is called (win to lose) because it is likely that while competitors may gain the outcome, the relationship of the parties is endangered. It may come to the mind to ask why the relationship with the other party is not important. The authors reply<sup>1</sup>:

- 1) The negotiation could be a one-time negotiation with no future relationship.
- 2) The future relationship may not be so important.
- 3) The relationship does really exist, but it is too poor to begin with.
- 4) The other party may have a reputation for hard bargaining or dishonesty.

This strategy tends to promote differences between the parties, stressing the “we/they” attitude, in addition to achieve the goal of getting the other party to give in, and thus, to satisfy the competitors’ needs (based on I win, you lose concept).

Although such strategy could be tempting to those who like to practice power in these deals, the competitive strategy has some critical factors which minimize its efficiency as a plan to negotiate. These factors in as Chapter Five<sup>2</sup> of their book are:

- 1- **A well-defined bargaining range:** in a competitive strategy, each party has a bargaining range which consists of a starting point, a target, and an ending point or “walk away” (high aspiration point and a resistance point). Bargaining occurs

<sup>1</sup> Ibid, p. 61

<sup>2</sup> Ibid, p. 54



because the bargaining range for each party is different. During bargaining, an attempt to bring the two ranges into overlap is made so that each party is satisfied. As long as the bargaining for one party in some way overlaps with that of the other party, then there will be a room for bargaining. If the ranges do not overlap, then there will be no successful negotiation. The parties will need to decide whether to adjust their bargaining ranges or to end negotiations.

- 2- **A good alternative:** an alternative is an option that can be pursued if the current negotiations fail. It is good to have alternatives because they can be weighed against the value of any particular outcome from this negotiation. Alternatives interact with walkaway points to influence the choices made.

Similarly, Lax and Sebenius (1991)<sup>1</sup> argue that parties' alternatives to a negotiated agreement play a large role in shaping the negotiation. They note that much of the negotiation literature focuses on tactics used within negotiations to optimize a party's outcome. These approaches tend to treat the range of possible negotiated outcomes as fixed, and focus on helping parties to achieve the best settlement from within that fixed range. This range of possible negotiated settlements is shaped by the various alternatives to negotiation available to the parties. The authors state that changes in parties' alternatives to negotiation may have a greater effect on the outcome than tactics used within the negotiations.

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<sup>1</sup> Lax, David, and Sebenius, James, (1991). The Power of Alternatives or the Limits to Negotiate. In: Breslin, J. William, and Rubin, Jeffery Z., (Eds.), **Negotiation Theory and Practice**, (97-114). Cambridge: The Program on Negotiation at Harvard Law School. p. 97

3- **Tactics:** there is a number of tactics used in the competitive strategy to enhance the competitors' position, and place the other party at a disadvantage. These include bluffing, being aggressive, and threatening. Steven P. Cohen says<sup>1</sup>:

*"...bluffing, for example, needs to be contrasted with lying. It is similar to the distinction between positional ("My way or the highway"<sup>2</sup>) bargaining and interest-based negotiation."* Cohen went explaining by mentioning that when one tells a lie to mislead the other party, and if his/her lie is detected, he/ she will lose its credibility and has to live with the consequences, while, however, a negotiator may bluff another party, not by saying something that is false, but by risking proposals and being prepared to accept the consequences of his/ her deed. This supports the fact that such tactics can potentially backfire on the person using them, so they must be employed correctly. The purpose of these tactics is to manipulate the other party into thinking that this settlement is the best possible<sup>3</sup>.

Tactics can be of some commitments, such as:

- a) Threats and promises (if you \_\_\_\_\_, then I will \_\_\_\_\_).
- b) Final offers: they are declarations that one party has made all the concessions it could make, and the rest is left to the other side to move by accepting or leaving. It should be stated explicitly.
- c) Getting out of commitments: if one party feels stuck with a commitment it has made, a way can be used to "uncommit" by either: 1) saying that the situation has changed and new circumstances or information appeared; 2) letting it die

<sup>1</sup> Cohen, Steven P. **Negotiation is not a Competitive Sport**, Op.cit, p. 5

<sup>2</sup> By saying that, a party puts itself in a position it can not get out of without losing face.

<sup>3</sup> Lewicki, Hiam, and Olander, **Think Before You Speak**. Op.cit, p. 91

quietly; and 3) changing the statement to more general terms. That is why the language of the commitment should be used carefully.

- d) Hardball: this aims at putting pressure on the other party, yet it may work against those who are poorly prepared. It starts by giving an extreme offer and refusing to make concessions, making tough demands, and making the final efforts.
- e) The good guy/ bad guy (or it is called: good cop, bad cop<sup>1</sup>): this implies the existence of two individuals of the same side at the negotiating table: one is the bad (hard and tough) who takes a very hard line; the other is the good (soft). The first talks when the negotiation falters. The latter takes over with a more moderate proposal when things seem so hard. The tactic is disadvantageous because:
- a. It is usually obvious and known.
  - b. It alienates the other party.
  - c. Energy is spent on the tactic rather than the negotiation per se.
- f) High ball/ low ball: this tactic is either to make a very high or a very low ridiculous first offer depending on the situation. This aims at forcing the other party to reassess its position.
- g) Bogey: this is used to pretend that an issue is important when it really is not. To use it, you have to:
1. Know the priorities of the other party.

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<sup>1</sup> Western Organization of Resource Councils. (1998). **How to Negotiate**, Op.cit.

2. Pretend that something is very important when it is not to make it difficult and confusing.
- h) Nibble: applying this tactic, the party waits until the end of the proceedings, when everything is almost ready and decided, then asks for something that was never been brought up before.
- i) Chicken: it is used to bluff and threaten to get the wanted goal. The objective is to hold the grounds and intimidate the other party into giving way so winning is achieved. Still, it has two problems:
1. It has a very high stake (risky) waiting for the other party to cower.
  2. A party must be willing to keep on its threat.
- j) Intimidation and aggressiveness: it is used to force an agreement using real or feigned anger, formal documents such as contracts forcing certain responses or postures, and pressing someone to do something by appealing to his/ her sense of guilt. Or it could be by aggressive behaviors such as being pushy, attacking others' views, and asking for explanations of positions.
- k) Deadlines, scheduling, and delays: scheduling can affect the outcome of the negotiation. For example, if a final negotiation session is scheduled for the hour before the other party's plane departs, this may have a strong effect on the outcome. Such situations could be taken as an advantage by manipulating the schedule to affect the course and outcome of negotiations. Also, not showing up on time, delaying, asking for a research for the proceedings, postponing a

meeting, and talking endlessly about different issues can all be used as long as they do not result in breaking down the negotiation.

- l) Manipulating the other party's impression of the outcome by using body language, showing up so many issues to confuse others so they will not know which the important issues are, exaggerating information, and giving only the facts necessary to the main point of view.
- m) Making the costs of negotiation seem higher.
- n) Manipulating the actual costs of delay or end negotiation.
- o) Use emotional tactics.
- p) Ally with outsiders: to threaten to talk to other groups (political action groups or protest groups) may prod the other party to action. Cohen sees it as a “coalition building”<sup>1</sup>. He says that it is important in multi-party, multi-negotiation negotiation: “*Finding out which other parties are likely to be supportive of one's own interests, what it will take to bring about other parties buy-in to an agreement, may well lead divisions among the parties to a potential agreement.*” In the same article, Cohen states clearly that such action “could raise the risk of some feeling of competition”.

However, using the competitive strategy has some results and drawbacks like:

1. It is costly and time consuming.
2. Time and good-will may be lost.
3. It may be used by inexperienced and untrained negotiators.
4. It is possible to under-estimate the other parties in a competitive situation.

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<sup>1</sup> Cohen, Steven P. **Negotiation is not a Competitive Sport**, Op.cit, p. 6

5. It is a self-filling prophecy (believing in something so much that we actually make it true).

○ The Collaborative Strategy (win-win):

This strategy differs from the previous ones. Both parties here are concerned about winning as they consider the relationship and the outcome to be equally important<sup>1</sup>. The parties, when adopting this strategy, must start with the compatible goals. In addition to this, they must be willing to collaborate among them in order for it to work. What is meant by willingness here is that much of work to be done while both parties “collaborate” or cooperate with each other. This means there should be a high degree of trust, openness, and cooperation. Collaboration also means that parties must work together to find a solution that will benefit all sides<sup>2</sup>. In order to cooperate, they have to respect deadlines and be willing to re-negotiate the time frame if necessary to achieve their goals. Thus, commitment, providing free flow of information, and achieving mutual goals by minimizing the differences and emphasizing the similarities are main factors in the collaborative strategy.

Chapter Seven of Lewicki, Hiam, and Olander’s book talks in details about implementing a collaborative strategy<sup>3</sup>. This strategy has four major steps:

1. **Identify the problem** by defining it as a common goal, and keeping that definition as simple as possible, using a neutral and impersonal language.

<sup>1</sup> Check out Table 1.1 on page 26.

<sup>2</sup> Kaczmarek, Dave S., (2001). Hold the Winning Hand: Tips on Negotiating to the satisfaction of all parties. **Materials Management in Health Care**, 10, (11), p. 22

<sup>3</sup> Lewicki, Hiam, and Olander, **Think Before You Speak**. Op.cit, p, 99

Creativity is a key factor here. Options can be created to benefit both parties<sup>1</sup>.

2. **Understand the problem** by looking at it from a broader perspective. It is important too to learn about the needs, fears, and concerns of every party involved.

3. **Generate alternative solutions:** this can be done through:

a. *Redefining the problem by:*

- i. Expanding the pie, so each party can obtain the desired end.
- ii. Logrolling: making some concessions by one party could be possible if there are two issues in the negotiations, and each party has a different priority to them.
- iii. Offering non-specific compensation: to pay off the other party for giving in on an issue. This may be monetary, and may not be related to the negotiations.
- iv. Cut costs: here one party accomplishes specific cooperatives and the others' costs are minimized by going along with the agreement. This is different from the previous one in that the other party can minimize costs and "suffering", while in the previous the costs and suffering do not go away but the party is somehow compensated. This requires a clear understanding of the other party's needs, preferences, and costs.
- v. Bridge: here, the parties invent new options that meet each others' needs. Again, both parties must be familiar with the other party's interests and needs.

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<sup>1</sup> Kaczmarek, **Hold the Winning Hand: Tips on Negotiating to the satisfaction of all parties**. Op.cit, p. 23

b. *Generating a list of solutions*: what is important here is to list as many solutions as possibly one can without evaluating them. They should be general rather than specific, and they should not favor one party over the other. At a later stage, each solution can be evaluated to determine which solution is the most adequate to solve the problem. Actually, there are many ways to generate ideas for solutions, such as:

- 1) Brainstorming.
- 2) Piggybacking (building on someone's idea).
- 3) Nominal groups (generating and working on solutions in small groups).
- 4) Surveys (distributing a questionnaire stating the problem and asking to list possible solutions).

When generating the list of solutions, it is important to prioritize the options and reduce the list till the more favored solution is reached to.

4. **Select a solution**: at this point, and according to the prioritization of the solutions on the list (done in the previous step), the evaluation of the solutions starts, depending on equality and acceptability. After that, the selection process starts.

In order to be able to apply those steps successfully, negotiators should create common goals or objectives among the parties involved, maintain confidence in their ability to solve the problem, value the other party's opinion, share the motivation and commitment to working together, and trust each other.



Although this strategy looks shining and tempting, there are some obstacles hindering it: if one party does not see the solution as having the potential for collaboration, if one party is only motivated to accomplish its own ends, if one party has historically been competitive, if this party is unwilling to collaborate, or if the negotiation or bargaining may include both competitive and collaborative issues.

○ The Compromising Strategy:

Applying this strategy is suitable for more occasions because both parties gain something at the end, and it does not require all the intentional efforts required for collaboration. There are three major reasons for using the compromising strategy:

1. When a true collaborative strategy does not seem to be possible because it is too complex or too difficult, or the relationship may already be too strained to the parties to work together.
2. When the parties are short of time or other critical resources necessary to get to collaboration.
3. When both parties gain something (do not lose anything) on both dimensions.

Those five strategies are what the negotiators may follow in their relations according to Lewicki et al. Their strategies are “ideal and pure”<sup>1</sup> negotiating situations when there may only be one issue at stake, while in real life negotiation, situations are more complex, and thus they are often best dealt with by using a combination of strategies.

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<sup>1</sup> Lewicki , Hiam, and Olander, **Think Before You Speak**. Op.cit, p. 58

In the same sense, Mu'alla<sup>1</sup> thinks that depending on one strategy to negotiate is not possible as it may imply many potential dangers. Having one strategy means that the other party will move in one way and this is of course wrong. If more than one strategy is available, it will be the suitable tactic in responding to other potential different moves. He goes on saying that it is necessary that a negotiator should have a group of what is called “contingency strategies” which can be used in accordance with the necessities of the negotiation process.

To realize the difference between the strategies of Lewicki and the strategies of Pruitt, here is a look on Pruitt's strategies. These strategies can usually be adopted one at a time, while combinations are possible, too, the thing that meets with the former model of strategies (that of Lewicki et al.). In this sense, Pruitt says: *“These strategies are somewhat incompatible because they require different psychological orientations and tend to send out contradictory signals to the other party.”*<sup>2</sup>

### **(1) The Problem Solving Strategy<sup>3</sup>:**

This strategy seeks to reconcile the parties' aspiration. Its tactics include expanding the pie (increasing the available resources), cost cutting (compensation), logrolling (exchanging concessions on low priority issues), and bridging (creating a new mutually beneficial options). The advantage of these tactics is that “they yield the best outcomes”. Mutually beneficial outcomes are more acceptable as they improve the parties' relationship, and benefit the wider society.

<sup>1</sup> Mu'alla, Najee. **Attafawod: Al Estratijiyya Wa Al Asaleeb**. Op.cit, p. 76

<sup>2</sup> Pruitt, **Strategic Choice in Negotiation**. Op.cit, p. 27

<sup>3</sup> Ibid, pp. 27-30

Pruitt tackles the policy of "firm flexibility". It means that parties must be firm about their aspirations or goals, but must be flexible regarding the means used to reach these goals.

The risk of problem solving strategy is that it may backfire if others pursue a contentious strategy.

**(2) The Contending Strategy:**

This strategy seeks to persuade the other party to agree on a solution that favors one's own interests. It has also been called the positional bargaining. Contentious tactics include inflated demands (demands which far exceed what is actually acceptable); irrevocable commitments (unalterable positions); persuasions; and threats. This strategy tends to yield poor outcomes (or unreachable agreements), and in case outcomes are finally reached, they may be low-level compromises, or in some cases, contending may escalate the conflict.

In strategic negotiations, contention is often used as an opening strategy to be replaced by problem solving at a later stage. In such cases, the early use of contention may still yield beneficial outcomes.

**(3) The Yielding Strategy:**

When parties yield, they reduce their aspiration. Yielding is an effective way to close the negotiation when issues are unimportant and time pressures are high. Yielding can also contribute to a successful problem solving approach. However, outcomes tend to be depressed when both parties use a yielding strategy.

**(4) The Inaction Strategy:**

It is usually used to increase time pressure on the other party as it wastes time, and sometimes, temporarily suspends negotiations.

After this quick display of both views, it is worthy to mention the methods or models each view follows to choose the adequate strategy. Lewicki, Hiam, and Olander see two key factors to be considered here<sup>1</sup>:

1. How important is the outcome to be gained from the negotiation?
2. How important is the past, present, and future relationship with the opponent?

To answer these questions, they took the coming points into consideration<sup>2</sup>:

- I. **Preferences:** it is important to choose a strategy that feels comfortable. Such preferences are influenced by subtle issues such as values and principles.
- II. **Experience:** having more experience means getting better at using a suitable strategy.
- III. **Situation:** it is important to figure out which situation is best in the current circumstances of the negotiation: one strategy could be more or less appropriate depending on the type of conflict and the situation.
- IV. **Style:** it is important to think of one's own style, and other parties' style to consider the possible consequences.
- V. **Perceptions and past experiences:** it is about trust. How were the past experiences (historically)?
- VI. **Other factors:** such as the negotiation being voluntary or imposed, or such as when the situation is highly structured with rules and laws directing the negotiations.

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<sup>1</sup> Lewicki , Hiam, and Olander, **Think Before You Speak**. Op.cit, p.69

<sup>2</sup> Ibid, p. 69

On the other hand, Pruitt develops two main models about choosing a strategy<sup>1</sup>:

- 1) The dual concern model (concern about the other's concerns and one's own concerns).
- 2) The feasibility model.

The dual concern model predicts strategy choice based on four factors: concern about both one's own and other party's outcomes (encouraging problem solving); concern about only one's own outcomes (encouraging contending); concern about only the other party's outcomes (encouraging yielding); and concern about neither party's outcomes (encouraging inaction). The table below summarizes that idea:

Table 1.2 "Pruitt's Dual Concern Model"

Concern about:		Strategy
One's own interests	The other party's interests	
✓	✓	<b>Problem Solving</b>
✓	✗	<b>Contending</b>
✗	✓	<b>Yielding</b>
✗	✗	<b>Inaction</b>

Feasibility also affects the choice of the negotiation strategy. Even though a strategy is favored by the dual concern model, it will not be employed if it is not also seen as feasible. The feasibility of problem solving strategies depends on the amount of the parties' perceived common ground (PCG), that is, how likely it seems that the parties will find a

<sup>1</sup> Pruitt, *Strategic Choice in Negotiation*. Op.cit, p. 30

mutually satisfactory solution. The PCG is greater when the parties' aspirations are low, and their confidence in their creativity is high.

Pruitt points out four factors which increase a party's PCG<sup>1</sup>:

First. Faith in own problem solving abilities.

Second. Presence of problem solving momentum (refers to prior success in reaching agreement in the current negotiation).

Third. Availability of a mediator as he/ she facilitates the communication activities.

Fourth. Presence of trust (when the trusted party has firm aspiration, the other party will generally adopt a problem solving strategy, whereas if the trusted party's aspirations seems weak, the other party will adopt a contentious strategy, expecting the trusted party to yield.)

In these terms, Snyder and Diesing (1977), in their book *Conflict Among Nations* think that any bargaining process should have three broad dimensions: **accommodative**; **coercive**; and **persuasive**<sup>2</sup>.

The accommodative dimension is the convergence of bargaining positions of the parties toward a settlement through a number of proposals such as demands, offers, and concessions. The process of accommodation toward some agreement is also the dominant image of "bargaining" in ordinary discourse. Accommodation here meets with the collaboration of Lewicki's, and the problem solving of Pruitt's.

The coercive bargaining is defined as the "*bilateral process of assertive firmness, making threats and warning, and exerting pressure in various ways to influence the other party to accept*

<sup>1</sup> Ibid p. 35

<sup>2</sup> Snyder, Glenn H., and Diesing, Paul, (1977). **Conflict Among Nations**. New Jersey: Princeton University Press. p. 195

*one's will or one's latest bid.*". Generally speaking, coercion is the unilateral exercise of power by one party over another who may respond by yielding or not. This meets with Lewicki's competition, and Pruitt's contention. Table 3.1 demonstrates where the strategies of Lewicki, Pruitt, and Snyder meet:

Table 1.3 "The common points in Olander, Pruitt, and Snyder's strategies"

Olander, Hiam, & Lewicki	Pruitt	Snyder & Diesing
Collaboration	Problem Solving	Accommodation
Competition	Contention	Coercion

However, Snyder and Diesing add another broad element to the game of bargaining, that is persuasion. In their explanation, persuasion is close to coercion in that it aims at influencing the adversary to make concessions and accept others' demands and proposals, yet it does not involve threatening other parties if they do not concede. Persuasion attempts to change the adversaries' estimates of the outcome, estimates of how one predicts the nature of the outcomes and values them.

The following table tries to point out the constraints of coercion and accommodation, and goals of both dimensions<sup>1</sup>:

Table 1.4 "Snyder & Diesing's coercion and accommodation's goals and constraints"

	GOALS	CONSTRAINTS
<i>Coercion</i>	Win (conflicting interests)	Avoid risk of war (common interests)
<i>Accommodation</i>	Settle (common interests)	Minimize losses (conflicting interests)

<sup>1</sup> Ibid, p. 208

From a different perspective, Fisher and Ury (1981), in their book *Getting to Yes*, have developed an alternative method of negotiation, which they call the “Principled Negotiation”. This method can function as a strategy in negotiation. The Principled Negotiation approach contrasts with the traditional negotiation method, which is called the “Positional Bargaining”.

In **Positional Bargaining**, each side takes a position to argue and defend, and then makes concessions to reach a compromise, whereas **Principled Negotiation** focuses on the needs or interests of the parties<sup>1</sup>.

Fisher and Ury develop four principles of negotiations<sup>2</sup> so it can be used effectively on almost any type of dispute. The principles are:

- 1) **Separate the people from the problem**, which suggests that substantive issues should be separated from relationship issues. This is because people tend to become personally involved with the issues and their sides' positions. This allows the parties to address the issues without damaging the relationships and it helps in getting a clearer view of the substantive problem.
- 2) **Focus on interests and not positions**: this principle is designed to overcome the drawback of focusing on people's stated positions when the objective of a negotiation is to satisfy their underlying interests. In this case, it is needed to identify the parties' interests regarding the issue at hand, and once the parties have identified their interests, they must discuss them together. Parties should keep a clear focus on their interests, but remain open to different proposals and positions.

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<sup>1</sup> Fisher, Roger, and Ury, William, (1981). *Getting to Yes: Negotiating Agreement Without Giving In*. New York: Penguin Books. p. 10

<sup>2</sup> Ibid, pp. 10+11



- 3) Invent options for mutual gains:** This proposes to think up a wide range of possible solutions that advance shared interests and creativity reconcile differing interests. This means that negotiators should look for new solutions to the problem that will allow them to “win”. Here, the concentration must be on the shared or common interests.
- 4) Use objective criteria:** this principle suggests that negotiators should base their agreement on some fair objective standard, especially when interests are directly opposed. Because of that, decisions based on reasonable standards make it easier for the parties to agree and preserve their good relations.

With all the explicit positives of the principled negotiations, positional bargaining, or negotiating over positions, has its positives, too. Taking position in negotiation serves some useful purposes. It tells the other party what you want, yet abiding to it and refusing to hear what others want will not end with a wise agreement<sup>1</sup>, and this is the negative point of it. So, how do Ury and Fisher envisage this? They say that arguing over positions produces unwise agreements as positional negotiators “lock themselves” into their positions. As negotiators pay extra attention to positions, less attention is devoted to meet the underlying interests of the parties, so any agreement reached here will not reflect common interests but “mechanical splitting” of the differences between final positions rather than solutions. Also, arguing over positions is insufficient and it endangers the ongoing relationship. What could make the situation worse is if the negotiation is multilateral. The more people involved in the negotiation, the more serious the drawbacks to positional bargaining. Positional bargaining is all about “I” and “you”, or “we” and “they”. As a result of that,

<sup>1</sup> Ibid, pp. 4+5

some may take a different side by being “soft” in front of the “hardness” of positional negotiators. They start to see others as friends rather than adversaries, and this is called the soft negotiating game. It was developed as a strategy to reply to the positional bargainers.

In the soft negotiating game, the standard moves are:

- Make efforts and concessions.
- Trust the other.
- Be friendly.
- Yield as necessary to avoid confrontation.

Thus, there are two styles of positional bargaining: soft and hard. This gets complicated if it is understood that pursuing a soft and friendly positional bargaining results in being vulnerable to someone who plays a hard game, as a hard game dominates a soft one.

Fisher and Ury explained the previous point in the following table<sup>1</sup>:

Table 1.5 “Ury and Fisher’s soft and hard games within the positional bargaining”

Positional Bargaining	
SOFT	HARD
Participants are <u>friends</u>	Participants are <u>adversaries</u>
The goal is <u>agreement</u>	The goal is <u>victory</u>
<u>Trust</u> others	<u>Distrust</u> others
<u>Change</u> the position easily	<u>Dig in</u> to your position
Make <u>offers</u>	Make <u>threats</u>

<sup>1</sup> Ibid, p. 9

The authors give an immediate alternative to all this, which is the principled negotiation or “negotiations on the merits”. This one is based on the previous principles (page 44 and 45) which are: people; interests; options; and criteria. This method of principled negotiation is contrasted with hard and soft positional bargaining. The authors set the differences as follows<sup>1</sup>:

Table 1.6 “The differences between Ury & Fisher’s principled negotiation and positional bargaining”

Problem		Solution
Positional bargaining: which game should you play?		Change the game: negotiate on the merits.
Soft	Hard	Principled
Participants are <u>friends</u>	Participants are <u>adversaries</u>	Participants are <u>problem solvers</u>
The goal is <u>agreement</u>	The goal is <u>victory</u>	The goal is a <u>wise outcome</u> reached efficiently and amicably
Be <u>soft</u> on the people and the problem	Be <u>hard</u> on the people and the problem	Be <u>soft</u> on the people, <u>hard</u> on the problem
<u>Change</u> your position <u>easily</u>	<u>Dig in</u> to your position	Focus on <u>interests</u> and not positions

Further more, Fisher and Ury talk about **distributive bargaining** that contrasts with **integrative bargaining**<sup>2</sup>. The former is an approach to bargaining or negotiating which is used when parties try to divide something up or distribute something, while in the latter; the parties try to make more of something. Generally speaking, integrative bargaining tends to be more cooperative, and distributive bargaining more competitive. Competitive tactics

<sup>1</sup> Ibid, p. 13

<sup>2</sup> International Online Training Program on Intractable Conflict, University of Colorado. Retrieved April 16, 2006, from <http://www.colorado.edu/conflict/peace/treatment/distbarg.htm>.

include trying to gain an advantage by insisting on negotiating in one's own home ground; having more negotiators than the other side; making threats; and trying to force the other side to give in by over-powering them or outsmarting them and not by discussing the problem as equal.

The goal in distributive bargaining is to make sure that one's own side wins as much as it can, which implies that the other side will lose automatically, or at least get less than it wanted.

Both approaches are seen as incompatible. This is because integrative bargaining is superior to distributive bargaining in most circumstances. Lax and Sebenius<sup>1</sup>, however, have suggested that most negotiations actually involve both integrative and distributive bargaining as they refer to "creating values" and "claiming values". Negotiators should do as much as they can to create values once the goal is as big as they can make it, and they should claim as much of the value as they can for themselves.

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<sup>1</sup> Ibid

### Part IV: The Negotiation Process

From what was previously mentioned, it is understood that negotiations are not just mere talking or discussing issues on the way to get a wished result, but it is a rational complicated process that involves personal efforts molded in an individual and collective interaction of the parties related. It also includes psychological, social, and environmental dimensions in relation to the parties involved, the surrounding circumstances, and the outcome they want to achieve.

The negotiation process is important for the outcome. If we go back to Iklé's definition of negotiation<sup>1</sup>, it would be realized that there is some kind of work to be done before, during, and after. This work requires a lot of acknowledgement in different fields, understanding of the issues being negotiated, and patience. These requirements are parts of what is needed to be found in a negotiator.

The negotiation process, generally, consists of three phases:

- 1) Pre-negotiation (preparations and procedures phase).
- 2) Substantive or actual phase.
- 3) Closing or implementation phase.

Before going further, it is important to remind of the “willingness” or “intention” which is the push to negotiate. If the willingness of the parties does not exist, negotiations may not exist, too. Thus, willingness is the necessary element to begin negotiating<sup>2</sup>. The intention to negotiate should be common<sup>3</sup> as all parties should share the willing to

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<sup>1</sup> Refer to page 2 for the definition.

<sup>2</sup> Zayed, Mohammad Badredine, (1991). *Al Mofawadat Addawliyya*. (1st ed.). Cairo: Al Hay'a Al Masriya Al Amma Lil Kkitab, p. 76

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid*, p. 195

negotiate. When absence of willingness, that is the obligation to negotiate, prevails on the negotiation, no agreement is reached<sup>1</sup>. Not forgetting to mention that willingness must be combined with a need to negotiate. Otherwise, the motivation to negotiate would disappear.

### ***First Phase: Pre-negotiation***

It is the starting phase of the negotiation process. This large process, as Saunders (1991) describes it<sup>2</sup>, starts with the persuasion of the conflicting parties to negotiate. It is characterized by complication, time-consumption, and being more difficult than reaching an agreement, once negotiations have begun.

The pre-negotiation phase requires its importance from the fact that it “paves the way”<sup>3</sup> to negotiation through dealing with the obstacles that hinders the flow of the negotiation process. In this sense, Zartman and Berman (1982) say<sup>4</sup>: *“Long before the first formal session opens; the negotiation process begins with the decision made by each party to explore the possibility of negotiation.”*

In more simple words, preparation for the negotiations involves several important steps<sup>5</sup>:

- A. Gathering the facts.
- B. Analyzing the facts.
- C. Establishing the negotiation objectives.
- D. Planning the negotiation strategy.
- E. Setting parameters (give and take).

<sup>1</sup> Ibid, p. 196

<sup>2</sup> Saunders, Harold, (1991). We Need a Larger Theory of Negotiation: The Importance of Pre-Negotiation Phases. In: Breslin, J. William, and Rubin, Jeffery Z., (Eds.), **Negotiation Theory and Practice**, (pp. 57-70). Cambridge: The Program on Negotiation at Harvard Law School. p. 57

<sup>3</sup> Ibid, p. 57

<sup>4</sup> Zartman, I. William, and Maureen R., Berman, (1982). **The Practical Negotiator**. New York & London: Yale University Press. pp. 9:42

<sup>5</sup> New York Comptroller G Bulletin, (1987). **Arts and Techniques of Negotiation**, Op.cit.

Saunders in his article *We Need a Larger Theory of Negotiation* focuses on the five-part process of negotiation<sup>1</sup>. Among those five parts, three are in the pre-negotiation phase:

1. Defining the problem: the definition of the problem indicates the definitions of interests and objectives of parties to the conflict. From here, the necessity of willingness and cooperation is derived. Determining how each side defines the problem and whether or not their definitions overlap may be the first step in isolating some of the reasons why parties negotiate or fail to negotiate.

Besides defining the problem, defining one's own needs, and learning as much as possible about the others form an integral part of the pre-negotiation phase. It might include role playing, use computer models to aid decision-making, and negotiation team formation. These considerations are interrelated in that teams must work together and with opponents. A party can know about the other parties by asking itself questions like: What divides them? What do they want out of the negotiation?<sup>2</sup>

2. Producing a commitment to a negotiated settlement: the commitment to negotiate is a political decision that is known in a variety of ways:
  - 1) Judging whether the situation continues to serve one's interests.
  - 2) Seeing the shape of a politically defensible settlement.
  - 3) Believing that the other side could accept.
  - 4) Judging that the balance of forces will allow a fair settlement.

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<sup>1</sup> Saunders, Harold, **We Need a Larger Theory of Negotiation: The Importance of Pre-Negotiation Phases**, Op.cit, p. 62

<sup>2</sup> Western Organization of Resource Councils. (1998). **How to Negotiate**, Op.cit.

These also are elements in deciding on a commitment to a negotiated settlement before leaders will negotiate.

3. Arranging negotiation: Saunders sees that all the efforts to arrange a specific negotiation tend to focus on the general terms of reference in order to reach an agreement for negotiations. This Saunders calls as “mini-negotiation”<sup>1</sup> about how to negotiate. This has two aspects:

First. Define the objectives of the negotiation to provide arrangements.

Second. Deal with those physical arrangements that involve issues of political and symbolic importance, which may easily become significant obstacles to negotiate, such as who sits next to whom, and what roles the supporters may play.

Al Hassan sees that the preparations for negotiation should be through the following<sup>2</sup>:

1. Deciding what is the cause/ theme of the negotiation and this should be said clearly.
2. Agreeing on having the negotiations by the parties involved.
3. Selecting the negotiating delegation. This is very important, and the members must be selected from the efficient among others, regardless their working positions, and from those who are well-experienced and well-trained in the field of negotiation. After choosing the delegation, work should be distributed between the members in accordance with the specialization, experience, and skill. The chief negotiator, who should excel in this role, would be selected to assign an observer, a secretary, and specialized consultants.

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<sup>1</sup> Saunders, Harold, **We Need a Larger Theory of Negotiation: The Importance of Pre-Negotiation Phases**, Op.cit, p. 68

<sup>2</sup> Al Hassan, Hassn, **Attawod wa Al Alaqt Al Amma**. Op.cit, pp. 28+29



4. A negotiator must have sufficient information about the other party, about its needs, and about its bottom line, in addition to information about the character of the chief negotiator and every member of the other delegation: their level of education and previous experiences, plus social and psychological studies about their habits and their points of weakness and strength.
5. Determining time and place of negotiation, especially in case of having a state-party negotiating a non-state party.
6. Receiving the negotiating delegation very well, and choosing a suitable hotel for its residency.
7. The first meeting must be preceded by making contacts (connections) between the members of both delegations to introduce themselves and exchange general opinions in order to reach a mutual understanding of their needs without taking any position. This could happen by visiting the negotiating delegation at its place of residence or during a reception honoring the delegation.
8. In the first official session, getting to know the other would happen simply away from emotions. There, the delegations agree on the agenda, and decide on the principles to follow as to prioritize the issues in the agenda.
9. Timing is very essential in trade and investment negotiations as it should be limited to a certain period of time, while it does not harm to take time to study and prepare for negotiation in political and economic negotiation.
10. Determining the goals and their priorities. Each delegation should set its goals clearly and accurately by prioritizing them. These goals have to be realistic, achievable, and negotiable.

11. Researching: every delegation should prepare a research as it guarantees truths by fact finding, analysis, or specific choice. They are supposed to simplify the negotiated issue as this is the cornerstone to build a plan on the way to reach a clear flexible strategy. These researches of negotiation tackle psychology and/ or sociology, and other sciences of negotiation.
12. Setting a strategy (previously tackled in part three): choosing the correct strategy for negotiation implies it should be flexible, depending on the issue and the goal, although all strategies have one goal: winning and reaching the wanted end.
13. Selecting negotiators: it is important to make sure that both negotiators from different negotiating parties are equal in responsibilities and authorities.

Zayed (1991)<sup>1</sup> thinks the problem could only happen through common bases. As a result, a negotiation-for –negotiation process starts. Naturally, the process of preparing changes in complexity and timing according to the case. It includes preparing many issues, most importantly the place of negotiation, who sets next to whom at the negotiation table, secrecy or publicity of the sessions, media and press coverage, the third party role (if existed), time limits for the sessions, and the flags of the participating parties in the negotiation.

Barston<sup>2</sup>, also, has put his own understanding of the pre-negotiation phase as consisting of:

- 1) Preparation of national position.
- 2) Agree venue.
- 3) Outline agenda approved.

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<sup>1</sup> Zayed, Mohammad Badredine, (1991). *Al Mofawadat Addawliyya*, Op.cit, pp. 204+205

<sup>2</sup> Barston, R. P., *Modern Diplomacy*, Op.cit, pp. 80+81

#### 4) Levels at which talks are to be conducted.

Barston sees the process of negotiation as “across the table” process as he talks about a “basic model” of negotiation, by which bilateral and some multilateral negotiation can be conceptualized as a progression in which parties agree on the agenda, outline and explore opening the positions, and seek compromises in order to narrow the gaps until a point of convergence is reached, the thing that forms the basis for a substantive agreement. For him, the preparatory and initial phases take some considerable time.

Going back to Saunders’ article *We Need a Larger Theory of Negotiation*, he suggests three reasons for why pre-negotiation is important<sup>1</sup>:

- Before a decision to negotiate is made, many conflicts at home and abroad force to spend much effort in the pre-negotiation period. It is this stage before formal negotiation when the decision is most likely to be made to pursue or avoid conflict.

Therefore; conducting relationship between parties requires each party to:

- a) Know more about how to produce that decision.
  - b) Analyze more thoroughly why parties stop short of that decision.
  - c) Know what persuades some parties to negotiate seriously.
  - d) Know what would persuade others who often engage only in a show of negotiation to commit themselves to a negotiated agreement.
- Analyzing the pre-negotiation phase of a conflict more fully may enable to establish useful reciprocal links between negotiation theory, the psychology of inter-personal

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<sup>1</sup> Saunders, Harold, *We Need a Larger Theory of Negotiation: The Importance of Pre-Negotiation Phases*, Op.cit, p. 58

or cross-cultural relations, the conduct and diplomacy, and foreign policy. In this way it could help in developing a strategy for conducting the relationship while protecting individual interests, building on common interests, and avoiding conflict.

- Pre-negotiation serves as effective the strategies for crisis prevention and management, peace-making, and negotiation.

### ***Second Phase: Actual Negotiation***

The actual negotiation lies only at a later part of a protracted process. The pre-negotiation phase may take much more time and effort than the negotiation itself, and the pre-negotiation must be carried out with a view of the situation that will be created. This phase (including also the bargaining phase) consists primarily of offering and discussing specific proposals. Negotiators often begin by indicating that the opponent's remarks were understood; giving hope of eventual settlement, but containing elements that remain unacceptable. Proposals often include an offer, sometimes conditions or time limits. They can close with a request for a response intended to prevent the opponent from feeling settlement is impossible and to keep the process going. Concessions are made bringing settlement closer.

Al Hassan<sup>1</sup> repeats the idea of mutual cooperation regarding the gains, saying that negotiation is based on fulfilling mutual needs of both parties, and this implies that each party should neither be too hard to be broken nor too soft to be squeezed, but flexible, cooperative, understanding, and ready to give and take, and to bargain.

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<sup>1</sup> Al Hassan, Hassn, *Attafawod wa Al Alaqt Al Amma*. Op.cit, p. 34

Barston calls this stage as the substantive stage, where the negotiation process can take one of a number of forms<sup>1</sup>:

- a) **The lengthy initial phase:** for instance, in polarized negotiation the process tends to have long initial phases that involve exposition of positions and issues of principle.
- b) **Incremental:** in other forms of negotiation, the progression can be considered as one in which the parties move from opening positions to seeking compromises, and narrowing gaps between positions until a point of convergence is reached on an item or issue, which then allows the expansion of areas of agreement.
- c) **Linear:** it is found in certain kinds of multilateral trade negotiation, in which ideally, a generally agreed “across the board” tariff reduction is negotiated, so reducing the need of bilateral haggling.

Barston introduces a new idea here that is the informal negotiations. He stresses that sometimes, the substantive phase of certain bilateral or multilateral negotiations might be “informal”<sup>2</sup>. Negotiations might be about general issues and leave details to a later date for officials to bargain over and to clarify.

Informal negotiation may also occur at margins of other negotiations, especially in regional organizations. Moreover, such informal negotiations might lead to an agreement that does not appear on papers. As a matter of fact, the use of such informal negotiations depends on the relation between the parties, the type of issue under negotiation, and the wish of the parties to keep some degree of suppleness and freedom of action.

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<sup>1</sup> Barston, R. P., **Modern Diplomacy**, Op.cit, p. 82

<sup>2</sup> Ibid, p.83

### ***Third Phase: The Implementation (closing)***

Saunders believes that after the actual negotiation takes place, the completeness and implementation of any agreement is an important part of the negotiation process<sup>1</sup>. It may appear easy but it is actually very sophisticated at implementation, therefore, careful implementation of one agreement may be the jumping off for the next negotiation. The major elements of this stage are agreeing on terms and ratification. Closing tactics play a major part in reaching the agreement.

Al Hassan sees the closing as writing down all the agreed points in a very accurate detailed way before working on the draft of the agreement<sup>2</sup>. Through discussions, he says, it is a must to decide when the negotiation is to stop, but not before making sure it is not stopped earlier than it should be.

If the parties did not approve on all the parts of the agreement, it would be necessary to go on with the negotiation till a final agreement is reached.

To complete the concept, Jeffery Rubin (1991) talks about a “post-negotiation” or a “post-settlement”<sup>3</sup>. It is a procedure by which parties –who have already concluded an agreement– are given an opportunity (with the assistance of a third party) to improve upon their agreement. The third party proposes a settlement that improves upon the agreement reached. If both sides endorse the proposed improvement on the existing contract, then each stands to benefit from this proposal, and the third party in turn is guaranteed a percentage of the “added value” of the contract.

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<sup>1</sup> Saunders, Saunders, Harold, **We Need a Larger Theory of Negotiation: The Importance of Pre-Negotiation Phases**, Op.cit, p. 69

<sup>2</sup> Al Hassan, Hassn, **Attawod wa Al Alaqt Al Amma**. Op.cit, p. 35

<sup>3</sup> Rubin, Jeffrey Z., (1991). Some Wise and Mistaken Assumptions About Conflict and Negotiation. In: Breslin, J. William, and Rubin, Jeffrey Z., (Eds.), **Negotiation Theory and Practice**, (pp. 3-9). Cambridge: The Program on Negotiation at Harvard Law School. p. 6

After considering the aforementioned, it should not be taken for granted that the previous steps of negotiation go that smoothly because there might be some problems of any kind which could hinder the process going on. It is worthy knowing that reaching this point, there are some influences, categorized by Barston<sup>1</sup>, that shape the negotiation:

A) The negotiation environment or setting:

This includes locations of talks, whether the negotiation is bilateral or multilateral, the amount of domestic support, and the degree of international tensions. The setting can influence:

1. The procedural conduct of negotiation because of the establishment of several working groups in a multilateral conference or through institutional competence.
2. The scope of negotiation.
3. The content of a summit conference agenda.

In this sense, a mediator can attempt to structure a negotiation by putting forward proposals, interpreting or articulating differences, as well as attempting to alter the pace of negotiations.

4. The time span of the negotiation.

B) Available assets:

Such as the number and skill of diplomatic personnel, the range of specialist, proximity of the negotiator to the central power, and the capacity to control the communication process in conflict. Decision-makers in this case are influenced by

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<sup>1</sup> Barston, R. P., **Modern Diplomacy**, Op.cit, p. 78

tradition, culture, bureaucratic organization, and perceptions of role characteristic such as legalism, attachment to the declaration of principles, inflexibility, and crudeness. Furthermore, deployable assets are considered crucial components of negotiating capability. These include the extent of domestic approval, the nature and range of effective means, trade-off possibilities, and the degree of external support.

C) Contingent variables:

These include the internal politics connected with the development and attainment of negotiating positions. Others include solidity of a government and its delegation, how far opening positions are re-evaluated, the concession rate, the impact of feedback, and the influence of external events, such as a change of government.

A question may come to the minds, is third party-intervention necessary? Howard Raiffa (1982)<sup>1</sup> puts an answer to the question by saying that negotiations are affected by the possible availability of outside interveners, usually mediators or arbitrators. This is known as third-party intervention, even when there are more than two disputants.

A negotiator must consider if and when to suggest (or to agree with the suggestion of) outside intervener. This usually poses a complex decision problem with uncertainties. Howard stresses that if an intervener enters a dispute, the negotiator has a new set of tactical options: how much should be revealed? How cooperative he/ she should be? ...etc.

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<sup>1</sup> Raiffa, Howard, (1982). **The Art and Science of Negotiation**. Cambridge Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, p.19



By answering the previous questions, the mechanism of how intervention is needed in negotiation should be mentioned. The actual process of modern negotiation may undergo two types of intervention:

**A. Interventions of no commitment or obligation:** it includes:

1. When the parties conducting direct negotiations (through face to face meetings, writing correspondences, phone calls, as well as conferences) fail to reach that wanted outcome, or at least a point of convergence, there would be a need for good offices, as they help in clarifying and explaining the different points of view in a trial to bring them closer. When the parties involved seem to be satisfied to negotiate again, the good offices' role ends (they never participate in the negotiation).
2. Mediation: Howard defines a mediator as an "*important outsider who tries to aid the negotiators in their quest to find a compromised agreement.*"<sup>1</sup> The mediator can help in the negotiation process but it does not have the right to dictate a solution. Mediation helps to reach an agreement through reflecting and explaining the parties' points of view. Parties either accept or reject the message of the mediator.
3. Fact-finding: its main task is to collect facts that help in solving the conflict.

**B. Interventions of commitment and obligation:** it includes:

- 1) Arbitration: an arbitrator (or arbiter) does the following<sup>2</sup>:
  - a. Hears the arguments and proposals of all sides and later "finds the facts";

<sup>1</sup> Ibid, p. 23

<sup>2</sup> Ibid, p. 23

- b. Tries to direct the negotiators to formulate their own solutions or may suggest a reasonable solution;
  - c. Has the authority to impose a solution if the previously mentioned actions fail. In this sense, the negotiators might willingly present their dispute for arbitration, or the arbitration might be enforced on them by some higher authority.
- 2) Juridical settlement: it is executed by law, not arbitration. It is the stage in which law is implemented and commitment is a must.

Finally, there are some important ideas and advices for a negotiator to help in his/ her performance during the course of negotiations. This will help in reaching an acceptable outcome<sup>1</sup>:

- a. Do be discriminating. Accept a good offer. Do not feel you always have to knock something off the offer.
- b. Do fight hard on the important points; win the war and not the battle. Do not start fights you have no chance of winning.
- c. Do remember you generally are in at least a good negotiating position.
- d. Do be courteous, considerate, and do what you say you will.
- e. Do know when to talk and when to sit and listen.

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<sup>1</sup> New York Comptroller G Bulletin, (1987). **Arts and Techniques of Negotiation**. Op.cit.

## Chapter II: Camp David Negotiations

The Arab-Israeli conflict has been the concern of the world for many decades, and according to what is taking place now on the international level, it will be the concern of the world for the coming decades. That unstable relation of the Arabs and Israelis has been through different stages. It experienced both “peace” and wars through history, including –for example- the October War with Egypt (1973), Lebanon War (1982), and the First Intifada (1987), while, however, there were some trials to use diplomacy to reach peace as in –for example- Camp David Accords (1978) , Madrid Conference (1991), Oslo Accords (1993), and Jordan-Israel Treaty of Peace (1994).

This chapter’s main focus is how peace and different kinds of diplomacy were used by the Israelis and Egyptians in Camp David Negotiations in 1978, reaching the famous agreement. Thus, this chapter will study the Camp David Negotiations from the following perspectives:

- 1- The political circumstances that lead to have the negotiations and the parties involved.
- 2- The Camp David Accords and the reactions to them.
- 3- Third-party role in the negotiation.
- 4- The impact of personal aspect on the negotiations.

*Part I: Political Circumstances*

The long history of the Arab-Israeli conflict is rich with wars that took a collective sense of all Arabs, like the Arab-Israeli War in 1948, although these wars were directed to one country as Egypt or Palestine for example. The attitude was that of collectivity and unity of Arabs. Later on, things seemed to be more practical if to be done bilaterally. Many treaties and settlements were signed bilaterally with Israel, yet it included the main concern of all Arabs: the Israeli existence in the heart of the Middle East. A good example of that was Camp David, in which, Mohammad Anwar al Sadat insisted on “acting as spokesman for all Arab interests<sup>1</sup>”. The Egyptian President Mohammad Anwar al Sadat, who took over Jamal Abdel Nasser in 1970, played an important role in forming and preparing the political scene for the bilateral negotiation that led eventually to Camp David Accords.

Before going into more details about the story of Camp David, it should be mentioned here that Sadat's reputation "preceded him to Washington."<sup>2</sup> It was known that Sadat's interest in the United States of America was great. Hassan Naf'a (1984) summarized the reasons for that to<sup>3</sup>:

1. Sadat's realization of the nature of the American role in the Middle East.
2. Throughout the years of his presidency, he showed a great fascination of the American model.
3. His beliefs that America is the only international force that can make peace in the Middle East, and force Israel to withdraw from the occupied territories of Arabs. In his

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<sup>1</sup> Raiffa, Howard, **The Art and Science of Negotiation**. Op.cit, p. 205

<sup>2</sup> Quandt, William, (1986). **Camp David, Peacemaking and Politics**. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution. p. 50

<sup>3</sup> Naf'a, Hassan, (1984). **Misr Wa Assira' Al Araby Al Israeli-Min Assira' Al Mahtoom ila Attasweya Al Mostaheelah**. (1<sup>st</sup> ed.). Beirut: Markiz Dirasat Al Wahdah Al Arabyya. p. 47

autobiography Sadat (1979) wrote<sup>1</sup>: I (Sadat) consider America responsible for not only making peace in the region as a great power, but also responsible for itself and its interests in this important part of the world. Also he said: 99% of the American interests are with us, the Arabs. We are friends, and we wish to stay like that<sup>2</sup>.

Because of the previous reasons, Sadat had shown a wish for negotiating partial agreements with Israel under the U.S. auspices in the years 1974 and 1975<sup>3</sup>. Quandt (1986) wrote about that: *"It was generally assumed in Washington that Sadat was ready to resume the peace process, though it was not clear how far he was prepared to go, or how far out of step with the Arab parties he was prepared to go."*<sup>4</sup>

As a result, all the actions of Sadat in internal and international policies could be considered as a trial to tempt America and to prove his own "good will" towards the American role in the region. In the same sense, the American and Israeli focus was -and still is- directed to Egypt because of Egypt's important and strategic role in the region since a long time. The Israeli attitude was clear in Ben-Gurion's theory which considers Egypt the strategic enemy to Israel, and peace with Egypt would make other Arab countries do the same<sup>5</sup>.

That focus on Egypt came as a result of long years of being the base of the Arab security. Its growing role in the region since World War II, the foundation of the Arab League (1945), and the July Revolution in 1952 that gave birth to the Arabian flow against imperialism, attracted

<sup>1</sup> Al Sadat, Mohammad Anwar, (1979). **Al Bahth Ann Athat, Qissat Hayaty**. (3<sup>rd</sup> ed.). Cairo: Al Maktab Al Masri Al Hadeeth. p. 314

<sup>2</sup> Ibid, p. 314

<sup>3</sup> Quandt, William. **Camp David, Peacemaking and Politics**. Op.cit, p. 50

<sup>4</sup> Ibid, p. 50

<sup>5</sup> Assayed Hussein, Adnan, (1995). Camp David Itar Litasweyya. **Majallat Sho'oun Al Awsat**. (42): 65:80, p. 65

the attention to it and made it a pioneer in the region as its confrontation with Israel was considered an Egyptian-Arab priority<sup>1</sup>.

Realizing that strategic and historic importance of Egypt, Israel aimed at –because of all the previous aspects- disassociating Egypt from the rest of the Arab world and weakening its role in the region, so the only frequent wish for Israel after 1967 was that Egypt to give up its commitment to the Arabian issues and pay attention to other internal issues in return of Sinai<sup>2</sup>.

In consequence, the Egyptian role in the region had gone through many changes during the Sadat's era, and Egypt played a different role from that it used to play in Nasser's era. Although Sadat was loyal to Nasser's ideas and beliefs, he had his own perspectives and views about the Arabs' situation<sup>3</sup>. To prove that point, it is worth mentioning -as an example- that the first government Sadat formed in 20 October 1970 after taking over consisted of Dr. Mahmoud Fawzi as a Prime Minister and another 32 ministers who were almost the same ministers of the late President Abdel Nasser<sup>4</sup>. Yet the change had occurred from the heart of Nasser's actions, and Sadat built his changes on Nasser's basics but in accordance with his own beliefs<sup>5</sup>.

Naf'a presents the differences between Sadat and Nasser's era, yet he believes that Nasser has made it easy for Sadat to execute his changes without meaning to do so<sup>6</sup>, thus how Sadat started his presidency did not seem different from what Nasser had followed. On the contrary, it seemed as if it was coming from within Nasser's times.

The question here is: how was that?

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<sup>1</sup> Ibid, p. 66

<sup>2</sup> Ibid, p. 66

<sup>3</sup> "Ayyam Assayid Arabi" Documentary, Al Arabiya Channel, 21<sup>st</sup> September, 2006.

<sup>4</sup> Mohammad, Abdel Aleem, (1990). Al Khitab Al Sadaty, Tahleel Al Khitab Al Ideology Lil Khitab Al Sadaty. **Kitab Al Ahaly**. (27): 291-300, p. 291

<sup>5</sup> Naf'a, Hassan. **Misr Wa Assira' Al Araby Al Israeli-Min Assira' Al Mahtoom ila Attasweya Al Mostaheelah**. Op.cit, p. 47

<sup>6</sup> Ibid, p. 47

One month before his death, Nasser had accepted the “Rogers Initiative”<sup>1</sup> in August 1970, led by the UN Negotiator Jarring, regarding the Egyptian-Israeli cease-fire for 90 days (three months)<sup>2</sup>. By accepting such initiative, Nasser aimed at giving the last chance to the US to create peace before starting the Attrition War in the spring of the coming year<sup>3</sup>. Nasser's death on 18<sup>th</sup> September 1970 (before the cease-fire period had ended) resulted in the continuation of the cease-fire agreement. Consequently, the Egyptian-American trials to come closer to each other would not have been explained in the early days of Sadat’s era as a serious change in Nasser’s line. At the same time, Nasser had suspended his disagreements with the conservative systems in the Arab world -mainly Saudi Arabia- since Khartoum Conference in 1967, and so Sadat’s support to the Egyptian relations with these systems that were greatly connected with America was difficult to be considered as a change<sup>4</sup>. However, the great change within the years of Sadat's presidency was showing a tendency towards having peace talks with Israel under the American auspices, the thing that marked the coming period with some “initiatives” which at the end led to Camp David in 1978. For instance, in his report to the Congress, President Nixon mentioned that the United States continued in the late 1971 and all along 1972 to conduct indirect negotiations under its auspices between Egypt and Israel to reach a temporal agreement, but it did not achieve any success<sup>5</sup>.

The period from 1971 through 1977 witnessed different events in the Egyptian-Israeli relations:

#### I. Secret diplomacy.

<sup>1</sup> It was William Rogers, Nixon's Secretary of State (till 1971), who presented an American initiative in the Middle East in 6 December, 1969 depending on "land for peace" principle and reaching peace between Egypt and Israel.

<sup>2</sup> Naf'a, Hassan. *Misr Wa Assira' Al Araby Al Israeli-Min Assira' Al Mahtoom ila Attasweya Al Mostaheelah*. Op.cit, p. 47

<sup>3</sup> Riyad, Mahmoud, (1985). *Mahmoud Riyad Autobiography (1948-1978)*. (2<sup>nd</sup> ed.). Cairo: Dar Al Mostaqbal Al Arabi, p. 445

<sup>4</sup> Naf'a, Hassan. *Misr Wa Assira' Al Araby Al Israeli-Min Assira' Al Mahtoom ila Attasweya Al Mostaheelah*. Op.cit, p. 47

<sup>5</sup> Riyad, Mahmoud. *Mahmoud Riyad Autobiography (1948-1978)*. Op.cit, p. 434

- II. October War (1973).
- III. Sadat's visit to Jerusalem (1977).

### I. Secret Talks:

Paul Seabury (1973), the professor of Political Science in University of California, wrote<sup>1</sup>: *"Just as openness is a procedural virtue of democracies, secrecy is the norm of state relations."* This explains what follows:

Since its existence in 1948, Israel had always maintained secret contacts with its Arab enemies, largely through Mossad, the intelligence service that operated on some kind of "underground" diplomatic corps for the Jewish State<sup>2</sup>.

The other notable thing in such diplomacy, besides its being secret, is that it tended to be bilateral with Arab countries as Israel feared alliances and pacts to be formed, and by that, the Arabs would be able to create a source of power to face Israel. In addition, bilateral talks, as Israel thinks, could guarantee better chances of changing Arabs' attitudes towards Israel. Stein (1997) says<sup>3</sup>: *"Israel wrongly expects that concessions on bilateral procedures or substance will change Arab attitudes positively toward Israel."* As a result, bilateralism marked the Arab-Israeli negotiations for a long time, especially later in Oslo negotiations between the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and Israel in 1993<sup>4</sup>.

Time Magazine wrote in August 14, 1978: *"...these contacts between Israel and a number of Arab states, notably Morocco, Egypt and Saudi Arabia bolstered Sadat's confidence and set the*

<sup>1</sup> Seabury, Paul, (1973). **The United States in World Affairs**. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company , p. 38

<sup>2</sup> Time, (1978, August 14). Israel's Secret Contacts. Time From The Magazine. Retrieved September 22, 2006, from <http://www.time.com/time/magazine/printout/0,8816,946966,00.html>.

<sup>3</sup> Stein, Kenneth W., (1997). Continuity and Change in Egyptian-Israeli Relation, 1973-97. **Israeli Affairs**, 3 (3&4), 296-320. p. 106

<sup>4</sup> For more information about secret diplomacy in Oslo negotiations and agreement, please refer to chapter III.



*stage for his peace initiative.*<sup>1</sup>” King Hassan II of Morocco had played an important role in mediating between the Egyptians and the Israelis to ensure their secret connections<sup>2</sup>, as he also tried to attract other Arab parties. This is due to the influence of the Jewish minority in Morocco that maintained good relations with the Royal Palace, in addition to the tilt of attitude towards America by the Moroccan King.

As mentioned before, Israel wanted to get Egypt out of its conflict with Arabs because of Egypt's importance on the regional level, to guarantee the minimization of the Arabian power. This encouraged Israel to resume its plan in bilateralism with the help of Morocco. Moreover, King Hassan II was known for organizing many secret meetings in Rabat. For example, the meeting held during September 1977 between Moshe Dayan, the Israeli Foreign Minister, and the Egyptian vice Prime Minister Hassan Al Tahamy to study the context of the Israeli-Egyptian Settlement. These meetings played an important role in pressuring the Egyptians to go for unilateral peace with Israel<sup>3</sup>. After Sadat's trip to Jerusalem, these secret meetings continued as another one between Dayan and Tahamy in Morocco in December 1979 was held, under King Hassan's supervision.<sup>4</sup> Also, secret connections among Egyptian and Israeli officials during Sadat's reign, before international mediations and before the Jerusalem trip, were revealed by Nahom Goldman, President of the Jewish Conference, in a declaration for the Israeli newspaper Davar in 19/11/1976<sup>5</sup>.

<sup>1</sup> Time, (1978, August 14). Israel's Secret Contacts. Time From The Magazine. Retrieved September 22, 2006, from <http://www.time.com/time/magazine/printout/0,8816,946966,00.html>. Op.cit.

<sup>2</sup> Abdel Mohsin, Rabab Yahia, (2005). *Camp David Khurooj Misr ila Atteeh*. (1<sup>st</sup> ed.). Cairo: Maktabat Madbooly. p. 32

<sup>3</sup> Assayed Hussein, Adnan. *Camp David Itar Litasweyya*. Op.cit, p. 68

<sup>4</sup> Naf'a, Hassan. *Misr Wa Assira' Al Araby Al Israeli-Min Assira' Al Mahtoom ila Attasweya Al Mostaheelah*. Op.cit, p. 63

<sup>5</sup> Assayed Hussein, Adnan. *Camp David Itar Litasweyya*. Op.cit, p. 68

In this sense, many Arabian and foreign capitals like Cairo, Vienna, London, Washington, and Bucharest...etc<sup>1</sup> were mentioned as the connections and meetings continued between the Egyptians and the Israelis. Some of the meetings were public while others were secret.

That secret diplomacy succeeded in bringing the points of view of both the Israelis and Egyptians closer. These secret talks were the major steps taken on the way to Camp David, and these points of view were translated into actual work written down in the Camp David Accords.

## **II. The October War (1973):**

No one can deny the fact that October War of 1973 or Ramadan War (also known in Israel as Yom Kippur War) was an important event in the history of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Starting to prepare for such a decisive step, Sadat knew that it will take him to his aims (finding a framework for the relation with the Israelis). But before talking about the war, it is vital here to give a glimpse of the political situation at that time in a bi-polar system of the American and Soviet powers.

During the Cold War, Israel allied with Washington, while Egypt allied with Moscow. During those years, Israel and Egypt maintained their alliances with the United States and Soviet Union, respectively, yet a tilt towards America appeared clearly in Sadat's actions due to the previously mentioned reasons. Although détente emerged (aiming at avoiding direct East-West confrontations), neither America nor the former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) was willing to halt regional competition. So in the Middle East, the US President at that time Richard Nixon and his Secretary of State Henry Kissinger saw détente as

<sup>1</sup> Ibid, p. 68

a means to draw Arab states closer to the US, only if it meant a diminution of the Soviet influence<sup>1</sup>. This explains the philosophy that guided Kissinger: “*maintain Détente, but try to weaken the Soviet Union economically and politically.*”<sup>2</sup>”

Since the beginning, Sadat had a tendency towards showing intentions to find solutions for the complicating issues at that time in the Middle East other than wars, especially that he succeeded Jamal Abdel Nasser, who was known for being so dedicated to his Arab nation and its issues, and his refusal to the Israeli existence in Palestine. Israel’s attentiveness allowed it at that time to sense these intentions of Sadat, knowing very well the strategic and political significance of Egypt in the Arab world<sup>3</sup>. Having Sadat believed in the American ability in “making peace” in the region and his full awareness of his need to a power like America to create peace with Israel, he started to take some steps on the way:

- a- Sadat worked on improving the relations with the conservative systems in the Arab world (especially Saudi Arabia which had good relations with America) which Nasser had previously faced up to, and so he succeeded in gathering a great Arabian coalition like never before<sup>4</sup>.
- b- As a major step, Sadat did a lot to come closer to the United States by reinforcing his relations with Shah of Iran and Saudi Arabia (which had closely aligned relations with America).
- c- Also, he tried to confront with the Soviet Union, the old classical enemy of the United States, which had good relations with Egypt and provided Sadat (and the Arabs) for a long time with weapons and financial aids.

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<sup>1</sup> Stein, Kenneth W., (2003). The October War: Super-Power Engagement and Estrangement. *ZMANIM*, (84), 59-69, p. 59

<sup>2</sup> Ibid, p. 59

<sup>3</sup> Assayed Hussein, Adnan. *Camp David Itar Litasweyya*. Op.cit, p. 47

<sup>4</sup> Ibid, p. 49

Taking all the previous points into consideration, the situation after the 1967 War in Egypt was so devastating, especially after Nasser's death. The Egyptian people were living a state of depression, and they felt that something must be done. With the general feeling of boredom and depression among the Egyptians, and the insisting desire to regain the lost Sinai, and when all the peaceful initiatives of Sadat and his signals of good will in every way failed, there was no way out of the situation but the war<sup>1</sup>. Sadat started to prepare for the war in Alexandria in 1972, after giving the world the impression that he and his army are not ready for any war. Working with his leaders and officers and maintaining secrecy about attacking Israeli locations in Sinai, plans were put accurately to guarantee success in the operations. To give the impression of being far from launching any wars on Israel, Sadat expelled 15,000 Soviet military advisers from Egypt in mid 1972. Sadat wrote<sup>2</sup>: the reason of the decision was that I have built my strategy on the bases that I will not start the war and there are no Soviet advisers in Egypt.

And so, the decision of war in the year 1973 was taken because of the following reasons<sup>3</sup>:

- 1- All military preparations were done and the army was pressuring to go for war.
- 2- Internally, there was a high level of wariness that led to some disturbances among Egyptian students, intellectuals, and workers.
- 3- The continuation of the Arab solidarity and support to Egypt made a positive movement towards finding a way out.
- 4- An important reason was Kissinger's signals to Egypt through secret connections with Hafiz Ismail; the Egyptian National Security Adviser to the President, that it can not

<sup>1</sup> Ibid, p. 50

<sup>2</sup> Al Sadat, Mohammad Anwar. *Al Bahth Ann Athat, Qissat Hayaty*. Op.cit, p. 243

<sup>3</sup> Naf'a, Hassan. *Misr Wa Assira' Al Araby Al Israeli-Min Assira' Al Mahtoom ila Attasweya Al Mostaheelah*. Op.cit, p. 50

take any step unless the ice of the situation is broken as heating it up would make it easy for the United States to take a move.

To some people, it was clear that the aim of the war was not to liberate the occupied lands of 1967 by military force, but to create a new situation that allows reaching the goals in the Middle East through diplomatic means, depending on the international and Arabian aspects which can change the situation from the status quo to the active mode by the war decision<sup>1</sup>. Stein indicates in this sense: *“Cairo’s insistence on opening negotiations with the US was an objective of October 1973 War. In the years preceding the war, President Sadat wanted the US to help him restore Sinai to Egyptian sovereignty. He wanted Washington and Moscow to exert collective pressure on Israel to withdraw from all of Sinai and all of the other territories which Israel had won in the June 1967 War.”*<sup>2</sup>

Similarly, Rabab Y. Abdel Mohsin (2005)<sup>3</sup> says that if the October War was meant to clear the effects of the 1967 War and to bring back to the Egyptian forces its position, then it achieved an undeniable goal, although such goal was not enough –as she continues saying- to justify the war on a wide scale. And if the war was meant to break the silence that prevailed on the Israeli occupation to the Arabian lands, it could be said that it managed to move the involved parties and started to find solutions that were as big as the military results. However, she continues, if the reason behind the 1973 War was to return the lands after having the diplomatic efforts failed, the war would not have achieved its goals. Kenneth W. Stein (2003)

<sup>1</sup> Ibid, p. 50

<sup>2</sup> Stein, Kenneth W., **Continuity and Change in Egyptian-Israeli Relation, 1973-97**. Op.cit

<sup>3</sup> Abdel Mohsin, Rabab Yahia. **Camp David Khurooj Misr ila Atteeh**. Op.cit, p. 18

says: *"The October War was Sadat's political key that would initiate, pursue, and sustain a diplomatic process."*<sup>1</sup>

Thus, Egyptian and Syrian armies, in participation with a small number of Jordanian, Iraqi, Moroccan and Palestinian armies, all attacked the Israeli locations in Sinai and the Golan Heights in order to return the Egyptian Sinai and Syrian Golan from Israel<sup>2</sup>. The war started – according to the plans- at exactly 2:00 PM on Saturday, the 6<sup>th</sup> October, 1973.

For the first three days of the war, the Israelis showed the world that they were the winners in a great propaganda, while the Egyptians were achieving great successes in Sinai. However, on the fourth day Kissinger received a call from Israel saying: SAVE ISRAEL. The Americans hurried to save their friends and sent them the newest and more sophisticated arms. After the American involvement in the war, and the Soviet slow response to the Egyptian requests for providing arms and bridges, and when the Israelis managed to create an "opening" in (Difresoire) area, Sadat and his officers decided to accept a cease-fire period on the 22<sup>nd</sup> of October, 1973.

It is worth mentioning here that the Arabs were supporting Sadat in his war, especially when America got involved in the war. All Arab Oil Ministers decided to minimize the oil production 5% of total production monthly till Israel withdraws from all the occupied territories<sup>3</sup>. For the first time, the use of oil as a weapon in the war was a surprise to the world which realized the danger of the Israeli expansion plans on the interests of the world, in

<sup>1</sup> Stein, Kenneth W., **Continuity and Change in Egyptian-Israeli Relation, 1973-97**. Op.cit

<sup>2</sup> Nofal, Ahmad Sa'id, (1999). *Malamih Assira' Al Araby-Al Israeli Montho Qiyam Israel Hatta Camp David*. In: Gassan Ismail Abdel Khakiq (Ed.), *Sira' Al Qarn.. Assira' Al Araby ma' Assohyonyya Abra Ma'at 'Am*. 1<sup>st</sup> ed., (pp. 107-145). Amman: Abdel Hameed Shouman Ins. pp. 112+113

<sup>3</sup> Riyad, Mahmoud. **Mahmoud Riyad Autobiography (1948-1978)**. Op.cit, p. 457

addition to that was the huge financial aids given to the fighting countries by many oil-producing states<sup>1</sup>.

The success in that war increased Sadat's popularity<sup>2</sup>. In this sense it could be said that the real beginning of Sadat's era was after the October War, and it continued till his assassination in 6 October 1981. During that time, many changes took place, in economy in special, and Sadat followed a liberal system that goes along with the new economic changes in Egypt<sup>3</sup>.

### **III. Sadat's Visit to Jerusalem:**

In addition to all the dramatic actions which Sadat took, his visit to Israel in 1977 was the most dramatic and tragic as many described it.

The most important thing here is how Sadat visualized the visit. He wrote<sup>4</sup>: there is a psychological barrier between us and the Israelis, and because of it, Israel objected some formalities and procedures from the simplest things in the preparatory phase of the peace process, aiming at making the working paper at Geneva Conference an American-Israeli paper.

Because of this situation, and out of his feeling of the insisting need to change, the initiative started to be visualized in Sadat's mind on the plane on his way to Iran.

Reading his memoirs, Sadat thought of the visit to Jerusalem and studied all its aspects in his mind before announcing it. The first view of the visit was to invite the five great powers in the Security Council, and invite with them the concerned parties in the Arab World: Syria,

<sup>1</sup> Ibid, p. 459

<sup>2</sup> Quandt, William, (1988). *Camp David after 10 Years*. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution. p. 40

<sup>3</sup> Naf'a, Hassan. *Misr Wa Assira' Al Araby Al Israeli-Min Assira' Al Mahtoom ila Attasweya Al Mostaheelah*. Op.cit, p. 54

<sup>4</sup> Al Sadat, Mohammad Anwar. *Al Bahth Ann Athat, Qissat Hayaty*. Op.cit, p. 316

Jordan, Lebanon, and Palestine, so Begin would know that they were ready to prepare for Geneva Conference and willing for peace. Moreover, Sadat thought of the time of the visit too. He thought of Friday so he could pray in Al Aqsa Mosque and then visit the Resurrection Church. The problem of this view was that there was no time for all that. The plan changed and Sadat decided to go alone<sup>1</sup>.

When asked by Dayan about the first time he thought of visiting Jerusalem, Sadat said he was looking for anything that can create abnormal waves that can cause shocking effects as long as it is positive<sup>2</sup>.

- The initiative in dates:

On 9<sup>th</sup> November 1977, President Sadat headed to the Egyptian Parliament to deliver a speech. To that session of the Parliament, more than 80 foreign reporters were invited –in an unprecedented way- as if Sadat was preparing the people for something new. Also, Yasser Arafat attended the session, too, invited by Sadat himself<sup>3</sup>.

In that speech, Sadat announced his desire to go anywhere to negotiate peace, even to the Knesset to speak for peace<sup>4</sup>. The surprise made the audience speechless. Arafat left Egypt immediately, and the Egyptian authorities thought the initiative was just a tactic. Quandt wrote about this incident<sup>5</sup>: *"No one was quite sure whether Sadat meant what he said. Some thought that his statement was just rhetoric, and the next day the Egyptian papers had deleted this portion of the speech from the printed text."*

<sup>1</sup> For more details, please refer to the full story in Sadat's book "In Search for the Identity".

<sup>2</sup> Abdel Mohsin, Rabab Yahia. **Camp David Khurooj Misr ila Atteeh**. Op.cit, p. 34

<sup>3</sup> Ibid, p. 35

<sup>4</sup> Al Sadat, Mohammad Anwar. **Al Bahth Ann Athat, Qissat Hayaty**. Op.cit, p. 322

<sup>5</sup> Quandt, William. **Camp David, Peacemaking and Politics**. Op.cit , p. 146



The 10<sup>th</sup> November 1977 witnessed Menachem Begin's, the Israeli Prime Minister, welcome to Sadat's idea, wishing that it would not be just a "verbal maneuver"<sup>1</sup>.

The White House took the initiative seriously, yet the Americans did not imagine that the trip would take place ten days later<sup>2</sup>. The US President Carter and his advisers admired the boldness of Sadat's decision and shared his belief that the visit would help break down some of the "psychological barriers" on both sides<sup>3</sup>.

On 14<sup>th</sup> November the Israeli Knesset held a "historic session" ended with the majority approval (88 votes against 3)<sup>4</sup> to send the invitation to Sadat to visit Jerusalem. On the 15<sup>th</sup> President Sadat received the invitation of the Prime Minister Menachem Begin to visit Jerusalem. Sadat arrived in Israel on 19<sup>th</sup> November 1977.

When Sadat arrived to Ben-Gurion Airport in his air jet, wearing a bullet-proof vest which made his movements slow<sup>5</sup>, a long line of Israeli leaders was waiting to shake hands with the Egyptian President, all preceded by Golda Meir, the previous Israeli Prime Minister, who said to Sadat: "You are late... we have been waiting for this visit since a long time."<sup>6</sup> Sadat wrote about the visit: I arrived in Israel in less than 40 minutes and nobody believed... when I stepped out of the plane, I found myself face to face with Golda Meir, who was in a trip to America and came in rush because of the visit... then I saw Dayan<sup>7</sup>.

<sup>1</sup> Khoury, Tariq and Barmamt, Mohammad, (1979). **Min Al Mubadara ila Al Mu'ahada-Tataworat Al Ahdath wa Rodood Al Fi'l**. (1<sup>st</sup> ed.). Amman: Al Rai Publishing. p. 14

<sup>2</sup> Quandt, William. **Camp David, Peacemaking and Politics**. Op.cit, p. 146

<sup>3</sup> Ibid, p. 147

<sup>4</sup> Khoury, Tariq and Barmamt, Mohammad. **Min Al Mubadara ila Al Mu'ahada-Tataworat Al Ahdath wa Rodood Al Fi'l**. Op.cit, p. 15

<sup>5</sup> Abdel Mohsin, Rabab Yahia. **Camp David Khurooj Misr ila Atteeh**. Op.cit, p. 37

<sup>6</sup> Assayed Hussein, Adnan. **Camp David Itar Litasweyya**. Op.cit, p. 69

<sup>7</sup> Al Sadat, Mohammad Anwar. **Al Bahth Ann Athat, Qissat Hayaty**. Op.cit, p. 323

Unknown to most onlookers, Israeli sharpshooters were positioned on the roof of the main terminal in case of a surprise attack from a planeload of terrorists<sup>1</sup>.

Sadat's speech (dated on the 20<sup>th</sup> November 1977) to the Israeli Knesset initiated a new momentum for peace that would eventually culminate in the 1978 Camp David Accords and a final peace treaty with Israel in 1979<sup>2</sup>. So, the main goal of the trip was achieved, as within days of Sadat's visit, the American side began to move, listening to both Egyptian and Israeli views of what had been achieved and what lay ahead<sup>3</sup>. Again, Sadat proved to the world that his perspectives of what was taking place on the international level were true; first the 1973 War and second the trip to Jerusalem, as both decisions accomplished, at least, one of its ends.

- Why Jerusalem?

Many reasons were behind Sadat's choice of the option to visit Israel.

He, first of all, came to feel that Geneva track in the peace process was more show than substance and was not progressing<sup>4</sup>. Also he lacked confidence in the United States to pressure Israel to take a step towards peace. All these resulted in feeling the need to do something shocking to strike the Israelis, the Americans, and the world, and reach a final understanding. On this basis, Sadat chose to be the first Arab leader to visit Israel, thereby implicitly recognizing Israel<sup>5</sup>.

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<sup>1</sup> Quandt, William. **Camp David, Peacemaking and Politics**. Op.cit, p.147

<sup>2</sup> Anwar Al Sadat Biography. Retrieved September 21, 2006, from <http://www.ibiblio.org/sullivan/bios/Sadat-bio.html>.

<sup>3</sup> Quandt, William. **Camp David, Peacemaking and Politics**. Op.cit, p. 148

<sup>4</sup> Camp David Accords. Retrieved July 8, 2006, from [http://www.en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Camp\\_David\\_Accords\\_\(1978\)](http://www.en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Camp_David_Accords_(1978)).

<sup>5</sup> Ibid.

Sadat hoped out of his visit to enlist the help of the United States in improving the ailing Egyptian economy, and hoped that an agreement with Israel would stimulate similar agreements with Arab neighbors, and help solve the Palestinian issue<sup>1</sup>.

To clarify more, the motivators to Sadat's trip can be divided into: internal, regional, and international motivators as follows:<sup>2</sup>

- 1- Internal: regarding internal issues, like:
  - a- Economy: which was getting worse day by day in Egypt, and which could not be improved unless a bold step towards peace is taken.
  - b- Military: in relation to the increasing fears of a pre-emptive Israeli war which could destroy Arab forces completely for a coming 10 years. This was thought more sure when the Likud arrived to the government.
- 2- Regional: related to the inability to draw a unified Arab policy to face Israel, a policy that distributes its expenses over all countries at a time when wealth was increasing in oil countries, while poverty and economic problems had increased in Egypt.
- 3- International: related to the American inability to push the blocked peace process started by Kissinger forward.

In this sense, Naf'a introduces an interesting discussion about the previous points<sup>3</sup>:

First: the economic aspect was not really the only reason as the war was not the only reason for the economic problems, but also the bad economic management and the greedy ambitions of the society classes. The visit would not have solved any of these.

<sup>1</sup> Ibid.

<sup>2</sup> Naf'a, Hassan. **Misr Wa Assira' Al Araby Al Israeli-Min Assira' Al Mahtoom ila Attasweya Al Mostaheelah**. Op.cit, p. 62

<sup>3</sup> Ibid, p. 63

Second: to say that the visit was to prevent a pre-emptive war was incorrect, as any pre-emptive war was far away from happening because the real war between Egypt and Israel had already finished according to the second cease-fire agreement, and the period before the visit witnessed for the first time in history a direct secret official Egyptian-Israeli negotiation. These are definite proofs that President Sadat knew very well that any pre-emptive war against Egypt was something unreasonable.

However, Sadat's decision to visit Jerusalem at a time when all diplomatic means failed, and when the option of another war was eliminated because of its costly consequences for both sides, was a result of deep thinking. Sadat knew what he was doing and why he was doing it. Many thought that Sadat took that decision for<sup>1</sup>:

- 1) It is that complicating and exciting part in Sadat's character, in addition to his knowledge that such a decision would make him attract the attention of the world, and it is a part Sadat liked the most.
- 2) Sadat realized that having Begin reached the government, Begin would not have accepted anything that would seem acceptable to the Palestinians, and so the extremists will not start any initiative unless he (Sadat) makes the first move.

It seems that when Sadat decided to go to Jerusalem, he was aware of the consequences. Hoping for a better new situation, he moved on with the Israelis towards Camp David, signed in the year after the famous trip in 17<sup>th</sup> September, 1978<sup>2</sup>.

<sup>1</sup> Ibid, p. 64

<sup>2</sup> For more details, please refer to Haykal, Mohammad Hasanein, (1982). **Hadeeth Al Mubadara**. (2<sup>nd</sup> ed.). Beirut: Al Matboo'at Publishing.

About the visit, Sadat wrote<sup>1</sup>: I considered that mission really sacred... although I had trusted my people's support to my action, yet I was ready to head to the Parliament and resign if my people showed any objection.

Writing that, Sadat was confident about himself and his words reflected a deep thinking of a man who is responsible for his deeds before his people. This was a major characteristic in his character.

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<sup>1</sup> Al Sadat, Mohammad Anwar. *Al Bahth Ann Athat, Qissat Hayaty*. Op.cit, p. 324

## Part II: The Camp David Accords

The Camp David Accords acquired a great amount of importance due to the fact that by signing the agreement in 1978, President Sadat, and after visiting Israel in the year 1977, had officially recognized Israel, the Arabs' enemy for many long decades. This kind of agreement between two enemies for such a long time surprised everybody, and brought many Arab fundamentalists to criticize the Egyptian President for such a step<sup>1</sup>.

Moreover, this agreement opened the door for coming years of similar negotiation and agreements, as in the case of Jordan, the PLO, and Egypt again in 1979. Also it paved the way for diplomatic representation of Israel as in the case of Jordan and Egypt, by founding Israeli embassies in both countries.

As previously mentioned, many different actions and events that took place on the international level led to having these negotiations; firstly, Sadat's peace initiatives and intentions, and then, in the second place comes the Israeli responses to these initiatives.

Telling the story of the Camp David negotiations requires studying and analyzing attitudes of the parties involved –Egypt and Israel-, not forgetting the third party role –USA- which will be tackled in the coming part.

To start with, it is worth mentioning that Egypt's move was the step that opened the door, and without which, there might not have been any agreement nor would be the situation on the political level as it is now. Thus, Sadat's opening move was his historic trip to

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<sup>1</sup> Oakman, Jonathan, (2002, January 8). The Camp David Accords- A Case Study on International Negotiation. Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, WWS 547 (1/02) Princeton University. Retrieved September 26, 2006, from <http://www.wws.princeton.edu/cases/papers/campdavid.pdf>. p. 3.

Jerusalem to speak before the Knesset. It was the first substantial move toward an eventual peace accord between two feuding nations<sup>1</sup>.

Israel responded in Begin's opening move which was "to concede on one of Egypt's most important priorities", i.e. control of Sinai Peninsula<sup>2</sup>.

The case was as if Sadat gave a present to the Israelis –that was his peace initiative- and in return, the Israelis must have rewarded him- by withdrawing their troops from Sinai. The reward was mostly welcomed.

A question here could be raised: what were the objectives of both Israel and Egypt to go to Camp David negotiations, mediated by the United States of America?

Mohammad Kamil (1986), the Egyptian Foreign Minister during Camp David negotiations, wrote in his memoirs<sup>3</sup>: "*The 1967 War had ended catastrophically for the Arabs with Israel's occupation of the whole Egyptian Sinai Peninsula, the Golan Heights, and the West Bank, including Jerusalem and the Gaza Strip- or all that then remained of Palestine.*" On the same level, though the October War permitted "the Arab nation to breathe again", it extorted 14 billion pounds as well as enormous number of lives and equipments from Egypt<sup>4</sup>. Thus, Sadat's objectives were economic and territorial-political objectives during the negotiations, in addition to "coaxing" and convincing his American friend –and mediator- President Carter into offering the Arab nation an extended financial aid packet for economic damage, encountered during the previous decades of war<sup>5</sup>.

<sup>1</sup> Eagle, Clarissa C., (2002, September). Optimal Behavior in International Negotiation: an interdisciplinary study of Camp David. Peace Studies Journal, 3. Retrieved September 26, 2006, from [www.peacestudiesjournal.org.uk/docs/CampDavid.pdf](http://www.peacestudiesjournal.org.uk/docs/CampDavid.pdf), p. 3.

<sup>2</sup> Oakman, Jonathan, **The Camp David Accords- A Case Study on International Negotiation**. Op.cit, p. 3

<sup>3</sup> Kamil, Mohammad, (1986). **The Camp David Accords: A Testimony**. London: Kegan Paul International. p. 8

<sup>4</sup> Ibid, p. 10

<sup>5</sup> Eagle, Clarissa C., **Optimal Behavior in International Negotiation: an interdisciplinary study of Camp David**, Op.cit, p. 3

Similarly, Israel saw the negotiation as a chance to boost its economic environment by decreasing defense expenditures and release the resources for productive uses<sup>1</sup>. However, normally, Israel would have not only financial but also territorial aspirations for the upcoming negotiation. And in accordance with what Dayan had proposed, the Israeli goals include<sup>2</sup>:

1. A “buffer zone” in Sinai.
2. Certain “boundary changes” with Egypt.
3. Freedom of navigation in the Red Sea and the Gulf of Eilat.

In other words, the main concern of Israel was to “secure” its boundaries through the course of negotiation with Egypt. This was so as Israel knew fully that mere military superiority was not strong enough to deter its Arab enemies.<sup>3</sup>

Oakman (2002) explains the Israeli point of view in this sense. He says that Begin at that time felt he could solve both problems of economic downturn and security simultaneously by striking a bilateral peace with Egypt. “*By eliminating the largest Member State from the Arab coalition, Israel could afford to ratchet down defense spending while still feeling secure against potential military threats,*”<sup>4</sup> he says. Therefore, Begin’s bottom line in the negotiations with the Egyptians was:

- a- A peace treaty with Egypt and demilitarization of the Sinai.
- b- Avoiding as much as possible the Palestinian cause.

In addition to all that, maintaining the support of the United States was also crucial to the strategy because America was seen as the only party that could help broker and enforce such a

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<sup>1</sup> Ibid, p. 3+4

<sup>2</sup> Ibid, p. 4

<sup>3</sup> Oakman, Jonathan, **The Camp David Accords- A Case Study on International Negotiation.** Op.cit, p. 3

<sup>4</sup> Ibid, p. 5



deal<sup>1</sup>. As a result, both Sadat and Begin found themselves hamstrung by the need to address economic and security situations in their respective countries<sup>2</sup>.

Depending on the previous facts, and after the failure of Geneva Conference in 1973 in solving the Arab-Israeli conflicts, the American President Jimmy Carter invited both the Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin and the Egyptian President Anwar Al Sadat to have a direct negotiation in Camp David from 5 to 17 September, 1978. President Carter wrote in the invitation letter to the Prime Minister Begin, on August 3, 1978<sup>3</sup>:

*“During the past year under your leadership of Israel we have made remarkable progress toward peace. The boldness and leadership qualities exhibited by you and President Sadat have contributed to a new and better relationship between Egypt and Israel which was not anticipated by the rest of the world. In my opinion, you are the leader who...can and must continue this progress.”*<sup>4</sup>

Then, after recommending Camp David, Carter finished his letter by saying: *“Please remember that you have my continuing friendship and personal best wishes as we work together as partners in a common search for peace.”*

The reader of Carter’s invitation letter would realize the explicit hopes and high aspirations that Carter had, reflected and implied by three factors:

- A. Carter was impressed by Sadat’s willingness to negotiate with the Israelis, the thing that Sadat wanted to do.
- B. He was sure that it would be for the benefit of the Israelis to negotiate with the Egyptians. This was the only option available other than wars as the option of another war was considered pretty tiring for the Israeli economy and security.

<sup>1</sup> Stein, Janis Gross, (1993).The Political Economy of Security Agreements. In: Evans, Peter B., Jacobson, Harold K., and Putnam, Robert D., (Eds.), **Double-Edged Diplomacy**, (pp. 77-103). Berkeley: California UP. p. 83-84

<sup>2</sup> Oakman, Jonathan, **The Camp David Accords- A Case Study on International Negotiation**. Op.cit, p. 10

<sup>3</sup> Camp David Invitation Letter. Retrieved August 3, 2006, from <http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsourc/Peace/cdininvite.html>.

<sup>4</sup> For the full lines of the letter, please refer to Appendix 4, p. 270.

- C. Carter knew the Israeli need for the American support (friendship) in finance and arms as the Israelis were enhancing their existence in the region.

Knowing fully that both Israel and Egypt had an interest in a resolution of their differences, Egypt sought the return of the Sinai occupied by Israel after the 1967 War, while Israel sought enhanced security with the break in a solid Arab front, as Egypt became the first Arab state to recognize its legitimacy<sup>1</sup>.

On 8 August, President Sadat accepted Carter's invitation and so did Begin, and consequently, both delegations were named, yet because of the restricted accommodations at Camp David, each negotiating team had to severely limit the delegation attending the Summit of Three<sup>2</sup>. The delegations included the following figures:

- Representing Egypt:
  1. Anwar Al Sadat, President
  2. Mohammad Ibrahim Kamil, Minister of Foreign Affairs
  3. Boutros Ghaly, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs
  4. Osama Al Baz, Under Secretary of Foreign Affairs
  5. Ashraf Ghorbal, Ambassador to the United States
  6. Ahmad Mahir, Director of the Foreign Minister's Cabinet
  7. Abdel Ra'ouf Al Reedy, Director of Policy Planning, Foreign Ministry
  8. Nabeel El Araby, Legal Director of Foreign Ministry
  9. Ahmad Abu El Gheit, Office of the Foreign Minister

<sup>1</sup> Glad, Betty, Carter's Greatest Legacy: The Camp David Negotiations. Retrieved February 17, 2007, from [http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/amex/carter/sfeatures/sf\\_glad.html](http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/amex/carter/sfeatures/sf_glad.html).

<sup>2</sup> Delegations at Camp David. Retrieved August 24, 2006, from <http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsourc/Peace/cddels.html>

- Representing Israel:
  1. Menachem Begin, Prime Minister
  2. Moshe Dayan, Foreign Minister
  3. Ezer Weizman, Defense Minister
  4. Aharaon Barak, Attorney General and Member-designate of Supreme Court
  5. Avraham Tamir, Major General, Director of Army Planning Branch
  6. Simcha Dinitz, Ambassador to the United States
  7. Meir Rosenne, Legal Adviser to the Foreign Ministry
  8. Elyakim Robenstein, Assistant Director, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
  9. Dan Pattir, Public Affairs Adviser to the Prime Minister

Similarly, the American delegation was also named as follows:

1. Jimmy Carter, President
2. Walter Mondale, Vice-President
3. Cyrus Vance, Secretary of State
4. Zbigniew Brzezinski, National Security Adviser to the President
5. Hamilton Jordan, Staff of the President
6. Jody Powell, Presidential Press Secretary
7. Harold Saunders, Assistant Secretary of State for Near East Affairs
8. Alfred Atherton, Ambassador at Large
9. Hermann Eilts, Ambassador to Egypt
10. Samuel Lewis, Ambassador to Israel
11. William Quandt, Staff of National Security Council
12. Harold Brown, Secretary of Defense

The fact that the formation of any delegation to represent any state in any event reflects the importance of the event and how serious the state is to be involved. By analyzing the figures of each delegation, it could be noticed that the positions of these figures in the delegation show true determination in going to negotiate in Camp David. In addition, and due to the importance of the event, we realize that each delegation consisted of a number of legal advisers, ambassadors, and ministers. Taking a deeper look into each delegation, it is clear that all parties were well prepared for such talks at Camp David, mainly Israel and Egypt.

Israel had, besides its Prime Minister, two ministers of important ministries in Israel; Defense and Foreign Affairs, to control the negotiations in the political part, one legal adviser and one member-designate of the Supreme Court to control the legal part of the talks, one director of army planning to control the military part, its ambassador to the US, one assistant director, and one public affairs adviser to control other related issues.

The Egyptians had, on the other hand, besides their President, many members of one important ministry in Egypt, the Foreign Affairs as the whole event was an important foreign affair in the Egyptian politics. Varying from the minister, secretary, director of policy planning, legal director, to the Egyptian ambassador to the US, the delegation was chosen to master all aspects of the negotiation.

Comparing the Israeli and Egyptian delegations, it could be realized that the Israelis managed to put one man for one mission. It means that the diversity of specializations and positions in the delegation allowed them to perform more practically in the negotiation, while the Egyptians concentrated on one field (that is foreign affairs) and tried to master the negotiations, but the Israelis were tougher and more arrogant as they were about to lead the negotiation with the Egyptians to a deadlock many times, and here where the American President excelled as a mediator.

Talking about the Egyptian delegation, the situation did not help them much during the negotiations. First of all, the Israeli position was stronger than the Egyptian because Israel was participating in direct negotiations while still occupying Arabian territories in Sinai, Golan, and the West Bank and Gaza Strip after the October War had failed regaining them. Secondly, the military balance of power changed to Israeli's favor because of the American military support. As a result, the ability of the Israeli army was doubled in 1978 in comparison with 1973, while the ability of the Egyptian army shrank obviously in comparison with its position in 1973<sup>1</sup>. Thirdly, by signing the partial agreement with Israel in 1975, Egypt was committed not to use force and so, Egypt gave up its military option in defense. Fourthly, Israel had had an Israeli plan designed by the Zionist institution. The first stage was accomplished in 1948 when the State of Israel was founded and the second stage was accomplished too in 1967 with the occupation the Palestinian lands, Sinai, and Golan Heights<sup>2</sup>.

Furthermore, the Egyptian negotiating position weakened more when the partial agreement with Israel and then visiting Jerusalem led to a complete disconnection in the military cooperation with the Arabs as the oil-producing countries had suspended its economic aids and financing arms sales for Egypt. In addition, Egypt lost the Soviet political support facing the American support to Israel because of the successive decisions of Sadat against the Soviet Union (starting from expelling the Soviet advisers and ending with the suspension of the economic relation and the continuous attack on the Soviet Union policies).<sup>3</sup>

On their part, the Americans prepared themselves to play their role as a third party to the conflict. The American delegation was ready by including both ambassadors to Egypt and Israel, and one member staff of National Security Council, one press secretary (as publicity in

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<sup>1</sup> Riyad, Mahmoud. **Mahmoud Riyad Autobiography (1948-1978)**. Op.cit, pp. 576+577

<sup>2</sup> Ibid, p. 577

<sup>3</sup> Ibid, p. 579+580

such event mediated by the United States was important), in addition to the President Jimmy Carter and his Vice-President Mondale.

Accompanied by their capable negotiating teams and with their respective interest in mind, both leaders, Sadat and Begin, met in Camp David for thirteen days of tense and dramatic negotiations from September 5 through 17, 1978<sup>1</sup>.

In order to know what had happened within these thirteen days and how the agreement was concluded, below is a summary of the most important minutes of everyday at Camp David<sup>2</sup>:

**- September 5, 1978:**

- That day witnessed the arrival of President Sadat and Prime Minister Begin to Andrews Air Base in Washington<sup>3</sup>. (Ironically, it was the same air base to which the PLO delegation arrived to sign their Oslo agreement with the Israelis in 1993!)<sup>4</sup>
- That night, President Carter consulted with Prime Minister Begin from 8:30 to 10:53 PM. The President tried to assure Begin that the United States understood Israel's security concerns and would not deal in "hazy guarantees on the critical issue."
- Carter emphasized his hope that face to face negotiations would rid Begin and Sadat of their mutual suspicions and eventually lead to a successful agreement.

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<sup>1</sup> Camp David Accords. Retrieved July 8, 2006, from

[http://www.en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Camp\\_David\\_Accords\\_\(1978\)](http://www.en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Camp_David_Accords_(1978)). Op.cit

<sup>2</sup> All the minutes in the coming pages are taken from Camp David Day by Day. Retrieved August 24, 2006, from <http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/Peace/cddays.html>. Op.cit

<sup>3</sup> Khoury, Tariq and Barmamt, Mohammad. *Min Al Mubadara ILA Al Mu'ahada-Tataworat Al Ahdath WA Rodood Al Fi'l*. Op.cit, p. 15

<sup>4</sup> Oslo agreement is the subject of Chapter III.

**- September 6, 1978:**

- Sadat and Carter met and discussed Sadat's position. Sadat presented a detailed proposal entitled "Framework of the Comprehensive Peace...." The proposal raised every major issue and presented a hard line approach to Israel. Carter believed that such a proposal would doom the discussions to failure.
- Then, Sadat produces an extraordinary gesture of good faith. He gave the President a three-page memo outlining concessions that Egypt would accept and encouraged the President to use them at the appropriate time. It is important to note here that submitting such proposal and concessions since the first day weakened Sadat's negotiating ability, and caused the Israelis to refuse and reject every point in it.
- Later, Begin and Sadat met face to face with Carter to discuss the Sadat's Framework.

**- September 7, 1978:**

- Begin and Sadat met face to face twice with the American President, and these meetings were less cordial than the previous. Begin disproved each of Sadat's points in the Egyptian "Framework". Sadat replied the discussion proved that Begin wanted territory more than he wanted peace.
- Behind the scenes, American Secretary of State Vance carried on explorations with others in the Israeli delegation, primarily Dayan and Weizman. In these conversations, the Israelis raised two important issues: their settlements and airfields in Sinai. Dayan and Weizman suggested that they could reach some kind of an agreement on the Sinai settlements and those on the West Bank. Dayan urged the USA to assume responsibility for putting forward a proposal of its own as the Israelis and Egyptians could go no further on their own.

**- September 8, 1978:**

- Sadat urged that, “Begin is making withdrawal conditional on land acquisition. Begin is not ready for peace.”
- In his meeting with Begin, Carter told him that the Israelis must not dwell on the Sadat proposal and suggested that Sadat had already agreed to a number of compromises which Carter now had in hand. Begin emphasized the Israelis' unwillingness to abandon the Sinai settlements and its continued claims to sovereignty in the disputed areas (Sinai, West Bank, and Gaza). He also complained that the American position in the negotiations had shifted from being a mediator to actively taking sides.

**- September 9, 1978:**

- Carter developed a list called “Necessary Elements of Agreement” to assist the team developing the draft of the American proposal. Sadat conferred with his delegation.
- On this day, Weizman met with Sadat twice to discuss the details. On each issue, Sadat indicated that the Egyptians would not accept any further suggestions from the Israelis until after the Americans had developed their proposal.
- The American President discussed the American proposal at four o'clock, adding his suggestions. In particular, the President added the word “minor” to the draft on modifying the 1967 lines on the West Bank and Gaza. Carter intended that this wording would become a bargaining chit in his negotiations with Begin.

**- September 10, 1978:**

- In two dramatic meetings (one held in the late afternoon and the other, a five and one-half hour meeting beginning at 9:30), Carter presented the American proposal to the Israeli



delegation. The exchanges became sharp when Begin focused on the American insistence on adhering to the UN Resolution 242. Carter insisted that an Israeli disavowal of 242 would scuttle the peace process. Begin eventually responded “We do not consider the resolution to be self-implementing.”

- Further, heated discussions revolved around the issue of self-rule on the Israeli occupied West Bank. The Americans argued that the Israeli proposal for vetoes and controls amounted to political control. Moshe Dayan responded, “...we are not after political control. If it looks that way to you, we will look at it again.” Carter suggested that Sadat might be willing to sign a separate peace treaty provided the Israelis showed some flexibility.
- Carter, then, outlined his priorities:
  - Sovereignty in the West Bank and Gaza would not be resolved at Camp David.
  - The question of the settlements would have to be added to any agreement.
  - A specific agreement on the Israeli withdrawal from Sinai would be concluded at Camp David.
- In securing these objectives, Carter revealed that he would push Sadat to accept the language that only representatives of the “permanent residents of the West Bank and Gaza will participate in the negotiations—not all Palestinians.” Sadat had proposed to agree with this compromise language in his earlier memo to the American President.

**- September 11, 1978:**

- At 3:00 AM, the meeting ended with the Israelis promising they would produce recommended changes to the American proposal by 8:00 AM. After making revisions responding to the Israeli position, Carter presented a revised American proposal to Sadat.
- Sadat offered that he would be willing to allow the Israeli settlers to remain in Sinai for three years and he might consider allowing Israelis to control two of the airfields in Sinai for the same length of time. The Americans can not reveal this position, though. Sadat would discuss the draft with his colleagues.
- The eventual Egyptian position taken that day turned out more pessimistic than Sadat's original reaction. Foreign Minister Kamil argued that Sadat's tendency to overlook how details would undermine his position in Egypt and the Arab world had led to Sadat's original optimism. In fact, though, Kamil argued that the proposal was unacceptable to Egypt in a number of ways.

**- September 12, 1978:**

- In a morning meeting, Sadat and President Carter discussed the American proposal. Sadat recounted his troubles with the Egyptian delegation and indicated he felt discouraged. He, nevertheless, told Carter that he probably would eventually sign the accords, after going through the motions of fighting on some issues. Carter assessed the meeting as indicating that Sadat would be cooperative.
- During the late morning, Begin and Brzezinski discussed the situation of dismantling the Israeli settlements in Sinai. Begin asserted: "My right eye will fall out; my right hand will fall off before I ever agree to the dismantling of a single Jewish settlement." Brzezinski

argued that the Arabs perceived the settlements as a form of colonialism and that the Israelis should be more sensitive to this Arab point of view.

- Dayan and Vance discussed the Sinai settlement situation, with Dayan arguing for completing a limited agreement leaving vague the question of settlements. Vance rejected the suggestion and Dayan said that he had tried his best to avert disaster. History would show, he said that this conversation with Vance had been the last chance to salvage something.
- Meanwhile, the President worked on a draft agreement he entitled a "Framework for a Settlement in the Sinai." The text represented Carter's own views on a potential solution. Sadat found Carter's "Framework" largely acceptable. Begin, however, became very concerned with the situation.
- In a late night meeting with Carter, Begin outlined his inability to accept the reference in UN 242 that claimed the "inadmissibility of acquisition of territory by war." Brzezinski interpreted this position to mean that Begin was maneuvering to protect his interests in claims to the West Bank territory seized from Jordan. Near the end of the meeting, Begin pulled out a type-written statement and read it, indicating willingness on Israel's part to end the negotiations unsuccessfully rather than agree to the general tenets of the American proposal.
- In a heated exchange, Begin raised the question of whether Israel acted as a colonial power exercising military rule over the Palestinians. President Carter accused Begin of throwing away a promising peace just to keep "a few illegal settlers on Egyptian land." As he left, Begin said that Israel would not want territory in the Sinai and would not want settlements on the West Bank for the first five years of the peace.

- Meanwhile, Vance and Brzezinski continued to work with staff to develop a new revision, incorporating the agreed upon changes and searching for ways to accommodate the Israeli positions.

**-September 13, 1978:**

- Carter and Vance spent a good deal of the day working with Israeli Attorney General Aharon Barak and Osama El-Baz from the Egyptian delegation. The Israelis continued to press for excluding the language of UN Resolution 242 that has to do with acquiring territory through war. And finally, the proposed final accord would only refer to 242 generally and then would append the text of 242 to the accord. A similar arrangement was constructed covering the sticky problem of referring to the Palestinian people as "Palestinian Arabs," which Begin insisted on doing while the Americans and Egyptians considered this an unreasonable point. In the end, all sides agreed to use their own phrases and Carter and Begin would exchange letters recognizing the linguistic differences.
- This team proposed an agreement on the status of Jerusalem, keeping it undivided and providing for free access to the holy places. Both Begin and Sadat agreed, thus sealing the deal. The problem of settlements still prevented progress, however. Both Barak and later Begin adamantly refused to agree to remove Sinai settlers while El-Baz refused to commit to open borders and full diplomatic recognition. This seemed to establish a quid pro quo on these two issues.

**- September 14, 1978:**

- With the Israelis adamant on the issue of Sinai settlers, the US President began to worry that the process of negotiations will eventually fail. Brzezinski and Vance added some

language to the American proposal that bolster Sadat's position. Having to do with the status of Jerusalem, these provisions drew a strongly negative reaction from Begin. "Non-possumus," he called the provisions for elections in the West Bank. And Sadat would not allow for any finessing of the question of Sinai. Without resolving the Sinai settlements question, Sadat would not sign an agreement. Instead he would agree to the American draft and leave it at that.

- Faced with such strongly divergent positions, Vance and Brzezinski begin to plan for the possible collapse of the talks. They recommended that the administration coordinate with Sadat to make it clear that the responsibility for failure rested with the Israelis. Carter phoned Vice-President Mondale to request that he comes up to Camp David in order to deliver a message to the Israelis about the potential plight of the talks. Brzezinski's strategy in making the request rested on the belief that the Israelis believed that Mondale is a strong supporter of the Israeli cause.
- The American position was that two fundamental stumbling blocks stood in the way of the talk's success: the Sinai settlements and how to achieve an Israeli withdrawal from the Sinai, and how to determine of the West Bank and Gaza, given the UN Resolution 242 emphasis undermining the status of territory obtained in war.

**- September 15, 1978:**

- The American team met to discuss how to proceed in the next few days, assuming that the talks had reached an impasse and would eventually fail to reach an agreement. The plan called for developing a joint communiqué and a Monday night presidential address. Over lunch with Harold Brown and Brzezinski, Weizman offered a deal on the Sinai airfields question - if the US would replace the lost airfields, the Israelis would give them up. The

US President decided he would not go along with such a deal unless the Israelis agreed to the whole American proposal.

- An afternoon meeting between Mondale, Brown, Vance and Brzezinski on the one hand and Dayan, Barak, and Weizman on the other. Barak devised a proposal for resolving the Sinai question -- with Sadat's agreement on a framework for the West Bank and Gaza; Begin would sign the American proposal on Sinai. The Israelis would then begin withdrawing from Sinai except for a thin security zone which they would retain until a peace treaty could be signed. Sadat would then be signing an agreement over the West Bank and Gaza while basically postponing a show down on the Sinai.
- In the middle of the work on these contingencies, the entire process was derailed as President Sadat decided to withdraw from the negotiations and leave without any formal actions at all. With Sadat arranging to leave, the entire Camp David negotiations would have failed.
- After considering the options, President Carter dressed into more formal clothes and went to Sadat's cabin for a show-down. Sadat recounted how Dayan had told him earlier that Israel would not sign any agreement. Carter recounted to Sadat the dire consequences for relations with the US if the Egyptians pulled out. In addition, Carter emphasized how Sadat's failure would bolster his critics in the Arab World, damaging his own reputation. Carter pleaded for patience for at least two more days. Sadat eventually agreed.

**- September 16, 1978:**

- The American President met with the Israeli Defense Minister, Ezer Weizman. Reviewing the current American proposal with his staff, the President chose stronger language constraining Israeli West Bank expansion. They also discussed the possibilities for

including the Palestinians in determining their own future and the Sinai settlements question.

- A morning meeting with the Israelis hosted by Vance focused on the issue of the West Bank and the UN Resolution 242 language.
- In a late morning to early afternoon meeting, Vance and Carter proposed a solution to the question of Palestinian autonomy which Sadat accepted as well as language on the treatment of Jerusalem, as long as the US would agree to an "exchange of letters" reaffirming the US position that Jerusalem is part of the West Bank.
- In a protracted meeting between the Israeli and American principals, Carter went through the entire draft framework listing the common positions and detailing the remaining sticking points. Begin insisted on an agreement over Sinai in which the parties would continue negotiating for a final peace treaty and after three months, if they were successful then he would submit the question of withdrawing the settlements to the Knesset. Carter pointed out that Sadat has consistently opposed such a proposition. Begin finally agreed to a Knesset vote over removing the Sinai settlements contingent upon settling all other Sinai issues (e.g., the question of airfields). With that agreement, Begin removed the roadblock to successfully concluding an agreement.

**- September 17, 1978:**

- The day began with Carter reviewing with Sadat the agreement as worked out with the Israelis. Sadat disagreed over the treatment of Jerusalem, as had Begin. The American proposal was to drop the language on Jerusalem and Begin had agreed to an exchange of letters stating each party's position. The American proposal reaffirmed its longstanding position, including the contention that Israel's position in East Jerusalem was an

illegitimate occupation. Begin refused to accept this letter and threatened that if the US did not change its letter, then the Israelis would not sign the accords.

- Meeting with Dayan, Weisman, and Barak, Mondale, Vance, and Brzezinski, Carter discussed the possible revisions of the American and Israeli letters on Jerusalem. The American position merely restated the positions of its three previous UN Ambassadors. Carter suggested restating the American letter by simply reaffirming its previous positions without stating them.
- The final issue remaining arose over the language on the Knesset vote. Begin's letter restated the agreement to mean that the Knesset vote would result in commencement of the peace negotiations while the agreement had been that no peace negotiations would commence until the Knesset voted. Carter insisted on the original language and eventually devised letters preserving that position and to which the Israelis would agree. With this final agreement, the three parties had reached a final accord.
- The Camp David delegations arrived at the White House at 10:15 PM and went immediately to the East Room where they signed the Accords.

**- September 18, 1978:**

- On Monday evening, President Carter addressed the Congress, reporting on the Camp David negotiations and the accords. Both Sadat and Begin were in the audience.

It is worth mentioning here that the Egyptian performance in the negotiation was weaker than the Israeli's, and because of the concessions the Egyptians made regarding the Palestinian cause –although the Egyptian delegation had not had the right to negotiate on the Palestinians' behalf-, the Egyptian Foreign Minister Mohammad Ibrahim Kamil believed that he can not



accept that frame of peace after changing from a comprehensive peace agreement into a bilateral peace between Egypt and Israel alone. Also he objected Egypt speaking for the Palestinian people in the absence of its representatives. Because of all that, Kamil resigned and refused to attend the signing ceremony of the agreement<sup>1</sup>.

After revising the most important details of the talks at Camp David, the following points could be realized<sup>2</sup>:

1. President Carter played an essential role in keeping the negotiation on track, and he was reluctant to allow the two men (Sadat and Begin) to leave without reaching an agreement.
2. For many times, both Egyptian and Israeli leaders wanted to leave and scrap the negotiations. Carter's trials to bring them back into the process had been successful.
3. Begin and Sadat had such mutual antipathy toward one another that they rarely had gone for direct contact.
4. The details of the talks show that Carter had to go for "shuttle diplomacy" by holding one-on-one meetings with either Sadat or Begin in one cabin.
5. The "Sinai Settlements" issue created an impasse to the negotiation process. Reaching this point, Carter had to go back again between both parties and chose not to cut off the negotiation, blaming Begin for it.
6. Jerusalem was a difficult issue to deal with; thus, it was put off for later negotiation in Madrid Conference and what followed it of negotiations and agreements<sup>3</sup>.

<sup>1</sup> Riyad, Mahmoud. **Mahmoud Riyad Autobiography (1948-1978)**. Op.cit, p. 583

<sup>2</sup> Camp David Accords. Retrieved July 8, 2006, from [http://www.en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Camp\\_David\\_Accords\\_\(1978\)](http://www.en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Camp_David_Accords_(1978)). Op.cit

<sup>3</sup> Assayed Hussein, Adnan. **Camp David Itar Litasweyya**. Op.cit, p. 71

As a result, Camp David Accords were born to the world in a form of two agreements: the first is a “Framework for Peace in the Middle East” which dealt with the concept of peace and the future of the West Bank, Gaza Strip, and Egypt-Israel relations. The second is a “Framework for the Conclusion of a Peace Treaty between Egypt and Israel”, which talked about the Israeli interim withdrawal, navigation, and UN forces stationing<sup>1</sup>. The second agreement led to having the “Israeli-Egyptian Peace Treaty” signed in March, 1979.

Looking at the first agreement, it consists of three parts: the first was about an autonomous self-governing authority in the West Bank and Gaza; the second part talked about the Egypt-Israel relations in two main points only, regulating the relations between them in cases of disputes, peace and negotiation, and stating a goal of concluding a peace treaty within three months from the signing of the agreement; and finally, the third part “Associated Principles”, which dealt with declared principles that should apply to relations between Israel and all of its Arab neighbors<sup>2</sup>, were mainly regarding full recognition of Israel, economic boycotts and endorsing peace treaties.

In a more detailed look, the second agreement outlined the coming Israeli-Egyptian Peace Treaty, particularly, deciding the future of the Sinai Peninsula<sup>3</sup>. It was also agreed to the withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from Sinai, the freedom of the Israeli ships to pass through the Gulf of Suez Canal, and finally stationing of military forces.

After that quick revision of the contents of both agreements of Camp David, it would be necessary to analyze the strategic aspects and dimensions of these agreements to know their effects on the Egyptian and Israeli levels. In a study published in the “Arab Strategic Thought”

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<sup>1</sup> Ibid, p. 70

<sup>2</sup> Camp David Accords. Retrieved July 8, 2006, from [http://www.en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Camp\\_David\\_Accords\\_\(1978\)](http://www.en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Camp_David_Accords_(1978)). Op.cit

<sup>3</sup> Ibid

magazine (Al Fikr Al Estrateeji Al Araby) in April- July, 1985, Abdel Men'im Al Mashat, under the title of "The Strategic Dimensions of the Camp David Accords", wrote that Camp David Accords include a number of strategic dimensions to be taken into consideration<sup>1</sup>:

One: military imbalance between Egypt and Israel, especially the restrictions imposed by the accords on Egypt affecting its strategy forming.

Two: growing strategic relations between Israel and America.

Three: special military relations between Egypt and America.

Four: a minimized Egyptian role in Arabian conflicts and interactions, especially toward the Lebanese crisis.

Five: Israel's plans in Africa and its effects on forming an Egyptian continental strategy.

These strategic dimensions can be analyzed as follows:

*First. Military imbalance between Israel and Egypt:*

It is clear that both Camp David Agreements and the Israeli-Egyptian Peace Treaty played an essential role in showing the military imbalance occurred between Egypt and Israel which started to grow after the October War 1973, and this imbalance became one vital fact in the Arab-Israeli conflict in its fifth decade. It is enough to point out that the Egyptian army had 2200 main fighting tanks in 1973 War, while the Israeli army owned 2400 similar tanks at that time, and then in mid 1983 Egypt had 1900 fighting tanks facing around 4000 similar tanks owned by the Israeli army<sup>2</sup>. This means that the balance average in tanks number increased from 1.09:1 in favor of Israel in the year 1973, and reached 2.1:1 for Israel, too. This is due to the great

<sup>1</sup> Al Mashat, Abdel Men'im, (1985). Al Ab'ad Al Estrateejiya Litifaqyyat Camp David. **Majallat Al Fikr Al Estrateeji Al Arabi**. (13-14): 55-72. p. 58

<sup>2</sup> Ibid, p. 58

restrictions of the agreements on the abilities of the Egyptian strategist in drawing his/her strategy for national defense. These restrictions –according to Al Mashat- start from limiting the ability of the decision-maker in determining who his enemy is or the source of real threat to national security, to imposing limits on the Egyptian forces movements.

Moreover, Al Mashat points out the restrictions in the Israeli-Egyptian Peace Treaty. For example, the First Article stated that both parties are not to threat to use force directly or indirectly against each other. Another example is the Sixth Article (Paragraph Four) which states that both parties should not be involved in any commitment which goes against the treaty. In other words, this Article imposes restrictions on the Egyptian strategists and decision-makers not to look to Israel as a source of threat to the national security. As a result of minimizing Egypt's role in the region and the military strategic imbalance between Egypt and Israel due to the Camp David Agreements and the Peace Treaty, a military strategic imbalance occurred in the neighboring countries, i.e., Syria and Jordan on one hand, and Israel on the other. For instance, in the year 1983, Israel could reinforce half million soldiers, while Syria could reinforce only around 325 thousand soldiers.

Generally, Israelis look at this military superiority as an important means to impose their conditions in any settlement with the Arabs.

*Second. Growing strategic relations between Israel and the US<sup>1</sup>:*

The Israeli objectives since its existence have been achieving peace, universal recognition and acceptance, security, and economic as well as social well-being<sup>1</sup>.

<sup>1</sup> Ibid, p. 65

Thus, the history of special relations between Israel and the United States goes back to the moment of founding the State of Israel in May, 1948, as the US, especially intelligence and military departments, consider Israel as the only ally which can be relied on to face the Soviet power in the region. However, the Israelis themselves realize that without the huge American subsidies Israel would not be able to go further in the arms race in the region.

After Camp David Agreements the total of the American sales of weapons to Israel increased. For example, between the years 1982 and 1983 the value of these sales increased around 21%, as the total amount of these sales reached 1,7 billion US\$. This is the largest value of arms sales America gave to any country in the world.

*Third. Special military relations between Egypt and the US<sup>2</sup>:*

No doubt that a special military relation between Egypt and the US had notably increased after the Camp David Agreements and the Peace Treaty with Israel in March 1979. Al Mashat evaluates the effects of these relations on Egypt and Israel's strategies through two hypotheses<sup>3</sup>:

1. We live in a world of exchanged dependencies and complicating interests among the countries, thus, Egypt needs the American subsidies and logistic support, exchanging it with its strategic and important location. In other words, Egypt gives up its strategic importance and dimensions in exchange of receiving the American subsidies and logistic support.

<sup>1</sup> Reich, Bernard, (2001). Israeli Foreign Policy. In: Brown, L. Carl, (Ed.), **Diplomacy in the Middle East: The International Relations of Regional and Outside Powers**, (pp. 121-137). New York: I.B. Tauris & Co Ltd. p. 121

<sup>2</sup> Al Mashat, Abdel Men'im, (1985). **Al Ab'ad Al Estrateejiya Litifaqyyat Camp David**. Op.cit, p. 66

<sup>3</sup> Ibid, p. 67

It is worth mentioning here that Camp David Agreement resulted in the United States committing to several billion dollars worth of annual subsidies to the governments of both Israel and Egypt<sup>1</sup>. In Egypt's case, the allying with the US brings in more than \$2 billion a year in direct aid. It also helps grease economic relations with other Western countries, and results in occasional windfalls, such as the decision by Washington to reward the Egyptian support in the Gulf War (in a later stage) by canceling Cairo's \$7 billion military debt<sup>2</sup>. This shows that the agreement of Camp David guaranteed to Egypt future American aids and support.

2. Every party on the international level tries to maximize its national gains, especially securing its national security through its interactions with other states. This is applicable on the Egyptian case as the Egyptian government seeks to defend its national security through these special relations. In numbers, the total American subsidies to Egypt between 1975 and 1982 reached around 7.2 billion dollars. However, since signing the Peace Treaty of Egypt and Israel, the American-Egyptian relations have been improving increasingly as Egypt offered the US logistic facilities in Rass-Benass area, and allowed shared military maneuvers known as Bright Stars I, II, and III.

To look at the issue from a different angle, some problematic points appear:

- a- At the time Israel gets a huge amounts of developed American weapons which is highly sufficient (include 40 F-15, 72 F-16, and 131 F-4 phantom) –in addition to technical and financial support-, Egypt gets limited amounts of the developed American weapons represented in 40 fighters (F-16) and 35 old (F-4 phantom).

<sup>1</sup> Camp David Accords. Retrieved July 8, 2006, from [http://www.en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Camp\\_David\\_Accords\\_\(1978\)](http://www.en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Camp_David_Accords_(1978)). Op.cit

<sup>2</sup> Doran, Michael, (2001). Egypt: Pan-Arabism in Historical Context. In: Brown, L. Carl, (Ed.), **Diplomacy in the Middle East: The International Relations of Regional and Outside Powers**, (pp. 97-120). New York: I.B. Tauris & Co Ltd. p. 116

- b- While the Israeli arms strategy is described as continuous, the change from the Soviet weapons to American weapons in Egypt caused a main transformation in the arms strategy within the Egyptian army which could lead to –at least in the short run- to lose any relative superiority in facing Israel.
- c- The dependency on sending young Egyptian military leaders for training in the US would change the ideas, principles, and values those young people have, which would necessarily affect their political attitudes and strategic dimensions in the region.

As a result, the shift from the Soviet to the American weapons, the limited amounts and quality of weapons, and the change of attitudes caused Egypt to lose its powerful influence in the region as an Arab state facing Israel, which was receiving the stable American financial and weaponry aids, not forgetting that Egypt's dependency on the Soviet weaponry started to minimize as the Soviets were slow in their responses to Sadat's calls for providing arms before and during the October War, while the US showered Israel with the most efficient military tools and tanks. Furthermore, Egypt lost the Arabs' support as most of the Arab regimes broke off relations with Cairo, and the headquarters of the Arab League were moved to Tunisia.

*Fourth. The minimized Egyptian role in the Arabs' conflicts and interactions- the Lebanese crisis in special:*

It is clear that the Israeli occupation to Lebanon in June 1982 is not directly related to the Camp David Agreements, yet what the agreement included in addition to the Peace Treaty limited Egypt's movements in this field. After Egypt being a central regional power, it started to move in the periphery only, as after signing the agreements,

diplomatic relations between Egypt and most of the Arab countries were broke off, except Sudan and Oman. At the same time, Israel enjoyed a higher level of movement freedom in accomplishing its national security especially that the previous agreements worked on restricting its first adversary in the conflict- Egypt. This might have allowed Israel to feel unafraid or unthreatened to take some actions like bombing the Iraqi nuclear plant, adhering the Golan Heights, building more settlements, occupying Lebanon, and cause the Palestinians to a new Diaspora.

What Al Mashat tries to say is that Egypt the center (before Camp David) should have done something facing the Israeli violations, but Egypt the periphery (after Camp David) is unable to take any action in the region, and so, Israel turned to be a state which could impose its own national security as a central state after being a marginal state.

This new balance appeared clearly in the Lebanese crisis in 1982 when Israel occupied Lebanon. While Egypt used to play a significant role in all the Lebanese crises since 1958, it could not take any positive stand in the last. About that, Doran (2001) wrote<sup>1</sup>: *"The decision to make peace with Israel precipitated a bitter divorce between Egypt and the Arab world."*

*Fifth. The Israeli plans in Africa and its effects on the conclusion of a continental strategy<sup>2</sup>:*

Having Egypt been a regional leader in the Arab World and Africa, it would be normal that African states would follow the Egyptian model in its international relations, or at least show support to its international stands in the world. The

<sup>1</sup> Ibid, p. 116

<sup>2</sup> Al Mashat, Abdel Men'im. *Al Ab'ad Al Estratejiya Litifaqyyat Camp David*. Op.cit, p. 70



Egyptian role in Africa had increased before the October War 1973, but after signing the Camp David Accords, many questions were raised by Africans about that role, at a time when the Israeli diplomacy and economic establishments started to open doors of cooperation with the Africans. In this sense, Sharon, the previous Israeli Minister of Defense, announced that Africa and the Middle East are inseparable in the future Israeli plans. Thus, he visited 6 African countries in early 1982, as the diplomatic relations between Israel and Zaire, and Israel and Liberia were brought to normal, following by that Egypt which was the first African country to normalize its relations with Israel. In addition to that, the Israeli economic activities maximized in Africa, reaching 190.9 million dollars in 1980<sup>1</sup>.

In final analysis, Camp David and the Peace Treaty made Egypt uncommitted to the Arab World, which is the opposite of what Egypt used to be in the past: a defender of the Arabs' rights and a resistant to the Israeli expansion plans in the Middle East.

Similarly, the agreement of Camp David was described as a dangerous stage in the Arab-Israeli conflict for the following reasons:<sup>2</sup>

- 1) The agreement limited the Egyptian sovereignty on Sinai, and determined the military forces locations (with previous Israeli approval), leaving  $\frac{3}{4}$  of Sinai non-armed, as Egypt recognized Israel and started diplomatic relations with it.
- 2) The agreements caused an imbalance in the military power of Israel and Arabs, benefiting Israel. For instance, the military power of Arabs (Jordan and Syria)

<sup>1</sup> Ibid, 71

<sup>2</sup> Nofal, Ahmad Sa'id. *Malamih Assira' Al Araby-Al Israeli Montho Qiyam Israel Hatta Camp David*. Op.cit, p. 141

decreased to 261 thousand soldiers (while it was 611 thousand soldiers with the Egyptian army), in comparison with 591 thousand Israeli soldiers.

- 3) Egypt (after being the biggest and most important Arab country) was driven away from the conflict and concluded a unilateral peace with Israel on the expense of its relations with Arab countries.
- 4) The Israeli existence in Palestine became a “legitimate and acceptable” issue, the thing that was unexpected by neither the Egyptians nor the Arabs.
- 5) After the peace treaty with Egypt, Israel dared to bomb the Iraqi nuclear plant, attacked the Palestinians in Lebanon, and occupied Beirut.
- 6) The peace treaty caused cracks in the Arabs' solidarity, the thing which created a state of depression and pessimism in the Arab World.
- 7) The agreement changed the attitudes of the Arab States and the PLO regarding Israel, thus the Organization changed its strategy, and the Palestinian and Arab recognition of Israel was not a taboo any more. All this paved the way later to Madrid, Washington, and Oslo.
- 8) The treaty accomplished what Israel had wished for since years: to disassociate Egypt from the Arab World as Israel knew that without the Egyptian qualified role in leading the Arab countries, they would not be able to attack Israel.

In the same field, the most important gains which Israel got out of the accords and the peace treaty can be summarized in four points<sup>1</sup>:

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<sup>1</sup> Abu Ezzidine, Ameen, (1991). Camp David Wa Ab'adoha Al Eqleemiya Wa Addowliyya. **Al Mustaqbal Al Arabi**. (143): 155-162. p. 158

- A. Egypt became the only Arab State which signed the agreement, pretending to represent all Arabs.
- B. Camp David Accords were inconsistent with the principle of the Palestinian Autonomy.
- C. Imposing restrictions on Arab and Egyptian sovereignty on Sinai by limiting the areas within which the Egyptian forces could move.
- D. Israel accomplished the Egyptian and American consent to continue occupying the West Bank and Gaza, in addition to separating Egypt from the Arab-Israeli conflict, and guaranteeing the Egyptian involvement in cultural, economic, and diplomatic relations with Israel<sup>1</sup>.

A striking event like Camp David and the Peace Treaty created strong reactions in the world, especially among Arabs who, for the first time, witnessed direct negotiations and peace agreement with their adversary: Israel.

The following is a quick look on how the world did receive those talks on three levels: nationally (in Egypt), regionally (in the Arab world), and internationally (in the rest of the world).

◆ Reactions in Egypt:

As mentioned before, Arabs, not only in the Arab World but also in the rest of the world, found themselves facing their classical enemy in new terms, the thing that caused different reactions, most of which were against what Camp David concluded. The case in Egypt was more sensitive because it was an Egyptian leader, Egyptian initiative, and Egyptian peace with Israel.

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<sup>1</sup> Riyadh, Mahmoud. **Mahmoud Riyadh Autobiography (1948-1978)**. Op.cit, pp. 576+577

On the 18<sup>th</sup> September, 1978, President Sadat announced in a very optimistic letter addressed from Washington to the Egyptian people that what had been reached to in Camp David was a comprehensive solution which opens new opportunities for all parties<sup>1</sup>.

Although the Egyptian press tries to create a positive view of their government to make the Egyptian people accept and welcome the agreement, Egyptians in the streets expressed their refusal to Camp David, emphasizing that what the system wants does not necessarily comply with the will of its people<sup>2</sup>. The refusal and anger reached students, workers, intellectuals, and different political parties, and many called for working to dethrone Sadat<sup>3</sup>. On 3<sup>rd</sup> October, 1978 Reuters mentioned that members of the previous Revolutionary Command Council attacked the Camp David Accords and considered it as a strong “hit” to the Egyptian sovereignty<sup>4</sup>. Also they sent a letter to President Sadat saying that Camp David would isolate Egypt, weaken the Arabs, finalize the Palestinian issue, and make the Israeli policies more legitimate. They also urged Sadat to rethink before taking any new step. These leaders were: Abdel Latif al Baghdady, Zakariya Mohiyeddin, Hussein al Shaf’y, and Kamal-addin Hussein.

◆ Reactions in the Arab world:

The reactions were not too different from those in Egypt.

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<sup>1</sup> Ibid, p. 590

<sup>2</sup> Studies Department in Palestine Al Mohtalla, (1980). **Camp David-'Ala Marahil Atta'amor 'Ala Asha'b Al Filasteeny**. p. 96+97

<sup>3</sup> Ibid, p. 97

<sup>4</sup> Khoury, Tariq and Barmamt, Mohammad. **Min Al Mubadara ILA Al Mu'ahada-Tataworat Al Ahdath WA Rodood Al Fi'l**. Op.cit, p. 85

- The **Jordanian** government criticized the agreement, and announced that Jordan does not consider itself committed verbally, politically, or legally to the consequences of Camp David in which it did not participate, and that any fair settlement which Jordan would accept should include an Israeli withdrawal from all Arabian occupied territories<sup>1</sup>.
- The **Palestinian** Liberation Organization (PLO) also criticized and refused the agreement, and condemned all agreements and treaties between Egypt and Israel, and it assured the continuity of the Palestinian Revolution<sup>2</sup>. All Palestinians in Lebanon, Syria, and other Arab states, in France, Australia, and European countries expressed their anger and denial to the agreements in the forms of strikes, announcements, and demonstrations all over the world. In the occupied lands of Palestine, people went out to the streets in demonstrations, denying Camp David in Nablus, schools and shops were closed in Jerusalem, and students stroked and demonstrated in Ramalla and many other Palestinian villages<sup>3</sup>.
- The **Syrian** government condemned and criticized the agreements through official announcements and media, and also Syrian people went into strikes to express the refusal to the agreement. Syrian press attacked the agreement viciously by saying it serves the American and Zionist interests<sup>4</sup>.
- **Iraq**, following the signing of Camp David, took the lead in organizing an Arab boycott to Egypt. In response, most Arab regimes broke off their relations with

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<sup>1</sup> Ibid, p. 97

<sup>2</sup> Studies Department in Palestine Al Mohtalla. **Camp David-'Ala Marahil Atta'amor 'Ala Asha'b Al Filasteeny**. Op.cit, p. 97

<sup>3</sup> Ibid, pp. 85-91

<sup>4</sup> Ibid, pp. 91+92

Cairo<sup>1</sup>. The Iraqi press attacked the Camp David meeting and its results, besides the condemnation of the accords by all organizations, parties, and students as they all called for an Arabian revolutionary reaction to bring the agreements to failure<sup>2</sup>. In addition to this, the Iraqi Revolutionary Command Council announced on 29 September 1978 that Iraq calls for founding a national fund to help Egypt in its economic crisis, and suggested that participation should include Iraq, Libya, Algeria, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA), Kuwait, Qatar, and United Arab Emirates<sup>3</sup>. Moreover, Iraq invited Arab presidents and kings to an immediate meeting of Arab foreign ministers in Baghdad in 20<sup>th</sup> October to prepare for an urgent meeting of the Arab Summit in Baghdad in the 1<sup>st</sup> of November to study the situation. As a result, the Summit disapproved the agreements and all its political, economic, and legal consequences, and issued a resolution (the ninth resolution) that stated the suspension of Egypt's membership in the Arab League<sup>4</sup>, and removing the League headquarters from Egypt in the case of signing a peace treaty with Israel by Sadat<sup>5</sup>. Also, the Arab League decided to put an economic and political embargo on Egypt<sup>6</sup>.

- **Lebanon, Libya, Algeria, Yemen, Sudan, Tunisia,** and other states' reactions were not different: people denied and refused, and press wrote and described.

<sup>1</sup> Doran, Michael, **Egypt: Pan-Arabism in Historical Context**. Op.cit, p. 116

<sup>2</sup> Studies Department in Palestine Al Mohtalla. **Camp David-'Ala Marahil Atta'amor 'Ala Asha'b Al Filasteeny**. Op.cit, p. 94

<sup>3</sup> Khoury, Tariq and Barmamt, Mohammad. **Min Al Mubadara ILA Al Mu'ahada-Tataworat Al Ahdath WA Rodood Al Fi'l**. Op.cit, p. 78

<sup>4</sup> Egypt was readmitted to the Arab League in 1989.

<sup>5</sup> Riyad, Mahmoud. **Mahmoud Riyad Autobiography (1948-1978)**. Op.cit, p. 600

<sup>6</sup> Sullivan, Paul. (1999). **Contrary Views of Economic Diplomacy in the Arab World: Egypt** (Electronic version). **Arab Studies Quarterly (ASQ)**, Fall, 1999.

- Since the beginning, **Saudi Arabia** had been an essential ally to Sadat in spite of being careful with its relations with the Egyptian system. The first signals of the Saudi attitude were clear, even before Camp David results were known, when Sheikh Ahmad Zaky Al Yamany, the previous Minister of Oil in KSA, announced on the 12<sup>th</sup> September 1978 that Saudi Arabia would not use the oil weapon if Camp David had failed.<sup>1</sup>
- However, in **Morocco**, the Moroccan attitude signaled that it is impossible to achieve anything in the Middle East without Egypt. Foreign Minister of Morocco at that time, Ahamd Abu Sitta, pointed out that the Egyptian-Moroccan relations are “friendly and strong” and must be enhanced. This came along with the Egyptian press mentioning that the Moroccan Ambassador to Egypt expressed the comfort and support of his country to Camp David Accords, moving from the Moroccan belief of President Sadat’s policy and his ever sincerity to the Arabian issues<sup>2</sup>. Besides that, King Hassan II of Morocco received Sadat heartily after coming back from Camp David, and called for more talks to be reached to for helping to settle that issue<sup>3</sup>.

On the other hand, the Moroccan people with all its associations and syndicates condemned and denied the Camp David Agreements. It is important here to note that King Hassan II was one of those who helped pushing the peace talks with the

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<sup>1</sup> Studies Department in Palestine Al Mohtalla. **Camp David-'Ala Marahil Atta'amor 'Ala Asha'b Al Filasteeny**. Op.cit, p. 98+99

<sup>2</sup> Ibid, p. 103

<sup>3</sup> Ibid, p. 104

Israelis, and organized many secret and public negotiations between Sadat and Israeli leaders<sup>1</sup>.

- The only Arab country who officially supported Camp David was the **Sultanate of Oman** as Sultan Qabus announced his approval and support to the agreements, and considered it as positive and good to be a fair base for a peaceful settlement in the Middle East<sup>2</sup>.

The most important reaction which summarizes the Arabs' attitudes toward Camp David and Egypt was the Baghdad Summit in 2 November, 1978 as it was an Iraqi initiative to all Arabs to create a united Arab attitude toward Camp David<sup>3</sup>. On the fourth day of the Summit, the results were to refuse all Camp David Agreements and its consequences; to help and support the Palestinian resistance in every means; and to appreciate the Jordanian and Syrian armies and the Palestinian people, besides the removal of the Arab League headquarters from Egypt (as mentioned earlier). The economic embargo put by the Arab League on Egypt was broken after a few years after it was adopted. For example, the United Arab Emirates increased trade with Egypt from zero before Camp David to over \$30 million in 1986. Saudi Arabia imports from Egypt increased from under \$50 million in 1979 over \$80 million in 1985, while its exports to Egypt increased from about \$40 million in 1979 to close to \$250 million in 1984<sup>4</sup>. Libya and Syria, on the other hand, shut off imports from Egypt. This clearly shows that the growth in trade was not influenced by the Accords of Camp David.

<sup>1</sup> Refer to Part I for more details.

<sup>2</sup> Studies Department in Palestine Al Mohtalla. **Camp David-'Ala Marahil Atta'amor 'Ala Asha'b Al Filasteeny**. Op.cit, p. 104

<sup>3</sup> Ibid, p. 243

<sup>4</sup> Sullivan, Paul, **Contrary Views of Economic Diplomacy in the Arab World: Egypt**. Op.cit.



◆ Reactions in the rest of the world:

The reactions in the rest of the world varied from support and approval to refusal and denial. Unlike America's full support<sup>1</sup>, the former **Soviet Union** attacked the Camp David Accords, and the Soviet press described Israel as a winner in the negotiations while Egypt as a loser<sup>2</sup>. Here, it is fair to mention that the late USSR was furious because Carter ignored the Soviet role in such agreement, while the Soviet Union had always been a major party in the trials of creating peace in the region<sup>3</sup>. Also the Soviet Union described the agreement as a "trick" and accused the US of following its own logistic interests to enhance its control over oil in the Middle East.

On the contrary, **Canada** said Camp David is a step forward for peace in the Middle East<sup>4</sup>. In **India**, the Foreign Minister expressed the comfort of his country to the results and consequences of Camp David, yet the Indian spokesman cleared that any settlement in the Middle East which does not comply with the UN Security Council resolutions would not guarantee peace in the region<sup>5</sup>.

**West Germany, France, and England** welcomed Camp David, as Germany considered the American President Jimmy Carter the real conqueror of the talks, while France saw it as opening possibilities yet including some doubts because it did not decide anything on the Palestinian issue. England considered the result as very great.

<sup>1</sup> The American role in the Camp David negotiations will be discussed in Part 3.

<sup>2</sup> Assayed Hussein, Adnan. **Camp David Itar Litasweyya**. Op.cit, pp. 73+108

<sup>3</sup> Riyad, Mahmoud. **Mahmoud Riyad Autobiography (1948-1978)**. Op.cit, p. 589

<sup>4</sup> Studies Department in Palestine Al Mohtalla. **Camp David-'Ala Marahil Atta'amor 'Ala Asha'b Al Filasteeny**. Op.cit, p. 107

<sup>5</sup> Ibid, pp. 107+108

Furthermore, **Madrid** expressed its hopes that Camp David would open the doors for communication to reach a comprehensive, continuous, and just peace in the Middle East on the bases of the UN Security Council resolutions<sup>1</sup>.

Beijing announced that **China** sees in Camp David some positive signs although China feared it would increase tensions more than accomplishing a just settlement.

In **Cuba**, President Fidel Castro assured that Camp David Agreements are just mere individual solutions that are inconsistent with the Arab Nation's interests and the Palestinian cause.

In conclusion, it is not a surprise that a great international event like Camp David was the focus of the international attention because it was the most important written down agreement that created some kind of a "framework" to regulate the relation between the Egypt and the Israel. Such an event caused Arabs' anger and refusal, while it represented comfort to some other countries of the world.

For Arabs, the situation was worrying because of the following reasons:

1. Egypt insisted on representing the Arabs in the negotiations, while Sadat was behaving individually and without consulting with any other Arab country, except when visiting Jerusalem, he consulted with the Syrian President Assad, who did not advise him to take such a step. However, Sadat went on with his decision.
2. The Egyptian delegation did not have the right to speak for the Palestinians in anywhere, and this was what weakened its position during the negotiation.
3. By signing the agreements, Egypt lost its strategic and regional position in the Middle East after being a great power on which many Arab countries depended in defending

<sup>1</sup> Ibid, p. 106

the Arabs' rights before the Israeli arrogance. Arabs felt that they have lost that power and now they are left with no support against Israel.

4. Egypt's agreement with Israel included explicit acceptance to the Israeli existence in the region, and an enclosed recognition of the State of Israel, ignoring by that the Palestinian suffering all over the past years.
5. The agreement gave Israel the freedom of navigation and improved trade with Israel, in addition to opening diplomatic channels in Egypt. The danger of this lies in the fact that such agreements which includes such facilities to the Israelis in the region could encourage other Arab states to take similar steps in the future, and this is what Israel had wanted since a long time. However, the political isolation Sadat suffered from as a result of his decision to deal with Israel might have served as warning to other Arab leaders thinking of doing the same<sup>1</sup>.

For the rest of the world, Camp David's dimensions varied as it seemed acceptable to some, while it seemed unfair to others. This can be related to the following reasons:

- 1) For the United States, it was a relief that both the Israelis and Egyptians reached an agreement because the American interests lies in counterbalancing the Soviet Union's existence in the region with a stable and secure Israel. This did not seem possible unless peace is created.
- 2) The United States and other European countries would secure their oil resources in the region as long as the region is stable, believing that the Egyptian model could turn to be a pattern other rich Arab states may follow.

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<sup>1</sup> Glad, Betty, Carter's Greatest Legacy: The Camp David Negotiations. Retrieved February 17, 2007, from [http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/amex/carter/sfeatures/sf\\_glad.html](http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/amex/carter/sfeatures/sf_glad.html). Op.cit.

- 3) Besides oil, the economic interests of open trade and navigation in the region represent a great part of the benefit they may get out of culminating the disagreements and conflicts in the region between Arabs and Israelis.
- 4) To some countries, ending the conflict was not of great benefit. For example, the previous Soviet Union was a great beneficiary of the conflict as through supporting Arabs against Israel, it was fighting indirectly the American influence in the Middle East, plus the Arab World represented a big market for the Soviet arms and weapons. By having no wars, there would be no need for that support of money and arms, the thing that enhanced the American presence in the region.

From a different perspective, no one can ignore the fact which says that some countries in some spots of the world were really wishing that peace is maintained in the Middle East. These wishes are pure and clarified from any political, economic, or even cultural interests. They only believe that the Israeli existence in Palestine is illegal, and the Palestinians should return their lands. An example on these could be Cuba.

*Part III: Third-Party Role*

What makes a third-party role in this negotiation distinguished is the fact that this third party was one of the super powers history has known at that time, and secondly, the issue in which it was a third-party is one of the vicious conflicts history has known, too.

Since 1967 War, the American policy towards the Middle East had been based on UN Security Council Resolution 242, and after the 1973 War, UN Security Council Resolution 338 had been adopted<sup>1</sup>. When the United States played its role in the Middle East mediating in the Arab-Israeli conflict represented in President Carter character, the American efforts opened the door widely for further initiatives and projects for peace in the Middle East, moving from the fact that the Camp David initiative was a success as Henry Kissinger announced that the advancement in Camp David is very important as it made the situation in the Middle East better than before<sup>2</sup>. And not forgetting that the US has had its strategic own interests in the region (oil, confronting the USSR, economic goals, and protecting Israel)<sup>3</sup>, it wanted to make its existence in the Middle East a necessity.

Before talking about the American role as a third-party in the Camp David negotiations, below are some of the American initiatives after Camp David for peace in the Middle East:<sup>4</sup>

- President Ronald Regan initiative to “solve the Middle East crisis” in September, 1982.
- The American Foreign Minister George Schultz’ Plan in 1988 to stop the Palestinian Intifada on the way to have an administrative autonomy in Palestine.

<sup>1</sup> Quandt, William. **Camp David, Peacemaking and Politics**. Op.cit, p. 33

<sup>2</sup> Studies Department in Palestine Al Mohtalla. **Camp David-'Ala Marahil Atta'amor 'Ala Asha'b Al Filasteeny**. Op.cit, p. 106

<sup>3</sup> Assayed Hussein, Adnan. **Camp David Itar Litasweyya**. Op.cit, p. 77

<sup>4</sup> Ibid, p. 77

- The American Brookings Institute Report in 1988 which concentrated on Palestinian autonomy and partial Israeli withdrawal from the Arabian lands, ensuring Israel's security.

This proves that the American leading role in the Middle East peace process was increasing more and more, especially throughout the mid 1970s<sup>1</sup>.

Before Camp David negotiations, the Americans realized the importance of solving the Middle East crisis and pushing the peace process forward to achieve better results. By that it would be protecting its interests in that region, in addition to President Carter's willingness and personal desire to solve the problem<sup>2</sup>. Israel on its side knew that the US has been its only supporter since its establishment in 1948, and without its subsidies and technical help, Israel would not have been able to face the Arab danger in its conflict. William B. Quandt (2001) wrote in explaining that<sup>3</sup>: *"Throughout its existence as a state, Israel has been able to count on support from the United States. Indeed, no country provided Israel with as much aid –economic and military- during its first year of independence. And no country received as much aid from America on a per capita basis as did Israel."*

Nevertheless, Anwar Al Sadat sensed the importance of the US at that time especially that *"previous alliances, financial and otherwise, with the Soviet Union had proved unreliable."*<sup>4</sup>

Realizing that, Sadat thought America to be a more consistent ally, and so he was willing to negotiate.

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<sup>1</sup> Oakman, Oakman, Jonathan, **The Camp David Accords- A Case Study on International Negotiation**. Op.cit, p. 2

<sup>2</sup> Ibid, p. 2

<sup>3</sup> Quandt, William, B., (2001). America and the Middle East. In: Brown, L. Carl, (Ed.), **Diplomacy in the Middle East: The International Relations of Regional and Outside Powers**, (pp. 59-73). New York: I.B. Tauris & Co Ltd. p. 61.

<sup>4</sup> Eagle, Eagle, Clarissa C., **Optimal Behavior in International Negotiation: an interdisciplinary study of Camp David**, Op.cit, p. 3

***The American Role:***

In early 1977, Secretary of State Cyrus Vance made a trip to the Middle East on February, 14 to try to reconvene a Geneva Conference to be jointly chaired by the US and the Soviet Union to mediate the Egyptian-Israeli conflict, but it was confronted by Syria, Israel, and Egypt's reluctance. Quandt wrote about that saying<sup>1</sup>: *"Concerning Geneva... Egypt would reluctantly accept the Syrian idea of a joint Arab delegation. As for the Palestinians, the point was made that they could be brought into negotiations only if Egypt, Syria, and Saudi Arabia were in agreement."*

At this early stage, US policy was aimed at exploring two central questions: were the parties to conflict willing to negotiate with one another, directly or indirectly? And was there a common ground in the form of certain key principles that could guide the talks? To get answers to these questions, Vance met first with the Israeli Prime Minister Rabin, and then visited Cairo, Damascus, Amman, and Riyadh. The responses he got were of positive attitudes towards creating peace in the region<sup>2</sup>.

The US appreciated the initiative, and offered its mediating services supporting the bilateral initiative, running a high risk of antagonizing the other Arab states and excluding the Soviets from the negotiation process<sup>3</sup>.

After long months of talks between the Israelis and Egyptians mediated by America, Sadat and Israeli Prime Minister Begin accepted Carter's invitation to Camp David to negotiate.

Howard Raiffa (1982), in the "Art and Science of Negotiation", talks about the American role in preparing for Camp David. First of all, Raiffa says that according to the

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<sup>1</sup> Quandt, William. **Camp David, Peacemaking and Politics.** Op.cit, p. 37

<sup>2</sup> Ibid, p. 42

<sup>3</sup> Raiffa, Howard, **The Art and Science of Negotiation.** Op.cit, p. 206

Brookings Institute Group report entitled “Towards Peace in the Middle East” in 1975, the American interests can be defined as<sup>1</sup>:

- 1) The USA had strong moral, political, and economic interests in resolving the conflict.
- 2) The increasing risk of another war because of the Arab-Israeli conflict escalation.
- 3) Future negotiations should make use of informal multilateral meetings; US can play a great mediator role.
- 4) The US enjoyed measures of confidence by both sides and had means to assist them economically and militarily.
- 5) The US should be willing to play a constructive role.

Taking from these points, Carter formed up a Task Force to prepare for the upcoming US mediating efforts and to drive methods or tools of mediation to be used by the President to invent solutions and to identify compromise language acceptable to both: Egypt and Israel.

Carter and his team decided that privacy is important during the negotiation, as he tried to create a cordial ambiance and to get the negotiation parties to approach the problem as a joint problem solving exercise. The idea was to isolate three very important world figures from all other duties in order to advise a compromised accord that would be acceptable for Israel and Egypt.

Raiffa goes saying: “*The US mediators did not want both sides to come to the negotiating table with fixed packages.*”<sup>2</sup> Thus they tried initially to get the principals to construct a package on an issue by issue basis but they expected this strategy may not work. In fact it did not, and by day two, Begin and Sadat would not talk to each other.

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<sup>1</sup> Ibid, pp. 208-209

<sup>2</sup> Ibid, p. 211



After that, the conflict was mediated through the use of “Single Negotiation Text” (SNT), a devise suggested by Roger Fisher of Howard Law School, who knew some of the key US players (Atherton, Quandt, and Brzezinski). This method is often used in international negotiations especially in multi-party negotiations. The US team devised and proposed on entire package for the consideration of the two parties and made it clear to them that it was not trying to push the first proposal, but that it was meant to serve as an initial single negotiation text to be criticized by both parties and then modified and re-modified in an iterative manner<sup>1</sup>.

Not only did the administration worry with the details of policy options, but it worked to maintain an atmosphere that would foster successful negotiations. Through Vance, Carter sent messages to the world leaders seeking their support. Also the administration asked religious leaders to make special prayers for the talks!<sup>2</sup> Carter asked both parties not to make negative statements about the possibilities for success prior to the actual negotiation.

From what has been said so far, the American role in Camp David as a mediator between Egypt and Israel went beyond the “good-will” mediation and reached the level of securing its interests in the Middle East, on one hand, and weighing the effect of the USSR in the region, besides some personal interests of President Carter, whose administration was distinguished from the previous ones by being sympathetic with the Palestinian case<sup>3</sup>. The tone Carter used in his speeches when taking over caused great pressures on Carter’s administration from the Israeli lobby and accordingly Carter changed it<sup>4</sup>. However, that does not mean his understanding of the issue in the Middle East has changed. On these bases, he

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<sup>1</sup> Ibid, p. 211

<sup>2</sup> Preparations for Camp David. Retrieved August 24, 2006), from <http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsourc/Peac/cdprep.html>.

<sup>3</sup> Adajany, Hisham, (1994). *Al Edarat Al Amerikiya wa Israel*. (1<sup>st</sup> ed.). Damascus: Culture Ministry of Syria Publishings, p. 117

<sup>4</sup> Ibid, p. 117

moved with his plan, which eventually led to Camp David Accords, and by that, Carter's administration accomplished a strategic goal: isolating Egypt from the Arab-Israeli conflict<sup>1</sup>.

Moreover, Carter was openly committed to an active American role in trying to break the deadlock in Arab-Israeli peace negotiations. He saw the Middle East dispute as closely related to both the energy crisis and the danger of superpower confrontation.

Glad wrote: *"As the thirteen days at Camp David demonstrated, no agreement would have emerged without Carter's determination and deep personal involvement."*<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Ibid, 37

<sup>2</sup> Glad, Betty, Carter's Greatest Legacy: The Camp David Negotiations. Retrieved February 17, 2007, from [http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/amex/carter/sfeatures/sf\\_glad.html](http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/amex/carter/sfeatures/sf_glad.html). Op.cit.

*Part IV: The Impact of Personal Aspect on the Negotiation*

No doubt that President Sadat's character influenced the process of the negotiation in Camp David, and because of that, it is important to revise some turning points in his life which helped in building up his character.

Being born as a villager gave him a tendency toward insistence and hard work which were reflected on his character later.

Four figures influenced Sadat's early life<sup>1</sup>: the first was a villager named Zahran, who was hanged by the British in Egypt for participating in a riot that had resulted in the death of a British officer. The second was Kemel Ataturk, who established a number of civil service reforms that Sadat admired. Third was Gandhi, who preached the power of non-violence in combating injustice. The fourth who impressed young Sadat was Adolph Hitler, whom the anti-colonialist Sadat viewed as a potential rival to British control.

The reader of Sadat's biography would realize the effect of these men on his life. For example:

- 1- Zahran could have inspired Sadat in fighting against the British in Egypt while committing himself to the Free Officers' Movement.
- 2- Kemel Ataturk could also have inspired Sadat to different reforms in Egypt such as amending the Egyptian constitution after taking over.
- 3- Gandhi's non-violent policies might have urged Sadat after 1973 War to seek peace. Not forgetting Gandhi's years in prison, the commitment to the Revolution led Sadat twice to jail<sup>2</sup>. There he taught himself French and English.

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<sup>1</sup> Anwar Al Sadat Biography. Retrieved September 21, 2006, from <http://www.ibiblio.org/sullivan/bios/Sadat-bio.html>. Op.cit

<sup>2</sup> Ibid.

- 4- Adolph Hitler toughness and military cleverness affected Sadat's military thinking. After attending the Royal Military Academy in Cairo 1938<sup>1</sup>, Sadat managed to cause the Israelis soar defeats in the 1973 War and regain parts of Sinai.

In addition, meeting Jamal Abdel Nasser had the great influence in Sadat's life: while working next to Nasser to overthrow the monarchy in Egypt, Sadat learned the dangerous game of nation building in a world of superpower rivalries<sup>2</sup>.

After succeeding Nasser, Sadat proved his "leadership abilities"<sup>3</sup> in facing the economic crisis Egypt had been experiencing at that time, especially as a consequence of the 1967 War, besides some international problems, mainly the Israeli existence in the Middle East. Also his peace initiatives indicated his sense of leadership in that he insisted on acting as a spokesman for all Arabs<sup>4</sup>.

In this sense, and after considering the previous important stations in Sadat's life, there are four characteristics of Sadat which affected his performance in Camp David:

A. His friendship with the United States:

It was hidden from no one that Sadat expelled the Soviets and welcomed the American existence on the international level especially that the American administration was working on that. Sadat's friendship with America made him accept the American mediation in his conflict with Israel, then after some secret talks, he reached to Camp David under the American auspices. In this sense, Sadat said that his initiative of peace

<sup>1</sup> Sadat's Biography. Retrieved September 21, 2006, from [http://www.en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Anwar\\_Sadat](http://www.en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Anwar_Sadat). Op.cit

<sup>2</sup> Anwar Al Sadat Biography. Retrieved September 21, 2006, from <http://www.ibiblio.org/sullivan/bios/Sadat-bio.html>. Op.cit

<sup>3</sup> Ibid

<sup>4</sup> Raiffa, Howard, **The Art and Science of Negotiation**. Op.cit, p. 205

was because of Carter, who encouraged him to take “bold steps for peace.”<sup>1</sup> Sadat wrote in his memoirs<sup>2</sup>: No doubt, Carter is honest with himself and with the others, and this makes me feel the ease to deal with him. I am dealing with a man who understands what he wants... with a man who has faith and values. However, in return of his friendship, Sadat expected to get from the Americans what Soviets stopped supplying of military and economic subsidies which America was committed to do as a result of Camp David.

B. Lack of secrecy in the negotiation:

The lack of secrecy resulted from Sadat’s blind trust in the US, and in Carter in particular. Oakman says in this sense<sup>3</sup>: “*Sadat... relied too heavily on his friendship with Carter, and entrusted the Americans with too much information on his bargaining position. In effect, Sadat showed Carter his cards and even allowed him to play out the hand.*”

Telhami (1992) also says<sup>4</sup>: “*Having little negotiating experience before this time, Sadat was too trusting of his counterparts.*” Thus, Sadat’s lack of secrecy in negotiation and his full trust in the Americans allowed them to acknowledge the Egyptian bottom line and manipulate it in favor of their ally, Israel.

Sadat in Camp David gave many concessions to the Americans and Israelis, and implicitly recognized the State of Israel, and bolstered the American presence in the Middle East as he saw the Americans as substitutes to the Soviets. Boutros Ghaly summarizes the President’s behavior by saying that secrecy was not his talent, and that

<sup>1</sup> Adajany, Hisham. **Al Edarat Al Amerikiya wa Israel**. Op.cit, p. 120

<sup>2</sup> Al Sadat, Mohammad Anwar **Al Bahth Ann Athat, Qissat Hayaty**. Op.cit, p. 316

<sup>3</sup> Oakman, Jonathan, **The Camp David Accords- A Case Study on International Negotiation**. Op.cit, p. 7

<sup>4</sup> Telhami, Shibly, Telhami, Shibly, (1992). **The Camp David Accords. Pew Case Studies in International Affairs**, Washington, D.C.: Institute for the Study of Diplomacy, p. 55

he revealed his interests far too early in the game, and that he lacked adequate suspicion of his bargaining partners<sup>1</sup>.

C. His ability as a political leader:

Since he became the Egyptian President succeeding Nasser, Sadat's main concern has been regaining full control of the Sinai Peninsula, hoping that the consequences of Camp David would help in solving his country's economic crisis.

In the negotiation or even a bit before, Sadat spoke of all Arabs in their struggle with Israel. This kind of self-esteem made many Arabs consider him as a "traitor", and some considered him as not having the authority to represent the Palestinians and speak for them<sup>2</sup>. In addition, Sadat ignored all other Arab leaders in his talks with Israel<sup>3</sup> (but he consulted with the Syrian President Assad before visiting Jerusalem in 1977), and by that, he lost an important potential aspect of success. This shows his rushed character as a political leader in war (1973) and peace with the Israelis. To regain the Arabs' support, he had to secure Israel's withdrawal from all the occupied territories and establish the right of self determination for the Palestinians as these two goals became Egypt's bottom line at Camp David<sup>4</sup>.

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<sup>1</sup> Eagle, Clarissa C., **Optimal Behavior in International Negotiation: an interdisciplinary study of Camp David**, Op.cit,12

<sup>2</sup> Studies Department in Palestine Al Mohtalla. **Camp David-'Ala Marahil Atta'amor 'Ala Asha'b Al Filasteeny**. Op.cit, p. 54

<sup>3</sup> Ibid, p. 55

<sup>4</sup> Oakman, Jonathan, **The Camp David Accords- A Case Study on International Negotiation**. Op.cit, p. 4

Not forgetting being one of Nasser's leaders, Sadat showed loyal obedience to Nasser<sup>1</sup>. When he succeeded Nasser, Sadat was completely unknown and untested, yet after that he managed to prove his leadership abilities<sup>2</sup>.

Being a political leader meant for Sadat achieving the aims and impressing others. Although he had not had that charismatic character –unlike Nasser-, Sadat managed to attract the attention of not only the Arabs, but also the world. Oakman says<sup>3</sup>: “*Sadat's strategy thus aimed at impressing both Americans and other Arab states. The former he felt could be easily achieved by continuing to demonstrate flexibility...*” The latter was by showing the world –especially the US- the Israeli intransigence<sup>4</sup>.

#### D. His courageous character:

The courageous character of Sadat appeared clearly as a President of Egypt in the 1973 War when he used the Strategic Deception Plan and made the Israelis believe in the Egyptian inability and unwillingness to fight. His courage was represented in being the first Arab leader who visited Jerusalem in 1977, creating by that a wave of shocked reactions included all Arabs and the world, too.

Also showing intentions to negotiate with the Israelis made him the first who rebels on the current stream of refusing Israel's existence and created a new trend of the possibility to negotiate and reach peace with the Israelis. This was represented clearly in following other peace treaties and agreements like Oslo (1993) between Israel and the PLO, and the Jordan-Israel Peace Treaty (1994), which might not have been possible without what Sadat did at Camp David.

<sup>1</sup> Sadat's Biography. Retrieved September 21, 2006, from [http://www.en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Anwar\\_Sadat](http://www.en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Anwar_Sadat). Op.cit

<sup>2</sup> Anwar Al Sadat Biography. Retrieved September 21, 2006, from <http://www.ibiblio.org/sullivan/bios/Sadat-bio.html>. Op.cit

<sup>3</sup> Oakman, Jonathan, **The Camp David Accords- A Case Study on International Negotiation**. Op.cit, p. 4

<sup>4</sup> Ibid, p. 4

Moreover, by accepting the American initiative of Camp David, he reveals much of his understanding of the issue as a whole and demonstrates his courage to negotiate the control of Sinai, as previously discussed.



### Chapter III: Oslo Negotiations

One may find himself in front of a history of conflicts and peace initiatives when talking about the Arab-Israeli conflict. By citing all the Arab wars with Israel, it is found that Arabs lost most of their wars except the 1973 war which was tackled earlier in chapter II, yet many peace treaties were concluded after some kind of negotiation in a trial to bring back some peace to that boiling relation. The question is: could these peace treaties bring the wished for solution to the famous conflict? Were they successful?

As previously mentioned, the aim of this thesis is to highlight the negotiation process in the Middle East as a main and only way to peace.

The previous chapter studied Camp David Accords and this one will talk about the Oslo Accords as another peace settlement with Israel by the Palestinians who waited for a longer time than the Egyptians to sign an agreement with the Israelis.

Since Camp David (1978) till Oslo (1993), the region was boiling; Israel was escalating its attacks against the Palestinians who sought all possible ways to confront the Israelis.

That period witnessed numerous wars and massacres, best to be cited here by years:<sup>1</sup>

• **Table 3.1:** "Examples of Arab-Israeli clashes and wars since Camp David 1978 till 1993"

1978	1982	1985	1987-1990	1988	1989
Coastal Road Massacre	Lebanon War	Operation Wooden Leg	First Intifada	Tunis Raid	Bus 405 Massacre
Operation Litani	Sabra and Shatila Massacre	---	---	---	Palestinian Islamic Jihad and Hamas suicide attacks

<sup>1</sup> Israeli-Palestinian Conflict/ Oslo Accords. Retrieved November 10, 2006, from [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Oslo\\_Accords](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Oslo_Accords)

The coming pages will study all aspects and events which eventually led to signing the Oslo Accords under many different circumstances. Consequently, this chapter will be dealing with Oslo negotiations from the following perspectives:

- 1- The political Circumstances.
- 2- The Oslo Accords and reactions to it.
- 3- Third-party role in the negotiations.
- 4- The impact of personal aspect.

*Part I: Political Circumstances*

As mentioned earlier, the Middle East has witnessed many international events which affected the Arab-Israeli conflict in many ways. This part will tackle these main international events which took place and had some influence on the conflict after signing Camp David agreement between Egypt and Israel.

**1. The world before Oslo (till Madrid Conference 1991):**

Before Oslo Accords, the world has been characterised by a new aspect in the Arab-Israeli conflict, or it can be said, it is a new phase which the relation underwent, that is the negotiation phase and peace treaties. It could be said that this new stage has started by signing the Camp David Treaty in 1978 which eventually led to the Israeli-Egyptian Peace Treaty in 1979. The previous chapter demonstrated that Camp David and the following treaty opened the doors widely before the Arab-Israeli peace negotiation, mostly based on the UN Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338, yet it is worth mentioning that before Camp David and before sitting with the Israelis at the negotiating table in Madrid (1991) or signing Camp David, Arabs (mainly the Palestinians) had some contacts with the Israelis and caused many political arguments among the Palestinians and the Israelis<sup>1</sup>. For example, Essam Sartawi was one of those who were asked to contact the Israeli parties which call for peace in 1977. He was attacked by the Palestinians and was assassinated in Barcelona<sup>2</sup>. Other secret contacts and meetings continued in 1986, 1987, and 1989 in different parts of the world like Spain and Romania, although the Knesset issued on 6<sup>th</sup> August, 1986 a resolution<sup>3</sup> that

<sup>1</sup> Abbass, Mahmoud, (1994). **Tareeq Oslo**. (1<sup>st</sup> ed.). Beirut: Al Matboo'at Publishing, p. 9

<sup>2</sup> Abdel Lateef, Salah, (1997). **Ma'ziq Assalam fi Al Mofawadat Al Felestinia Al Israelia**. (1<sup>st</sup>, Ed.). Amman. Al Rai Library. p. 27

<sup>3</sup> This resolution was officially cancelled later on 19<sup>th</sup> January, 1993.

prevents any meetings with PLO<sup>1</sup>. However, those who opposed such treaties saw them as signs of concession and deceptive peace in the sense that Israel could always find ways to be the only beneficiary and elude its commitments, while Arabs were the losers in that game for a long time.

Camp David also changed the concept of negotiating with Israel in a way that made it not a taboo any more, and Arabs later were encouraged to take that step following the Egyptian model by negotiating and signing Camp David. These efforts resulted in having Arabs accepted the idea of Madrid Conference in 1991 to negotiate the peace process in the Middle East which encouraged the Palestinians -represented by the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) - to go through secret negotiation with the Israelis in Oslo in Norway that resulted in the Declaration of Principle on Interim Self-Government Arrangements, September 13, 1993. On the other hand, those years before Oslo were not so peaceful as the world has experienced many events that varied from wars to negotiations for peace, including the collapse of the former USSR and the American relaxation in the Middle East after its enemy's disappearance. It is important here to study such main events and how they could affect the essence of the Arab-Israeli conflict, pushing the Palestinians towards Madrid Conference and then Oslo in 1993 because the international environment played an important role in that conflict which –since its beginning- took an international dimension. Many international parties participated in the conflict directly and indirectly as its reflections and consequences affected –generally- the international relations<sup>2</sup>. In this sense, that period (pre-Oslo) witnessed many events that could significantly change the world's face

<sup>1</sup> Ibid, p .28

<sup>2</sup> Barakat, Nitham Mahmoud, (1999). Assira' Al Araby-Al Israeli Montho Madrid Hatta Al'an: (Al Janib Assiyassy). In: Gassan Ismail Abdel Khaliq (Ed.), *Sira' Al Qarn.. Assira' Al Araby ma' Assohuniya Abra Ma't 'Am*. 1<sup>st</sup> ed. (pp. 199-240). Amman: Abdel Hameed Shouman Ins. p. 202

affecting with it the Middle East with its well-known conflict between the Arabs and the Israelis.

The first event the Middle East faced was the Second Gulf War (1990 through 1991) against Iraq, and a coalition led by the United States and mandated by the United Nations in order to liberate Kuwait from the Iraqi invasion<sup>1</sup>. It was said that this war made essential changes in the Arab-Israeli conflict. Barakat (1999) summarises the most important effects the Gulf War had left on the conflict<sup>2</sup>:

- 1) The Second Gulf War caused cracks and splits in the Arabs' attitude which weakened their position before the international community and Israel. That split transformed the Arabs into two forces: one included eight Arab States refused to condemn the Iraqi invasion to Kuwait (pro-Iraqi position) and another included twelve Arab countries which condemned the invasion and asserted the necessity of compelling Iraq to the unconditional withdrawal from Kuwait.<sup>3</sup>
- 2) The Gulf war resulted in eliminating the Iraqi role from the political, economic, and military equation between Arabs and Israel.
- 3) Also, America pressed on including the Gulf States in the peace process especially in the multilateral negotiation because of their strong economies. Israel was sure to take advantage of the Gulf war to normalise its relations with rich Arab States.
- 4) Arab parties failed to exercise pressure to take advantage of the war (unlike Israel) due to the aligned American policy in favour of Israel.

<sup>1</sup> Gulf War. Retrieved November 28, 2006, from [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gulf\\_War](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gulf_War).

<sup>2</sup> Barakat, Nitham Mahmoud, *Assira' Al Araby-Al Israeli Montho Madrid Hatta Al'an: (Al Janib Assiyassy)*. Op.cit, p 203

<sup>3</sup> Jad, Emad, (1999), *Palestine..Al Ard WA Asha'b Min Annakba ILA Oslo*. (1<sup>st</sup> ed.). Cairo: Strategic and Political Studies Center. P. 236

- 5) The war led to a strategic defect in the balance of power between the Arabs and Israel because of the destruction of the Arabian powers, and the privileges Israel got to protect its security after the war.
- 6) The war consolidated the American hegemony over the Middle East and the world.

*"The Gulf War had also illustrated the inflammatory nature of the Arab-Israeli conflict,"* Emma Murphy (1994) says.<sup>1</sup> In explaining that, she says that in the period of the war, Israel became a "liability" for the United States<sup>2</sup>, especially when Saddam attempted to link the Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait with settling the Israeli occupation to the Palestinian lands, the thing that caused an undeniable massive popular support for the Iraqi leader and caused tremendous fears among American decision makers. *"It was evident to President Bush and Secretary of State Baker that the running sore of the Arab-Israeli conflict could potentially disrupt any American plans for the reason,"* she says.<sup>3</sup> In addition, the western hypocrisy by taking a moral stance against the occupation of Kuwait and not being willing to question similar Israeli activities in Palestine rekindled Arab grievances against "western imperialism in the region". The only possible way out of it for America is to draw in Arab participation in an international peace conference after the war.

Talking about the same concept, Emad Jad (1999) stresses that the idea of linking the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait with the Israeli occupation of Palestine created great fears between western leaders, especially President Bush, that such connection would

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<sup>1</sup> Murphy, Emma C., (1994). The Arab-Israeli Conflict and the New World Order. In: Jawad, Haifaa A., (Ed.), **The Middle East in the New World Order**, (pp. 81-97). London: The Macmillan Press LTD. p. 82

<sup>2</sup> Ibid, p. 82

<sup>3</sup> Ibid, p. 83

extinguish Arabs' support and eventually lead to the impossibility of having an international coalition with an Arab participation to exactly achieve Bush's plans<sup>1</sup>.

Moreover, one may feel that the split in Arabs' position during the war could be a result of Camp David Agreement. Al Farra (2002) introduces this idea by saying that after having Egypt –the biggest Arab State- out of the Arab-Israeli conflict as a consequence of signing Camp David, the Arabs' position was weakened and cracked and such a crack continued to maximize paving the way to having Arab-Arab disagreements which reached its maximum with the outbreak of the Second Gulf War in August the 2<sup>nd</sup>, 1990 which caused an Arab and international crisis, leading to the American attack on Iraq and destroying its infrastructure in 25<sup>th</sup> February, 1991<sup>2</sup>. Consequently, the Gulf War destroyed the Arab strategic ability and caused a great military defeat<sup>3</sup>, and in such environment, having a settlement with Israel would sound possible and necessary to protect the Arab security and peace. The United States took advantage of that and worked to exploit that situation to convene an international conference in Madrid in 1991 and make Israel and the PLO members meet and negotiate. Madrid Conference will be tackled later in this part.

Secondly, and to look from a different angle, was the Cold War, and then the collapse of the previous USSR. This has had its effect on the Middle East represented in building coalitions, making allies, and the arms race in the region as the most important characteristics of that time. The previous USSR had many allies in the region mainly Syria and the PLO, who were targeted under the Reagan Presidency by the US-foreign

<sup>1</sup> Jad, Emad. *Palestine..Al Ard Wa Asha'b Min Annakba ila Oslo*. Op.cit, p. 237

<sup>2</sup> Al Farra, Mohammad Ali. *Assalam Al Khadi': Ila Ain?* Op.cit, p. 252

<sup>3</sup> Bulqzeez, Abdel Ilah, (1999). *Saqata Itifaq 17 Ayyar/Mayo Al Lubnany Al Israeli, Falimatha Ybqa Itifaq Oslo?! Al Mustaqbal Al Araby*. (243): 12-22. p. 14

policymakers "as the prime vehicles for Soviet ambitions in the region."<sup>1</sup> Israel represented an American "barrier" to these intrusions from the American spectacular.<sup>2</sup>

Supporting arms to the Middle East by the previous USSR and the U.S.A was an outcome of the Cold War: the previous USSR supported Egypt with arms and weapons, and America supplied Israel with the most modern high technological weapons. This is how the situation was during the Cold War, however, by the time Mikhail Gorbachev had ascended to power in 1985, the Soviets suffered from bad economy, and to restructure the damaged economy, Gorbachev announced an agenda of rapid reform and used the "perestroika" and "glasnost"<sup>3</sup>. Such reform required Gorbachev to redirect the country's resources from costly Cold War military commitments to more profitable areas in the civilian sector, and consequently, Gorbachev offered major concessions in his Cold War policies.<sup>4</sup> Later on, in the late 1980s and early 1990s, the Soviet Union quickly abandoned its Cold War commitments. In December 1989, Gorbachev and George H. W. Bush declared the Cold War officially ended at a summit meeting in Malta. By December the next year, the union-state also dissolved breaking the USSR up into fifteen separate independent states.<sup>5</sup>

With the end of the Cold War, the United States became the only power that is able to play a decisive role in any conflict<sup>6</sup> and uni-polar force started to change the world after such drastic changes.

From that, it has been obvious that by the elimination of the influence of the American opponent (the USSR), America would have the region empty and clear to exert its powers using whatever methods to guarantee that its interests and own benefits in the

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<sup>1</sup> Murphy, Emma C., **The Middle East in the New World Order**, Op.cit, p. 83

<sup>2</sup> Ibid, p. 83

<sup>3</sup> Both words respectively mean reconstruction and openness.

<sup>4</sup> Second Cold War (1980-1985). Retrieved November 28, 2006, from [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cold\\_War#End\\_of\\_the\\_Cold\\_War\\_](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cold_War#End_of_the_Cold_War_)

<sup>5</sup> Ibid

<sup>6</sup> Jad, Emad. **Palestine..Al Ard Wa Asha'b Min Annakba ila Oslo**. Op.cit, p. 242



Middle East would be safe, mainly oil supplies in necessary amounts and cheap prices<sup>1</sup>. The question here is: how did the USSR collapse and the American uni-polarity affect the Arab-Israeli conflict?

Ali Al Jarabawi (1999) says that for long decades, especially during the Cold War, the Soviet Union represented a protective cover for the Palestinians and Arabs on the international level against Israel which was supported by the West, on top of it the United States. Although such cover was not so effective in regaining the Palestinian rights, it was efficient to create an international balance regarding the Palestinian cause and the Arab-Israeli conflict. When the USSR collapsed, Al Jarabawi continues, that protective cover diminished quickly damaging with it that international balance which was maintained by the bi-polarity, and thus the United States became the only power in its "new world order" changing the world into a uni-polar system<sup>2</sup>.

With these changes, America –with Israel- became more able to take certain steps towards finalizing the Palestinian cause and closing the Arab-Israeli conflict file in a way that makes the Israeli existence in the region legal while maintaining the Israeli and American interests.<sup>3</sup>

From a different angle, the Soviet Union collapse had its effects on Israel as Murphy says that the Soviet retreat from the Middle East "enables America to reassess its evaluation of Israel's importance to its own regional interests."<sup>4</sup> As previously mentioned, Israel was the American barrier in the region facing the Soviet influence, but now, having the threat vanished, that barrier lost its significance which escalated the Israeli fears from the retreat of the Israeli position at the Americans. These fears were

<sup>1</sup> Adajany, Hisham. *Al Edarat Al Amerikiya wa Israel*. Op.cit, p. 156

<sup>2</sup> Al Jarabawi, Ali, (1999). *Al Bo'd Al Felastini-Al Israeli Lil Sira' Montho Oslo Hatta Al'an-1998*. In: Gassan Ismail Abdel Khaliq (Ed.), *Sira' Al Qarn.. Assira' Al Araby ma' Assohuniya Abra Ma't 'Am*. 1<sup>st</sup> ed. (pp. 159-198). Amman: Abdel Hameed Shouman Ins. p. 162

<sup>3</sup> Ibid, p. 162

<sup>4</sup> Murphy, Emma C. *The Middle East in the New World Order*, Op.cit, p. 83

unfortunately turned real when the Bush Administration agreed to the suggestions of Senator Robert Doll to minimize the American subsidies to Israel in a percentage of 5% in 1991<sup>1</sup>. Doll said that this was not to harm Israel but to make it feel that America has other priorities (Eastern Europe countries and previous Soviet Union states)<sup>2</sup>. It is true that America was seeking to minimize its huge budgetary commitments during the Cold War which lasted for more than four decades. It cost the United States up to \$8 trillion in military expenditures, and the lives of nearly of 100,000 Americans<sup>3</sup>. Consequently, military commitments were reduced and the US was freed making use of them by moving some of the burdens to providing weaponry for allies in the Middle East. Ironically, it was not Israel who benefited the most from this, but rather it has been Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and Bahrain. The arms transfer reached \$25 billion between the end of the Gulf War and October 1992.<sup>4</sup>

A third influence can be the fertile environment the US found in the Middle East after the Soviet collapse to develop new ties with Arab countries in the year 1991, paving the way for its trials to recreating peace in the Middle East and settling the Arab-Israeli conflict. Here, it is fair to say that some Arab countries headed to the US seeking aids and subsidies after the loss of their Soviet supplier. Murphy mentions that from the year 1989, Gorbachev made it clear to President Hafiz Al Assad that the Soviet Union would no longer support the goal of strategic parity with Israel promising only strategic defense capability. The substitute would be: "Syria had to find a path of reconciliation with the United States."<sup>5</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Adajany, Hisham. *Al Edarat Al Amerikiya wa Israel*. Op.cit, p.154

<sup>2</sup> Ibid, p. 154

<sup>3</sup> Second Cold War (1980-1985). Retrieved November 28, 2006, from [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cold\\_War#End\\_of\\_the\\_Cold\\_War](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cold_War#End_of_the_Cold_War) Op.cit

<sup>4</sup> Murphy, Emma C. *The Middle East in the New World Order*, Op.cit, p. 85

<sup>5</sup> Ibid, pp. 83+84

The retreat of the Soviet Union from the Middle East caused many economic difficulties for those states which depended on the Soviet injections of aids and arms. The solution was to head to America's help. Murphy says: *"For countries like Syria, the need for reintegration with world capitalist finance and trade has made it inevitable that anti-American posturing should be more confined to the rhetorical spheres and excluded from political policymaking."*<sup>1</sup>

To sum up with this, the collapse of the Soviet Union and its influences on the Arab-Israeli conflict and the Middle East can be summarized in the following:

- 1- The USSR was a provider of arms and financial aids for many Arab States, yet later it became no longer committed to them.
- 2- The collapse paved the way for America to enhance its existence, exercise power in the region, and change the world into a uni-polar system.
- 3- Arab countries which depended on the USSR financially and militarily found themselves looking for other options. The US was the only option available.
- 4- After losing their Soviet cover, the Palestinians (represented by the PLO) -in defense for their rights-moved to America as the only existing solutions.
- 5- Israel became no longer the barrier for the Soviet movements in the region.
- 6- Gulf States benefited from the American aids after the Gulf War and the collapse of the previous USSR.

All the previous points implied a drastic change in the face of the world, transferring the region into a new phase of American uni-polarity and control over the world, with a marginalized role of the Russian Federation, the successor of the late Soviet Union, and weak Russian inputs as Russia became busy in taking care of its own

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<sup>1</sup> Ibid, p. 84

damaged economy. About this change, James Baker said<sup>1</sup>: there is no doubt that the ambient of the region has changed, and it is clear now that the world wants to befriend the United States as the Soviet Union has vanished. The values and principles of the American democracy and the free market are adopted in different parts of the world like never before. It seems as if everyone wants to be a best friend of America's... now we are on top of the Middle East.

This change was mainly characterized by the "New World Order" of George H. W. Bush and it is the third event the world witnessed before Oslo.

In March 1991, President Bush proclaimed the existence of a new world order, one in which "the principles of justice and fairplay... protect the weak against the strong."<sup>2</sup> Murphy wrote:

*"The war which had just been concluded in the Gulf had demonstrated that in this world order, an effective and consensual United Nations, supported by the military might and moral will of the United States, would ensure the protection of weak and vulnerable states from roguish elements of the international community."*<sup>3</sup> The basics of the new order were democracy, economic prosperity, and regional security.

Murphy in her article The Arab-Israeli Conflict and the New World Order (1994) introduces certain ideas. She says that the national interests of America require "a secure and stable Gulf", and so the American foreign policy towards the Middle East is based on four components:

1) regional disarmament, 2) regional security, 3) regional economic development, and 4) revitalization of the Arab-Israeli peace process. From an American point of view, the last three components were in a way accomplished by the Gulf War, and later "the fruits" of the New World Order turned to be "tangible" and true by having the peace

<sup>1</sup> James, Baker, (1999). **Siyasat Adiplomassiya**. (1<sup>st</sup> ed.) Cairo: Maktabat Madbooly. p. 607

<sup>2</sup> Murphy, Emma C. **The Middle East in the New World Order**, Op.cit, p. 81

<sup>3</sup> Ibid, p. 81

talks finally opened in Madrid, October 1991, between Israel and PLO under US patronage. However, by the end of 1992, the New World Order seemed "less promising" as the regional disarmament had given way to an accelerated arms race; regional security arrangements had never materialized; and regional economic development had gained some success, although the gap between poor and rich countries had not been minimized.<sup>1</sup>

In this sense, the most important features of the New World Order can be summarized as follows: <sup>2</sup>

- a) The American control over the New World Order, using the United Nations and international legitimacy as means of passing its policies on the international level. This system helped enhancing the international trend towards settling regional conflicts by peaceful means, and increasing the American will to get rid of the spots of conflict in the region.
- b) The disappearing of the Soviet role on the international level because of its internal problems, the thing that was reflected negatively on some of Arab forces' role which depended –mainly- on the Soviet support, like the PLO and Syria.
- c) The emergence of the unified Europe as a great power competing with the American role in the region, depending on the deep relations of history and economy with parties to the conflict.
- d) The shift towards globalization and weakening the role of the local and regional ideologies which do not get along with the existing international system and eliminating the importance of the political borders in favor for an international

<sup>1</sup> Ibid pp. 81+82

<sup>2</sup> Barakat, Nitham Mahmoud, *Assira' Al Araby-Al Israeli Montho Madrid Hatta Al'an: (Al Janib Assiyassy)*. Op.cit, p. 202+203

and regional economic cooperation, the thing that requires settling political conflicts and soothing the national and ideological conflict.

By marketing its image of protecting the weak against the strong, America turned to be the only power in the world that would sponsor all events and create peace on earth in a new world order, starting with the Arab-Israeli conflict. Ironically, in such conflict, the Palestinians were the weak and Israel –naturally- was the strong, yet was America objective? Obviously it was not.

The "pre-Oslo" world has been worn a new gown and the change became the main characteristic. It started long time ago with two major international powers and ended with one major international power which has been monitoring the Middle East, playing its role directly or indirectly. Mahmoud Abbass (1994) sees that George Bush achieved two victorious goals during his presidency; one was the Gulf War and the second is the dissolving of the previous USSR. By that, America became the ultimate power. Bush after that saw that it was convenient for him to continue his victories and headed to the Middle East<sup>1</sup>.

## **2. Madrid Conference (30<sup>th</sup> October – 3<sup>rd</sup> November, 1991):**

After all these drastic changes in the world, especially with the United States being the ultimate power, Arabs found themselves accepting the American invitations to convene an international conference to settle the Arab-Israeli conflict in the Middle East.

It has been made clear that Arabs' situation at that time was in its worst levels, especially after the Gulf War and the loss of their Soviet supporter, and on top of that

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<sup>1</sup> Abbass Mahmoud, **Tareeq Oslo**. Op.cit, p. 131

is dealing with the American hegemony and globalization, while Arabs were living under absence of democracy and internal instability with a weak national development in politics, economy, and society<sup>1</sup>. Under that amount of pressure, Arabs tend to transform the losses into a different form; that is a settlement with the Israelis. By accepting to negotiate with the Israelis, Arabs translated the defeats into concessions to Israel, negotiating bilaterally with their enemy and changing the principle of the national conflict into mere boundary clashes with the Jewish State<sup>2</sup>.

The question could be here: how did it happen?

With the American World Order, the Gulf War, and the late USSR collapse, America shifted its attention towards the Middle East by applying a globalized economy and considering the economic aspect as a priority in the international relations, in addition to the American interest in the Arabian oil and strategic location<sup>3</sup>. And because the New World Order aims at re-looking at the map of the world- basically the Arabian region-, solving the Palestinian cause was the main pillar in creating that new order on the Arabian lands. For that, America accepted to supervise that process with a symbolic participation of the previous USSR, starting by convening Madrid Conference<sup>4</sup>.

At the same time, Arabs agreed to negotiate as they trusted the American commitments towards reaching a fair political settlement with Israel while clinging to the principle of not making essential concessions to Israel through complete cooperation between all Arab delegations. This continued until the Palestinian delegation went for secret negotiations in Oslo, the thing that changed the whole

<sup>1</sup> Barakat, Nitham Mahmoud, *Assira' Al Araby-Al Israeli Montho Madrid Hatta Al'an: (Al Janib Assiyassy)*. Op.cit, p. 131

<sup>2</sup> Bulqzeez, Abdel Ilah., *Saqata Itifaq 17 Ayyar/Mayo Al Lubnany Al Israeli, Falimatha Ybqa Itifaq Oslo?!*. Op.cit, p. 14

<sup>3</sup> Bou Talib, Abdel Hady, (1996). *Wa Matha 'An Bada'el Okhra Li Tahqeeq Assalam Al Felasteeny Al Israeli? In: Wa Matha Law Akhfaqt Assalam fi Asharq Al Awasat?*. 1<sup>st</sup> ed. (pp: 339-364). Al Ribat: Matboo'at The Moroccan Kingdom Academy. p. 353

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid*, p. 353

concept and turned it to match with the Israeli view, accomplishing more than what it wanted<sup>1</sup>.

In the aftermath of the 1991 Gulf War, the US President George H. W. Bush and his Secretary of State James Baker, with a nominal Soviet participation extended an invitation letter to Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, Israel, and the Palestinians on October 30, 1991<sup>2</sup> to convene Madrid Conference under President Bush and Gorbachev auspices (the Soviet presence was used to legitimize what was in fact a unilateral American diplomatic initiative<sup>3</sup>), and with the Spanish Prime Minister Philip Gonzalez attendance<sup>4</sup>. The PLO leadership welcomed the American initiative for peace<sup>5</sup>, and participated within a Jordanian delegation in the late 1991, and then split into an independent delegation with Faisal Al Hussein as head negotiator in February 1992<sup>6</sup>.

The Madrid Conference inauguration was ceremonial in the first place<sup>7</sup>, and then the negotiations were transferred to the American capital Washington D.C. to be resumed. It is important here to mention that although such a conference was an American initiative, yet it was in compliance with the Israeli conditions.

And so, America could convince the Arabs that the basics of the peace negotiations would be the United Nations' Resolutions 242 and 338<sup>8</sup>. The negotiations followed two tracks: direct bilateral and regional multilateral, as bilateralism has been the Israeli pattern in negotiation with Arabs in order to maximize its share.

The tracks were:

<sup>1</sup> Jad, Emad. *Palestine..Al Ard Wa Asha'b Min Annakba ila Oslo*. Op.cit, p. 245

<sup>2</sup> Madrid Conference of 1991. Retrieved November 28, 2006, from [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Madrid\\_Conference\\_of\\_1991](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Madrid_Conference_of_1991)

<sup>3</sup> Shlaim, Avi, (1992). When Bush Comes to Shove: America and the Arab-Israeli Peace Process. *The Oxford International Review*, 3, (2), 2-6.

<sup>4</sup> Al Farra, Mohammad Ali. *Assalam Al Khadi': Ila Ain?* Op.cit, p. 252

<sup>5</sup> Abbass Mahmoud, *Tareeq Oslo*. Op.cit, p. 131

<sup>6</sup> Abdel Lateef, Salah. *Ma'ziq Assalam fi Al Mofawadat Al Felestinia Al Israelia*. Op.cit, p. 30

<sup>7</sup> Al Farra, Mohammad Ali. *Assalam Al Khadi': Ila Ain?* Op.cit, p. 253

<sup>8</sup> Ibid, p. 253



One: the bilateral talks were aimed at achieving peace treaties between the three Arab participants and Israel.

Two: multilateral talks –opened in Moscow in January 28, 1992- were focusing on one major issue each time: water, environment, arms control, refugees and economic development.<sup>1</sup>

The bilateral negotiations produced the Israel-Jordan Peace Treaty of Wadi Araba (in 1994) but never reached the form of a treaty with Syria whose talks with Israel resulted in several series of negotiations.

Thus, the settlement process in Madrid was based on adopting peace and negotiation strategic option, according to the following bases:<sup>2</sup>

- 1- Madrid Conference agreed on the slogan: "peaceful comprehensive and just settlement in the region".
- 2- The Settlement is based on the principle "peace for land".
- 3- Respecting the international legitimacy resolutions regarding the Arab-Israeli conflict including UN Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338.
- 4- Reaching negotiated solutions on the occupied lands, self-government, security, and re-stationing, with putting off the decisive issues like Jerusalem; settlements, and the Palestinian entity for a later stage.
- 5- Creating frames of joint cooperation through multilateral negotiation to face problems such as water, disarmament, development issues, refugees and others.

<sup>1</sup> Madrid Conference of 1991. Retrieved November 28, 2006, from [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Madrid\\_Conference\\_of\\_1991](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Madrid_Conference_of_1991). Op.cit

<sup>2</sup> Barakat, Nitham Mahmoud, Assira' Al Araby-Al Israeli Montho Madrid Hatta Al'an: (Al Janib Assiyassy). Op.cit, p. 212

- The Palestinians and the Israelis during the negotiation:

Since the Palestinians and the Israelis are the main parties to the peace process, it is important here to concentrate on their performance during the Madrid Conference and the peace negotiations in Washington, and how the circumstances led both parties to negotiate secretly in Oslo.

First of all, and in response to the American initiatives, Israel agreed to come to the negotiation table with Arabs first, and in this there are two opinions: **one** says Israel was driven to the negotiation against its will because it did not want to give the Arabs any regional concessions in spite of all the great benefits it might have gotten from the multilateral negotiations.<sup>1</sup> The US convened the Madrid Conference and forced Shamir to sit down with the Arabs at last, even non-PLO Palestinians<sup>2</sup>. The **second** opinion says that it was Israel, not the PLO, who initiated the talks at Oslo. After winning the elections of 1991, Yitzhak Rabin and Shimon Peres understood how weak Yasser Arafat had become after the Gulf War. They also understood "if Israel does not normalize its relations with the Arab World and globalize its economy, it will not keep up with the West."<sup>3</sup>

This means that Israel understood how strong it was when the PLO was weak, and taking advantage of the situation could lead to no way but its own benefit. In this sense, Barbara Victor (2000)<sup>4</sup> wrote that Arafat's choice of making peace with Israel was not an individual choice to which the Israelis did not respond. The truth is that the Israelis may have pushed Arafat towards such choice as they knew that after the Soviet Bloc had collapsed, the West changed its image of Israel as a democratic

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<sup>1</sup> Adajany, Hisham. *Al Edarat Al Amerikiya wa Israel*. Op.cit, p. 161

<sup>2</sup> The Hidden Economic Logic of Oslo, Retrieved November 21, 2006, from <http://www.odaction.org/economy.html>

<sup>3</sup> Ibid

<sup>4</sup> Victor, Barbara, (2000). *Hanan Ashrawi: Asseera Wal Masseera*. (1<sup>st</sup> ed.). Cairo: Maktabat Madbooly. p. 29

pioneer in the Middle East, and that the collapse made the US concerned more than any other state with applying a new world order which does not obtain the reasons from any cold war nor socialist threats. As a result, and taking into consideration the bad economic situation on the international level, Israel would not have expected the same amount of financial aids from the West for defense against the socialist threats that do not exist any more. Because of that, Israel had to work for destroying the boundaries and economic barriers, and support a peace agreement with its enemies. This was not possible unless Israel ended its occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip<sup>1</sup>.

Actually, it does not matter who came first to negotiate, yet what matters is what every part got and to what conditions.

When Israel agreed to negotiate with the Arabs, it had its own vision of the settlement which was as follows: <sup>2</sup>

- 1) The settlement shall be based on direct negotiation between the parties of the conflict in the conference, away from the international community and the UN Security Council resolutions as a reference for the settlement. Camp David also could be a referential model to the negotiation, too.
- 2) The conference shall negotiate a group of issues that include security, normalization, water, and more.
- 3) The conference shall be a formality which has no authority to imply solutions, nor does interfere in the negotiation process.
- 4) The direct negotiation process shall be in to parallel tracks:

<sup>1</sup> Ibid, p.29

<sup>2</sup> Barakat, Nitham Mahmoud, *Assira' Al Araby-Al Israeli Montho Madrid Hatta Al'an: (Al Janib Assiyassy)*. Op.cit, p. 207+208

a. between a joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation and Israel over the self-governing issue, b. between Israel and each Arab country alone to negotiate normalization, economic cooperation, and security arrangements.

Arabs, similarly, have their own vision of the settlement, too:<sup>1</sup>

- 1) The necessity of continuing the conference schedule and not to minimize it to the inauguration and final session till an acceptable settlement is reached.
- 2) International legitimacy –represented in the UN Resolutions- is the reference of the conference.
- 3) Accepting the double-negotiating tracks at the same time: one is for the parties directly related to the conflict, and the other multilateral negotiating track which cares for general issues in the region.

The Palestinians, from their part, went to Madrid in 1991 with the concern of achieving four goals:

1. Making the world listen to them while explaining their case.
2. Convincing the Arab states that the Palestinians are now an independent people fighting for a national home and there is no reason to go in wars with Israel<sup>2</sup>.
3. Accomplishing the Palestinian decision independency in negotiation through ensuring the independency of the Palestinian negotiating delegation.
4. Ensuring not to ignore the PLO and depriving the Palestinian leadership in Tunisia from the negotiation process<sup>3</sup>. This can be explained by the fears from

<sup>1</sup> Ibid, p. 210

<sup>2</sup> Victor, Barbara, **Hanan Ashrawi: Asseera Wal Masseur.** Op.cit, p. 185

<sup>3</sup> Al Jarabawi, Ali. **Al Bo'd Al Felastini-Al Israeli Lil Sira' Montho Oslo Hatta Al'an-1998.** Op.cit, pp. 163+164

within the PLO that another entity (from the occupied lands) would replace the PLO and eliminate its role in the negotiation<sup>1</sup>.

By looking at the previous visions, a sense of hoping to get something out of the settlement is clear. Some differences in attitudes that express how both sides –Arabs and Israelis- think could be noticed. These differences are:

**First:** Arabs wanted the UN Security Council Resolutions to back the conference, and so, in a way guarantee their rights, while Israel saw the conference without the United Nations, so it would not be under pressure before the international community.

**Second:** Israel insisted on separating both negotiating tracks in addition to negotiating in the bilateral track with each Arab party aside: Syria, Jordan (with the Palestinian delegation), and Lebanon. This implies the Israeli strategy of getting a larger space for negotiations and separating Arabs' attitudes to increase arguments among them<sup>2</sup> by using bilateralism in the negotiation with Arabs. When the invitation of the conference was received by the PLO, the Palestinians wanted to participate in an independent delegation, or a joint-Jordanian delegation. The first suggestion was refused by Israel and America, while the second was refused by the Arabs themselves because the participating Arab countries (Syria, Lebanon, and Jordan) feared that the Palestinian issue would overcome their issues and be a barrier on their way to regional solutions due to the complication of the Palestinian case. As a result, a joint Arabian delegation was an impractical idea<sup>3</sup>. Yet, finally they agreed on a joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation under which the Jordanians deal with Jordanian issues, while the Palestinians deal with Palestinian issues as the Palestinians were sure that the Jordanians would

<sup>1</sup> Ibid, p. 164

<sup>2</sup> Zarnooqa. Salah Salim, (1998). *Khibrat Attafawod Al Araby Ma' Israel (Mulahathat Amma)*. **Assiyassa Addawliyya**. (133): 111-117, p. 116

<sup>3</sup> Abbass Mahmoud, **Tareeq Oslo**. Op.cit, p. 132

never sign anything which the Palestinians would not accept. However, the Israelis insisted on negotiating with the joint delegation about both tracks: the Jordanian and the Palestinian. This made the Palestinian team refuse to enter the negotiation hall, and made the Jordanians stick to the Palestinians<sup>1</sup>. Also, the Israeli arrogance complicated the situation more by adding two more conditions<sup>2</sup>:

- a. This joint delegation shall not include any Palestinian figure from within the PLO.
- b. This joint delegation shall not include any member from Jerusalem.

After a whole week of discussions, the problem was solved, and the Israelis accepted the formula suggested by King Hussein<sup>3</sup>: the Palestinian delegation with Haydar Abdel Shafy as the head negotiator, including two Jordanians, while the Jordanian delegations would be led by Abdel Salam Al Majaly as the head negotiator with two Palestinians to express the continuity of the joint delegation<sup>4</sup>.

As mentioned before, the inauguration session of the Madrid Conference on 30<sup>th</sup> October, 1991 was ceremonial. President Bush stood at the opening session in the Palacio Real in Madrid as the "proud victor in two wars: the Cold War and the Gulf War." In his speech, Bush stated that the United States and the Soviet Union were there not as rivals but as partners, and that the United States was simply there to facilitate the search for peace. He pleased the Palestinians by calling for peace based on security, and pleased the Israelis by calling for peace based on fairness.

<sup>1</sup> Ibid, p. 139

<sup>2</sup> Al Majaly, Abdel Salam, (2003). **Rehlat Al Omor, Min Beit Asha'ar ila Siddat Al Hokm.** (1<sup>st</sup> ed.) Beirut: Al Matboo'at Publishing. p. 206

<sup>3</sup> Ibid, p. 206

<sup>4</sup> Abbass Mahmoud, **Tareeq Oslo.** Op.cit, p. 139

Gorbachev in his speech talked about his countries economic needs, and that it was not in Madrid to compete with America but "rather to compete with Arabs and Israelis for American largesse"<sup>1</sup>. His speech was described by Avi Shlaim (1992) as "pathetic".

Shamir's version of the Arab-Israeli conflict in his opening speech was narrow-minded and "blinkered", portraying Israel as a victim of "Arab aggression". He imaged all Arabs waiting to see the destroyed Israel. The speech was described by Shlaim too as "exceedingly short on substance".

Abdel Shafy's speech (received from the PLO leadership in Tunisia) delivered a message that the Israeli occupation must be ended, the Palestinians have a right to self-determination, and that they are determined to pursue that right until they achieve statehood. His speech was both the "most eloquent and the most moderate presentation of the Palestinian case ever made by an official Palestinian spokesman since the beginning of the conflict."<sup>2</sup>

After that session was over, stage two of the peace process began in Madrid. It took the form of separate bilateral meetings between Israel and each of the three Arab delegations. The closing session ended with the statement read to the press by Al Majaly who mentioned that the talks of Madrid were held in a practical atmosphere and included all the procedural issues of the future talks<sup>3</sup>. Moreover, the American Administration invited all the parties to hold peace talks in Washington D.C. on Wednesday, the 4<sup>th</sup> of December, 1991<sup>4</sup>.

Finally, the bilateralism of Madrid Conference acquired its importance from the fact that it opened the door for the peace process to be resumed, leading to the famous Washington negotiation and then to Oslo. And thus it can be considered an important

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<sup>1</sup> Ibid, p. 139

<sup>2</sup> Ibid, p. 139

<sup>3</sup> Al Majaly, Abdel Salam. **Rehlat Al Omor, Min Beit Asha'ar ila Siddat Al Hokm.** Op.cit, p. 281

<sup>4</sup> Avi, Shlaim, **When Bosh Comes to Shove: America and the Arab-Israeli Peace Process.** Op.cit.

aspect and a great reference in history of the Arab-Israeli conflict, changing with it the perception of the impossibility of negotiating with Israel for peace, and ensuring (later) the recognition of the PLO by Israel, an action that Israel would have had done. So the change of the taboos was mutual.

Benny Morris (1999) wrote in that sense: *"Israel has done its share- it has recognized the PLO, recognized the necessity of dividing Palestine between a Jewish State and a smaller Palestinian state. This is a vast revolution in Israeli thinking compared to where Israelis were on this question in the years between 1948-1992."*<sup>1</sup> Also, Al Majaly considered the conference as the first international event with that great international attention given to the Palestinian cause and the Palestinians.<sup>2</sup>

### **3. Washington Negotiations (December 1991 –July 1993):**

On the decided date -4/12/1991- and at exactly 10 o'clock in the morning, all Arab delegation were ready to negotiate at the American Foreign Ministry building in Washington D.C., and after waiting for more than half an hour, the Israeli delegation did not show up for a known reason. They did not want the negotiation to be held in Washington but they wanted them to be in the Middle East.<sup>3</sup> This demonstrates the Israeli arrogance which tried to place barriers in the face of the Arab delegations and create tensions in order to prolong the negotiations, and so take advantage of the time aspect for anything that may be in its benefit. For instance, Shamir used the status of the Palestinians as a delegation to spoil the negotiation. On this, Avi Shlaim, in his article *When Bush Comes to Shove: America and the Arab-Israeli Peace Process* wrote:<sup>4</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Morris, Benny, (1999). **Righteous Victims: A History of the Zionist-Arab Conflict 1881-1999**, London: Alfred A. Knopf. p. 62

<sup>2</sup> Al Majaly, Abdel Salam. **Rehlat Al Omor, Min Beit Asha'ar ila Siddat Al Hokm**. Op.cit, p. 220

<sup>3</sup> Ibid, p. 223

<sup>4</sup> Shlaim, Avi, **When Bosh Comes to Shove: America and the Arab-Israeli Peace Process**. Op.cit.



"On the last day of the Madrid talks an understanding was reached that in the bilateral phase the Israelis would negotiate separately with the Palestinians and Jordanians." "Accordingly," he continued, "the Americans prepared two rooms in the State Department, one for the Israeli and Palestinian teams, and one for the Israeli and Jordanian teams." Later in Washington, and after choosing the 10<sup>th</sup> of December as the first round of the negotiation, the Israelis refused that arrangement and insisted on negotiating with a joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation. For six days, the heads of the Israeli and Palestinian delegations "haggled" in the corridor of the State Department, unable to agree on anything, even entering the negotiating room, the thing that required the Americans to place a sofa in the corridor. This corridor incident led to having a new term in the lexicon: "the corridor diplomacy." That round was ended without finding a final solution for the "joint delegation" concept, however, the efforts made helped beating that procedural disagreement: the Palestinian delegation gave up calling for "parity" with Jordan and Israel in representation in the general meetings, while Israel gave up the parity principle between its delegation and the joint delegation, and recognized negotiating within the two tracks<sup>1</sup>. It is worth mentioning here that negotiations on the Syrian and Lebanese tracks had started on the decided date: 10<sup>th</sup> of December, 1991.<sup>2</sup>

The second round of the negotiation started on 13<sup>th</sup> January, 1992 and included three sessions on the days 14<sup>th</sup>, 15<sup>th</sup>, and 16<sup>th</sup> January held by the Jordanian and Israeli delegation. The negotiations were of exploring and discovering attitudes as they were limited to a general discussion about the visions of the peace process. Also both parties examined the others' wills and strategies. Both parties did not agree on certain agenda for the negotiation.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Al Majaly, Abdel Salam. **Rehlat Al Omor, Min Beit Asha'ar ila Siddat Al Hokm.** Op.cit, p. 243

<sup>2</sup> Abbass Mahmoud, **Tareeq Oslo.** Op.cit, p. 140

<sup>3</sup> Al Majaly, Abdel Salam, (2003). **Rehlat Al Omor, Min Beit Asha'ar ila Siddat Al Hokm.** Op.cit, p. 243+244

The Arab-Israeli negotiation continued for almost eleven continuous rounds in Washington. The first, second, and third rounds through the seventh were without great results. The eighth lasted for six days and was suspended twice when the Palestinians celebrated the First Intifada's fifth anniversary, and when Israel expelled 415 Palestinians from Hamas members to Lebanon<sup>1</sup>. It was suspended in December, 1992, and resumed again in April, 1993<sup>2</sup>.

It was mentioned by many people that the peace negotiations in Washington did not achieve any important results or outcomes that benefited the Palestinians or the Israelis. Nofal wrote that "despite negotiating for 10 rounds in 20 months, neither party reached an agreement."<sup>3</sup> This can not be considered true unless we gather all aspects of the subject in hand and study the issue from the different circumstances that surrounded it:

- A) Oslo secret negotiations.
- B) The financial crisis.
- C) Internal disagreements.

The main and direct effect is the secret Israeli-Palestinian meetings in **Oslo** which were taking place while the negotiations in Washington were being conducted. Both negotiations (in Oslo and Washington) were supervised by the PLO leadership in Tunisia. As the Oslo negotiations were totally secret, the Palestinian negotiators in Washington felt that their leadership's decisions were confusing and embarrassing in certain occasions and this caused the negotiation to slow down. The truth was that Yasser Arafat felt the efficiency of Oslo channel and wanted to paralyze any

<sup>1</sup> Ibid, p. 250

<sup>2</sup> Nofal, Mamdouh, (1995). **Qissat Itifaq Oslo-Arriwaya Al Haqeeqiya Al Kamila**. (1<sup>st</sup> ed.) Amman: Al Ahliyya Publishing. p. 57

<sup>3</sup> Ibid, p. 115

advancement in the Washington negotiation till something is reached to in Oslo. That is why he ordered the negotiating team in Washington to show toughness in attitudes in the negotiation.

Moreover, the PLO had suffered from a **financial crisis** and bankruptcy. Arafat suspended all the budgets allocated to the PLO's offices abroad and all interior institutions. At that time, Faisal Al Hussein and the negotiating delegation in Washington were in debt and were not able to pay the hotel they were staying at<sup>1</sup>. The crisis' effects reached many countries, and many talked about financial corruption and bad management of the financial resources. The PLO employees and martyrs' families which did not receive their salaries were complaining in Tunisia, Amman, Algeria, and Sudan, and because Arafat refused to discuss the bad economic crisis and corruption, the situation led two of the PLO members to resign<sup>2</sup>: Mahmoud Darweesh<sup>3</sup> and Shafeeq Al Hout<sup>4</sup>.

This confusion reflected by the PLO leadership and rigidity in decisions and attitudes caused to have a great **disagreement** between the Palestinians themselves especially knowing that because of the secret negotiation in Oslo Arafat was not so enthusiastic to resume the negotiations in Washington. He used many excuses among which was that he insisted on the return of the expelled Hamas members as a condition to resume the disrupted negotiations<sup>5</sup>. All these circumstances made the Washington negotiation seem inefficient. However, no one can ignore the great effort made by the delegation in Washington to bring the points of view closer, as well as making sure to be connected directly to the PLO leadership in Tunisia and never ignore it. However, Arafat was

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<sup>1</sup> Ibid, p. 96

<sup>2</sup> Ibid, p. 113

<sup>3</sup> Darweesh resigned also because of his opposition to the Oslo Agreement per se and not the secret channel in Oslo, although he supported the peace process and Madrid Conference.

<sup>4</sup> He was a Palestinian politician, a founder of the PLO, and was the PLO representative in London.

<sup>5</sup> Nofal, Mamdoh, **Qissat Itifaq Oslo-Arriwaya Al Haqeeqiya Al Kamila**. Op.cit, p. 57

anxious that the delegation in Washington may turn to be an alternative to replace the PLO, although Al Hussein and Abdel Shafy had decided that it is a PLO delegation since its formation<sup>1</sup>. Although Israel insisted on not negotiating with any of the PLO representatives, the Palestinian negotiators had their connections with the PLO leaders in Tunisia, and it was not a secret that the PLO leadership, led by Yasser Arafat, was directing the delegation from behind the curtains.<sup>2</sup>

The absence of trust, double confused decisions, and extreme inflexible attitudes Arafat asked the team to adopt caused three members of the negotiating team in Washington to resign after the ninth round. Faisal Al Hussein, Sa'eb Oreikat, and Hanan Ashrawy had never grasped Arafat's attitudes neither during that round, nor did they after it, especially they felt that Arafat was worried about their relations with the Americans and about that they were preparing themselves to replace the Palestinian leadership. Moreover, the team felt that something was going on secretly through the Egyptians, but Arafat kept denying it<sup>3</sup>. At that moment, the negotiators understood that Arafat was placing barriers before them as Faisal was accused of being financially independent from the PLO, and Hanan with the rest of the team were faced by a slanderous campaign<sup>4</sup>. All that resulted in having the three resigned from their positions in the Palestinian negotiating delegation in Washington, thinking that they may exert pressure on Arafat to change his attitude, yet the resignations gave Arafat an extra excuse to resume Oslo negotiations<sup>5</sup>.

Ahmad Yousif Ahmad (1998) says that the mechanism of the negotiation in Washington (that is bilateral negotiations) weakened the negotiating ability of the Palestinian negotiator, and made the Israeli negotiator more able to manipulate the

<sup>1</sup> Ibid, p. 29

<sup>2</sup> Victor, Barbara. **Hanan Ashrawi: Asseera Wal Masseur.** Op.cit, p. 31

<sup>3</sup> Nofal, Mamdouh, **Qissat Itifaq Oslo-Arriwaya Al Haqqeeya Al Kamila.** Op.cit, p. 96

<sup>4</sup> Ibid, p. 96

<sup>5</sup> Ibid, p. 96

Palestinian negotiator by hiding facts in a particular bilateral track from another<sup>1</sup>. It made the Palestinian negotiator with his fresh negotiating experience behave personally while waiting for decisions to come from Tunisia. Thus, bilateralism in Washington gave the Palestinian issue its international dimensions, yet it brought back weak positions and difficulties in decision-making which the Palestinians might not have had when negotiating within an Arab joint delegation.

Moreover, the negotiations in Washington D.C., especially on the Palestinian and Syrian tracks, had faced many Israeli barriers and traps to prolong the negotiations endlessly causing it to fail and to make Arabs responsible for it, and change realities so nothing was left to negotiate about. This policy has been adopted by Israel and approved by the Likud and Labor<sup>2</sup>. To express that to the Palestinians, Israel had not stopped its oppressive methods in the occupied territories to oppress the Palestinian First Intifada- started in December 1987- which was taking place while the Israeli officials were seeking a peaceful settlement for their conflict with the Palestinians<sup>3</sup>.

After that long discussion, it is true that Israel succeeded in:

- a) Negotiating separately with every Arab party.
- b) Eliminating all international parties from serious participation in the bilateral negotiation except the United States which was pro-Israeli all the way.

However, Israel failed to eliminate the PLO as the only and legitimate representative for the Palestinian people, and finally had to recognize the Organization within the Oslo frame.<sup>4</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Ahmad, Youssif Ahmad, (1998). Oslo Ka'itar Lil Tassweya: Annathariyya wat Tatbeeq. In: Ahmad Al Rasheedy (Ed.), Al Qadiyya Al Felasteniyya wa Afaq Attasweyya Asselmiya. **A'mal Al Mo'tamar Al Hady 'Ashar Lil Bohooth Assiyassiah**, Cairo, 6-8 Decemebr 1997. pp. 15-25. p. 16

<sup>2</sup> Al Farra, Mohammad Ali. **Assalam Al Khadi': Ila Ain?** Op.cit, p. 253+254

<sup>3</sup> Ibid, p. 254

<sup>4</sup> Assayed Sa'id, (1997). Ta'mmoulat Hawla Osloob Attafawod Al Isreali, '**Alam Al Fikr**. (4): 63-79, p. 71

- c) Achieving a real GDP per capita growth at an annual average rate of about 3.4% during the period from September 1993 till June 1996<sup>1</sup>. Before Oslo, the number was only about 1.3% annually. Nevertheless, that growth of per capita during the post-Oslo was not a result of the peace agreement but due to:
- 1- Immigrants who arrived before Oslo (in particular during the period 1990-1993) had temporarily high unemployment rates as they adjusted to Israeli society increasing the unemployment to 11.2% of the labor force in 1992. In 1996, by which time many immigrants had found jobs, the Israeli unemployment rate fell to 6.5%<sup>2</sup>. This means that such growth has nothing to do with Oslo and the peace process.
  - 2- The growth in productivity was achieved at the expense of a severe deterioration in other parts of the economy, including a sharp deterioration in Israel's balance of payments and equally a sharp growth in its foreign debts.
  - 3- Such growth was treated as a windfall by the Labor government, which used it to inflate and expand the Israeli public center.

And by attending the peace negotiations, the Palestinians achieved certain goals:<sup>3</sup>

1. The Palestinians succeeded in the accentuating their existence and announcing their attendance.
2. They succeeded in publicizing their case after having the world's attention focused on them, and they got the suitable chance to talk to the world through media.

<sup>1</sup> Plaut, Steven, (1997). Has Oslo Brought a Peace Dividend? **Middle East Quarterly**.

<sup>2</sup> Ibid

<sup>3</sup> Al Farra, Mohammad Ali. **Assalam Al Khadi': Ila Ain?** Op.cit, p. 256

3. As a result, the world started to understand the dimensions of the Palestinian cause, especially that the Intifada could acquire the world's support and sympathy like never before.
4. The Palestinian participation in the negotiation visualized the Palestinians as peace-loving people and cast away the terrorism accusations from them.

In other words, the negotiations of peace were based on bilateralism and secrecy which led to having the Oslo Accords. Having Oslo been reached to in a complete secrecy, secrecy deprived the agreement from any popular or institutional Palestinian supervision before announcing the Accords<sup>1</sup>. The bilateral secret negotiation were taking place between representatives of the PLO (Ahmad Qurai' –Abu 'Ala'-, Mahir Al Kord, and Hassan Asfour) and the Israeli delegation (Hirschfield and Bondek) in Oslo, Norway, while the Palestinian delegation (with Hyder Abdel Shafi head of the negotiating team) was negotiating with an Israeli delegation in Washington<sup>2</sup>.

<sup>1</sup> Ahmad, Youssif Ahmad. **Oslo Ka'itar Lil Tassweya: Annathariyya wat Tatbeeq.** Op.cit, p. 17

<sup>2</sup> Al Farra, Mohammad Ali. **Assalam Al Khadi': Ila Ain?** Op.cit, p. 257

*Part II: The Oslo Accords*

This part will deal with the Oslo Agreement itself, and how the political ambience drove the negotiators from the Palestinians and the Israelis to end up negotiating secretly in Oslo, Norway, in addition to how both peoples reacted to the agreement reached.

From what has been mentioned, the Washington negotiation led to a cross point of interests between Israel and the Palestinian leadership in Tunisia. From their part, the Israelis realized that not only there would be no use of consequently preventing the PLO from participating officially in the negotiation, but also they were convinced that the only Palestinian authority is the PLO and its leadership abroad. On the other hand, the Palestinian leadership in Tunisia was in a hurry, not only because of its worries about its existence, but also it was anxious that any other Arab party would reach an agreement with Israel on the Palestinian expense. This was because of the separate negotiating tracks which made each Arab party worried about the results of the negotiation of other parties with Israel. As a result, a kind of hidden competition and covered race among the Arabs emerged in the negotiation, especially within the Palestinian leadership in Tunisia as the Palestinian party was to be considered the weakest Arab negotiating party.<sup>1</sup>

Consequently, a secret negotiating channel was opened between the Palestinian leadership and the Israeli government in Oslo, Norway resulting in the Oslo Accords, officially called the Declaration of Principles on Interim Self- Government Arrangements, or simply called the Declaration of Principles (DOP), which was officially signed in a public ceremony in Washington D.C. on September 13, 1993 with Mahmoud Abbas (Abu Mazin) signing for the PLO and Shimon Peres signing for Israel,

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<sup>1</sup> Al Jarabawi, Ali, (1999). *Al Bo'd Al Felastini-Al Israeli Lil Sira' Montho Oslo Hatta Al'an-1998*. Op.cit, p. 164



witnessed by Warren Christopher for the US and Russian Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev for Russia, in the presence of President Bill Clinton and Israel's Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin<sup>1</sup>. Before telling the story of Oslo, it is worth mentioning that analyzing the circumstances of Oslo agreement shows that the agreement was born naturally in special circumstances and special international patronage. It is an agreement which was not imposed on the two parties by a third party, but was reached to and signed by legitimate representatives<sup>2</sup>.

The story of Oslo began (as Mahmoud Abbass tells<sup>3</sup>) on 3<sup>rd</sup> December, 1992 in London when Faisal Al Hussein, Hanan Ashrawy, and Afeef Safieh<sup>4</sup> asked Ahmad Qurai' to meet the member of the Labor Party and lecturer at Tel Aviv University Yaer Hirschfield, who introduced himself as a consultant to Shimon Perez, the Israeli Foreign Minister and his Deputy, Yossi Beilin. And for the first time, Ahmad Qurai' sat with an Israeli official, with Safieh's presence, as Faisal and Hanan were busy. It was true that Qurai' leads the multilateral negotiations, yet as agreed he does not attend any meetings because he has an official position in the PLO, in addition to the fact that the Israelis prevented any member of its delegation from meeting any PLO representative.

The meeting with Hirschfield was concentrating directly on the political issues related to Washington negotiation and he tried to give the impression that the meeting was unofficial and that he was talking as an academic who is neither committed to anything nor commit anyone to anything. At the end, Hirschfield suggested meeting in Norway to continue the dialogue.

That initiative meant to the PLO leaders that there was a determination to open secret doors of negotiations and that man (Hirschfield) would not behave like that without any

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<sup>1</sup> Israeli-Palestinian conflict/ Oslo Accords. Retrieved November 10, 2006, from [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Oslo\\_Accords](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Oslo_Accords). Op.cit

<sup>2</sup> Nofal, Mamdouh, **Qissat Itifaq Oslo-Arriwaya Al Haqeeqiya Al Kamila**. Op.cit, p. 275

<sup>3</sup> Abbass Mahmoud, **Tareeq Oslo**. Op.cit, p. 178

<sup>4</sup> He was the PLO representative in London.

direction, so he must have been charged to do that by Beilen and Perez. It was clear that the Israelis wanted to open other channel than Washington<sup>1</sup>. The Israelis wanted a back channel with the Palestinians and the Palestinians themselves thought of that too. The will of having secret negotiation came from Arafat who stressed the importance of "back channels" in the negotiation and that Washington negotiation would not have any future if no back channel was created between decision makers from both sides<sup>2</sup>. Arafat said that in a meeting with Terje Roed-Larsen in Tunisia, in January 1992. He was a Norwegian, a director of a strategic studies center for Palestinian refugees' issues (FAFO).

After discussing all the aspects to be addressed, Mahmoud Abbass and Qurai's plan was to concentrate on the issues at which Washington negotiations stopped<sup>3</sup>. Then, Ahmad Qurai', Mahir Al Kord, and Hassan Asfour flew secretly to Norway. The leaders of the PLO thought that secrecy is best to be adopted in such case until they can know what these meetings could lead to.

When they had arrived in Oslo, they were taken to an old royal palace and the Israelis (Hirschfield and Bondek with Larsen's presence) were taken to another palace in the same area, then they met and discussed the agenda. Qurai' suggested not to discuss history as it would take them to nothing, but they should directly discuss the UN Security Council Resolution 242, the interim authority, the final status, Jerusalem, and the settlements. The goal would be reaching a declaration of principles. The Israelis agreed to that immediately, and then they agreed primarily on the issues to negotiate about and their goals. They also agreed that their meetings in Oslo (if their leaderships

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<sup>1</sup> Ibid, p. 179

<sup>2</sup> Nofal, Mamdouh, **Qissat Itifaq Oslo-Arriwaya Al Haqeeqiya Al Kamila**. Op.cit, p. 50

<sup>3</sup> Ibid, p. 52

approve) are not an alternative to the Washington negotiation. Finally, both parties guaranteed the secrecy of these meetings before flying back to their countries<sup>1</sup>.

The main points of these meetings were:

- 1- The aim is to reach a declaration of principles or a framework.
- 2- Starting to gather the agreed upon points and separate them from the disagreed upon points.
- 3- These meetings will not replace Washington negotiation but are directed to convey to Washington whatever is agreed upon in that secret channel through the American sponsor.
- 4- The Norwegian side must keep the American sponsor acknowledged of what happens step by step.

In mid February 1993, the second Oslo meeting was held with the same group. Qurai' was more optimistic after agreeing with Hirschfield to merge both parties' attitudes in one paper called the "to be discussed draft of a declaration of principles."<sup>2</sup>

Later in March and April and before the beginning of the ninth round of Washington negotiation, Oslo's meetings were continued intensively, and both parties started serious discussions. Mutual trustful relations were initiated among both parties, yet Qurai' with Perez and Rabin's attitudes towards Oslo, as Hirschfield was concerned with Arafat's attitudes towards Oslo too, and how much Qurai' influences Arafat. In spite of the mutual suspicions, both parties insisted on doing anything to succeed in the talks and reach tangible results. To achieve that, both parties agreed to work with their leaderships to make them believe that Oslo channel is the only leading to an agreement.

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<sup>1</sup> Ibid, p. 52

<sup>2</sup> Ibid, p. 58

However, the opening stage of Oslo was considered weak by Abbass who said that the major weak pointing this channel is that it was secret, and this means that the Israelis can deny it completely and consequently finish it. The other point is that the Israeli delegation did not announce that it represents an official party, although it signaled in many places to connections and relations with some officials (meaning Hirschfield who said he was a consultant to Rabin and Beilen)<sup>1</sup>.

It is important here to mention that the Israelis were as always arrogant and tried to gain the maximum from the Palestinians knowing fully that the Palestinians were the weakest in the equation. Because of that, and some months after Oslo, many Israeli officials tried to meet Mahmoud Abbass, who refused assuming that Rabin wanted to test the PLO and see how much they were clinging to Oslo<sup>2</sup>. Moreover, the Israeli Mossad tried to open a dialogue channel with Abbass, who did not respond and that explains why the Mossad tried to install spying instruments in his office<sup>3</sup>.

Before talking about the details and minutes of the agreement, it is important to talk about how these details were reached to by citing the rounds of the negotiation by date:

- The First Round (21/1/1993):

The Israeli delegation consisted of Yaer Hirschfield and Ron Bondek, while the Palestinian consisted of Qurai', Hassan Asfour, and Mahir Al Kord. Qurai' expressed that the Palestinians were depressed at that time because of<sup>4</sup>:

1. The tough and nervous Israeli political nature.
2. The negotiation in Washington did not achieve any positive outcome.
3. The bad financial, social, and economic situations in the occupied lands.

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<sup>1</sup> Abbass Mahmoud, **Tareeq Oslo**. Op.cit, p. 196

<sup>2</sup> Ibid, p. 109

<sup>3</sup> Nofal, Mamdouh, **Qissat Itifaq Oslo-Arriwaya Al Haqeeqiya Al Kamila**. Op.cit, p. 118

<sup>4</sup> Abbass Mahmoud, **Tareeq Oslo**. Op.cit, p.187

The first round was more about knowing each other and it addressed many different points and issues generally without concentrating on specific issues. The result both parties got was a positive impression to go on.

- The Second Round (11/2/1993):

The dialogue was long and detailed, and sometimes repeated to focus on the points mentioned before or to suggest new ideas. What is worth mentioning is that understanding and trust between both parties increased, and things turned to be more serious. This round concentrated on basic subjects in the DOP such as the elections, Jerusalem, and the economic development. From that, the major points in the DOP had emerged.

However, the main issue of that time for the Palestinians was to make sure that Oslo channel had the Israeli government's support for two reasons<sup>1</sup>:

1. To reassure themselves that such talks with the Israelis are not fruitless.
2. To control and cancel any trials to contact other Palestinians to open dialogue channels by the Israelis.

- The Third Round (20/3/1993):

The Israelis talked about achieving a transformational point which can move both parties from being enemies to being cooperative and friends. They also talked about the US role and Christopher's visit to Jerusalem and his negotiations with Faisal Al Hussein about the expelled members of Hamas.

The round was ended by demonstrating the document which was prepared by Perez to be a declaration of principles' plan (the Israelis brought it with them). Also

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<sup>1</sup> Ibid, p. 204

at this stage, the Americans knew about the secret negotiations on the Foreign Minister's level and they encouraged it.

- The Forth Round (30/4/1993).

- The Fifth Round (8/5/1993):

Both delegations discussed the Gaza-Jericho plan and the declaration of principles. At this round, the Israelis suggested leaving the controversial points to a later stage. The round ended after writing a draft of the DOP depending of the discussions during the previous rounds. However, the Israelis talked in a language that was far from trust, and at the same time the power of attorney they received did not reach the level of being legitimate to move further in the negotiation because Rabin was hesitant, yet he was convinced that Washington channel was the safer and more guaranteed to him than any other channel. In addition to that he did not believe that such meetings could lead to an agreement, yet if they did, he was worried that the PLO would not be able to keep its commitments and sign it. Also he was not sure of the American approval on Oslo meetings and that Oslo was Perez' channel with whom he was not in complete consistence.

The Palestinians were serious in Oslo and Washington channels but it was noticed that the talks in Oslo were more realistic. The Palestinians themselves were ready to reach an agreement but their doubts remained as the Israeli negotiators did not enjoy their government's support.

- The Sixth Round (21/5/1993):

At this round, a sudden development occurred. A third person joined the Israeli delegation. He introduced himself as Oary Sphere, the General Manager of the Israeli Foreign Minister. This development relaxed Abbass as he felt that for the first time they were in front of an official Israeli employee because Hirschfield and Bondek had introduced themselves earlier as academics close to the authority. However, and because Rabin was not involved completely in Oslo, Abbass' doubts remained as Rabin could destroy everything at any moment.

- The Seventh Round (13/6/1993):

The negotiation has entered a new stage with a fourth person joining the Israeli team. He was Yonel Zinger. Zinger was a personal envoy from Rabin personally and he brought with him a list of prepared questions like are the government and the council one body or two? Can you call to stop the Intifada after signing the declaration? And can you convince your delegation in Washington to issue a joint statement? ...etc. the Palestinian delegation was very upset because of the questions, knowing that it is becoming to be a decisive stage with Rabin and the Israeli government started to give Oslo channel the attention needed.

Zinger's participation in Oslo talks was considered by the Israelis a complete participation of the decision-making center in Israel. This meant too that Rabin had decided to be in the talks to amend it and decide its ends, so Zinger's participation was a qualitative addition to the Israeli delegation<sup>1</sup>.

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<sup>1</sup> Ibid, p. 229

- The Eighth Round (27/6/1993):

The Palestinians were very careful to know the Israeli reactions after Zinger's questions. What they heard was comforting to some extent. Zinger had some suggestions to reach a final formula, saying that Rabin had revised the minutes of the rounds sentence by sentence, and he wanted all agreements to be written down and specified, although he still suspected the credibility of the PLO. Qurai' replied that the Palestinians also had their suspicions about the Israeli commitments to Oslo.

It is noticed that the time gap between the seventh and eighth rounds was short as the Israelis were careful to come back quickly to Oslo to reassure the Palestinians that they were serious in dealing with them. The other thing was setting the bases of the mutual recognition by the Israelis. This gave the ultimate signal that Israel wished to get something out of Oslo.

- The Ninth Round (6/7/1993):

In this round, the Israelis presented a new plan which was better in construction than the previous one but it included a dramatic retreat in the essential and major issues, and showed a desire to reach a final agreement.

The minutes of this round were numerous, such as the PLO, Gaza and Jericho, Jerusalem, the immigrants, security, and arbitration.

- The Tenth Round (12/7/1993):

The plan of the DOP was accepted by the Palestinians in principle, but from a Palestinian perspective it needed many amendments to be balanced, accepted, and



ready to be marketed among the Palestinians and applicable in the future. This required the Palestinians to pay attention to every word, sentence, and expression. During the negotiations and up to the tenth round, the texts of the DOP were not shown to any legal consultant to revise it because the Palestinians feared leakages. About this round Abbass wrote<sup>1</sup>: although we did not achieve any agreement with the Israelis at the end of the tenth round, but we can say that we are about to reach one... we had to maximize Oslo's base... specially that all information and news were signaling the failure of Washington negotiations.

- The Eleventh Round (25/7/1993):

Time in this round was a pressuring element for both parties because leakages of information were feared and so it could lead to the negotiation's failure. It was true that information leakages about the secret channel had reached the press (early July) and it was said that the source of such leakages was the American Administration<sup>2</sup>. Once again, many rumors spread, yet this time the Israeli press published trusted news about meetings between Israeli and Palestinian officials. This leakage moved the opposition in Israel and Palestine to question the right of conducting such secret negotiation without public consent<sup>3</sup>.

The Palestinians felt that the Israelis were trying to take advantage of that pressure to make the Palestinians accept what they had offered.

- The Twelfth Round (14/8/1993):

This round was dedicated by both sides to finalize any controversial points in the DOP, however, it ended with clear disagreements over a group of points, and the

<sup>1</sup> Ibid, p. 245

<sup>2</sup> Nofal, Mamdouh, **Qissat Itifaq Oslo-Arriwaya Al Haqeeqiya Al Kamila**. Op.cit, p. 89

<sup>3</sup> Ibid, p. 116

Israeli party repeated that idea of the possible suspension of Oslo channel because of the difficulties they were facing.

- The Final Stage:

The final stage was nothing but many phone calls during 7 hours between Tunisia, Stockholm, and Tel Aviv. The story begins with the Palestinians preparing altogether with the Israelis a plan for an agreement which was not finished as both sides stopped with 9 points, some of which were Israeli requests and some were Palestinian requests, and both thought that it was the end. With the arrival of Perez to Stockholm on the 17<sup>th</sup> August 1993, he met with the Foreign Minister of Norway Johan Jorgen Holst and both agreed on calling Tunisia.

In Tunisia, Arafat, Mahmoud Abbass, Yasser Abed Rabboh, Qurai', and Hassan Asfour were on the phone, and on the other line in Stockholm was Perez and Holst, and in Tel Aviv was Rabin. They all discussed the hot points and the required amendments, and each party's opinion about it. After that, all agreed to finalize the differences and agreed to meet in Oslo Thursday 19<sup>th</sup> August, 1993 where the initialing would take place.

- The Final Session:

The Palestinian delegation left to Oslo from Tunisia on 18/8/1993 to sign the agreement. On 20/8/1993 a final session was held.

On the 13<sup>th</sup> September, 1993, the US President Bill Clinton went out to the southern garden of the White House, surrounded by the Israeli Prime Minister Rabin and the PLO President Arafat. This scene was a very realistic event in the TV history as

two of the worst enemies of the world were signing a peace agreement in Washington. In spite of that, the scene was more like a compulsory wedding ceremony than an end to decades of antagonism. This is how Barbara Victor described the signing of Declaration of Principles on Interim Self- Government Arrangements<sup>1</sup>.

The Oslo Accords contain a set of "mutually agreed upon general principles" regarding a five year interim period of the Palestinian self-rule.<sup>2</sup> This affirmation of the Palestinian right to self-government would be practiced through the creation of the Palestinian Authority in the areas of parts of Gaza Strip and West Bank from which the Israeli forces would withdraw. The Palestinian rule would last for a five year interim period during which a permanent agreement (beginning no later than May 1996)<sup>3</sup> to negotiate over the most contentious issues, like borders, refugees, Jerusalem, and the Israeli settlements. These were postponed to be discussed at a final stage. All this was concluded within a preamble, seventeen articles, four annexes, and the agreed minutes to the Declaration of Principles on the Interim Self-Government Arrangements.

The remarkable point to be made here is that the arrangements are to be done in phases. It was agreed on a time-table as follows:<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Victor Barbara, **Hanan Ashrawi: Asseera Wal Maseera**. Op.cit, p. 23

<sup>2</sup> Israel 1991 to Present. Retrieved November 10, 2006, from [http://palestinefacts.org/pf\\_1991to\\_now\\_oslo\\_accords.php](http://palestinefacts.org/pf_1991to_now_oslo_accords.php).

<sup>3</sup> Israeli-Palestinian conflict/ Oslo Accords. Retrieved November 10, 2006, from [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Oslo\\_Accords](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Oslo_Accords). Op.cit

<sup>4</sup> Al Farra, Mohammad Ali. **Assalam Al Khadi': Ila Ain?** Op.cit, p. 258

Table 3.2 "The arrangements of the DOP"

<b>13 October 1993</b>	Starting to apply the Oslo Accords signed at the White House
<b>13 December 1993</b>	Starting to agree on the withdrawal of the Israeli forces from Gaza Strip and Jericho Area
<b>13 December 1993 to 13 April 1994</b>	Beginning the interim stage for five years
<b>13 April 1994</b>	Israel withdraws from Gaza Strip and Jericho area
<b>13 July 1994</b>	The deadline for the Palestinian Legislative Council's elections.
<b>13 December 1995 to 13 April 1996</b>	Starting the final status negotiations for the West Bank and Gaza Strip and the final status issues
<b>13 February 1998 to 13 April 1999</b>	The final status in Gaza Strip and the West Bank would come into force

More specifically, a deeper look must be taken on the accords to revise all its articles.

Starting with the preamble, it does not seem different from any other preamble in any agreement, especially with the use of words like "dignity", "legitimate", "political rights", and "peaceful coexistence". The most distinguished thing in the preamble of the DOP is the use of the words "Palestinian people" for the first time in history by the Israelis. Such words were refused to be used during the pre-talks among the negotiating parties except in the context of ancient history. Even the American Administration refused to use these words till the year 1988 when the Palestinian Council was convened. At that time, President Bush said that since that date, the expression of "Palestinian people" would be used instead of the "Palestinians" by the US Administration<sup>1</sup>.

**Article 1** of the accords talks about the aim of the negotiation which is the establishment of a "Palestinian Interim Self-Government Authority for the Palestinian people in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, for a transitional period not exceeding five

<sup>1</sup> Attazee, Abdel Hady, (1996). Qira'a Jadeeda fi Itifaq Oslo. In: **Wa Matha Law Akhfaaq Amalyyat Assalam fi Asharq Al Awasat?**. 1<sup>st</sup> ed. (pp: 61-70). Al Ribat: Matboo'at The Moroccan Kingdom Academy. p. 63

years, leading to a permanent settlement based on Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338."

**Article 2** was about the framework for the interim period which would be set in this Declaration of Principles, while **Article 3** was concerned with the elections, including annex I for more details.

**Article 4** talked about the jurisdiction of the Palestinian Legislative Council (the "Council"), and that the Gaza Strip and the West Bank are considered to be "a single territorial unit, whose integrity will be preserved during the interim period."

**Article 5** talked about the transitional period and the permanent status negotiations with the issues to be negotiated, including: Jerusalem, refugees, settlements, security arrangements, borders, relation and cooperation with other neighbors, and issues of common interests.

**Article 6** talked in two paragraphs about the transfer of powers to the Palestinians from the Israeli military government in the following spheres: education and culture, health, social welfare, direct taxations, and tourism. It could be noticed here that such issues do not represent a full control over the territory, as many other issues would be taken into consideration by any normal self-government, like security, arms, and foreign policy, although paragraph 2 stated that the two parties may negotiate the transfer of additional powers and responsibilities!

**Article 7** pointed out the responsibilities and duties of the Council that varied between the structure of the Council and the number of its members.

**Article 8** stated guaranteeing the public order and internal security in the West Bank and Gaza through a strong police force established by the Council, while Israel would continue defending external threats.

**Article 9** concerned with laws and military orders that would be reviewed by both parties, Palestinians and Israelis.

What **Article 10** stated was the establishment of a joint Israeli- Palestinian Liaison Committee to deal with issues requiring coordination, issues of common interests and disputes. On the other hand, **Article 11** talked about the establishment of an Israeli-Palestinian Economic Cooperation Committee for the purpose of developing and implementing the programs identified in Annex III and IV of the DOP.


**Article 12** pointed out possible fields of cooperation with Egypt and Jordan. It could be noticed here that a bilateral agreement led to a multilateral agreement<sup>1</sup>.

**Article 13** was about the redeployment of Israeli military forces in the West Bank and Gaza, while **Article 14** was about the Israeli withdrawal from the Gaza Strip and Jericho area stated in Annex II.

**Article 15**, in its 3 paragraphs, was concerned with the resolution of disputes arising from interpreting or applying the DOP by a joint Liaison Committee through which they could be negotiated. If such a procedure fails, reconciliation would be a mechanism to agree upon. Otherwise the dispute would be transferred to an Arbitration Committee.

That mechanism is demonstrated in the following diagram (figure 3.1):

<sup>1</sup> Ibid, p. 67



- **Figure 3.1:** Mechanism of resolving disputes about interpreting or applying the DOP according to Article 15.

**Article 16** stated that both parties would work together to implement some programs pointed out in Annex IV, such as economic, developmental, social rehabilitation, business and other programs in Gaza Strip and the West Bank.

And finally, **Article 17** was concerned with some miscellaneous provisions, such as entering into force (one month after signing), and considering all the protocols annexed to the DOP as integral.

The agreement was politically an act of recognition by each side of the other<sup>1</sup>. The mutual recognition between the State of Israel and the PLO was expressed in two letters, one sent by Yasser Arafat on September 9, 1993, and the other is a response to it by Yitzhak Rabin on the same date. Arafat's letter specified that:<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Discussion of the Oslo Declaration of Principles. Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies. Retrieved February 17, 2007, from <http://www.biu.ac.il/SOC/besa/books/oslo/osloapl.html>.

<sup>2</sup> Israeli 1991 to Present. Retrieved November, 10, 2006, from [http://palestinefacts.org/pf\\_1991to\\_now\\_oslo\\_accords.php](http://palestinefacts.org/pf_1991to_now_oslo_accords.php). Op.cit

- A. The PLO recognizes the right of the State of Israel to exist in peace and security.
- B. The PLO accepts the UN Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338.
- C. The PLO commits itself to the Middle East peace process by solving issues through negotiations.
- D. The PLO renounces the use of terrorism and violence.
- E. Articles in the Palestinian Covenant that deny the Israeli existence and other provisions which are inconsistent with the commitments of this letter (Arafat's Letter<sup>1</sup>) are to be regarded inoperative and no longer valid.
- F. The PLO would submit to the Palestinian National Council for formal approval the necessary changes in regard to the Palestinian Covenant.

From his part, Rabin responded by a letter stating that Israel has decided to recognize the PLO as the representative of the Palestinian people and commence negotiations with the PLO within the Middle East peace process.<sup>2</sup>

The mutual recognition –as we said before- a great achievement on both sides, specially the Palestinians who realized that the Israeli-American recognition of the PLO and its right to return to the Palestinian land are great achievements<sup>3</sup>. This appeared clearly when the Palestinian President, Yasser Arafat arrived in Gaza on 1<sup>st</sup> July, 1994, accompanied by Hosny Mubarak from Cairo to Rafah passage. The PLO members arrived earlier on 8<sup>th</sup> May, 1994<sup>4</sup>.

Being the weaker part in the negotiation, the Palestinian negotiators played their role fairly, and with the DOP, no matter if it was good or bad for the Palestinians, they have reached a stage neither the Palestinians nor the Israelis have waited to reach since

<sup>1</sup> For the full lines of the letter, please refer to Appendix 5, p. 272

<sup>2</sup> For the full lines of the letter, please refer to Appendix 5, p. 273

<sup>3</sup> Abdel Lateef, Salah. *Ma'ziq Assalam fi Al Mofawadat Al Felestinia Al Israelia*. Op.cit, p. 61

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid*, p. 59



a long time. Mahmoud Abbass in his memoirs wrote: to make sure that the Palestinian delegation's performance at the peace negotiation is well-prepared; a committee for following up the negotiating was formed and consisted of a number of PLO members<sup>1</sup>.

Francis A. Boyle, Professor of International Law and Legal Advisor to the Palestinian Delegation to the Middle East Negotiations (1991-1993) wrote:<sup>2</sup> *"Before the signing ceremony, I commented to a high-level official of the Palestinian Liberation Organization: ... it will be very difficult to negotiate your way out of it,"* meaning negotiating the DOP. The official replied by that it will depend on their negotiating skill. Boyle continued: *"Of course I have great respect for Palestinian negotiators. They have done the best they can negotiating in good faith with the Israeli government that has been invariably backed up by the United States."* He stressed that there has never been any good faith on the part of the Israeli government before, during or after Oslo.

Like any other agreement, the Oslo Accords had its positives and negatives regarding the consequences it brought back which, according to some people, did not reward the Palestinians much as they have been expecting. To explain that, such positives and drawbacks must be revised:

A. Positives Achieved:

1. The accords achieved the Israeli recognition of the PLO, which was regarded as "terrorist" organization.<sup>3</sup>
2. The PLO leadership and its staff could settle in Palestine<sup>4</sup>, and Oslo gave the PLO a territorial base in Palestine.<sup>5</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Abbass Mahmoud, **Tareeq Oslo**. Op.cit, p. 139

<sup>2</sup> Boyle, Francis A., A New Direction for the Palestinian People. Retrieved November 28, 2006, from <http://www.hartford-hwp.com/archives/5la/029.html>.

<sup>3</sup> Ahmad, Youssif Ahmad. **Oslo Ka'itar Lil Tassweya: Annathariyya wat Tatbeeq**. Op.cit, p.18 and Al Farra, Mohammad Ali. **Assalam Al Khadi': Ila Ain?** Op.cit, p. 258

<sup>4</sup> Al Farra, Mohammad Ali. **Assalam Al Khadi': Ila Ain?** Op.cit, p. 259

<sup>5</sup> Fishman, Joel S., (2003). Ten Years Since Oslo: the PLO's "People's War" Strategy and Israel's Inadequate Response. **Jerusalem Viewpoints**, 1-15 September, 2003, (503).

3. The Israeli withdrawal from some Palestinian lands from which Israel refused earlier to withdraw.
4. The Accords laid down a mechanism to solve the Palestinian cause through negotiations.<sup>1</sup>
5. The main economic achievement of Oslo –for Israel- is the relief from the worst effects of Arab boycott.<sup>2</sup>

B. Negatives:

1. The accords did not include any limits on the Israeli settling in Palestine, as there was nothing in the context that prevents Israel from building more settlements<sup>3</sup>. (For example, from 1993-95, 10,000 settlements were built and the settlers increased from 105,000 in 1993 to 145, 000 in 1995)<sup>4</sup>.
2. The Accords imposed restrictions on going to other track than negotiation<sup>5</sup>.
3. Essential issues like Jerusalem, refugees, and settlements, were put off for a later stage of negotiation<sup>6</sup>.
4. Dividing the Palestinian territories (the West Bank and Gaza Strip) into three zones:<sup>7</sup>
  - Area A: full control of the Palestinian Authority (Jenin, Toulkarim, Nabuls, Ramalla, Qalqeelia, Hebron, and Bethlehem).
  - Area B: Palestinian civil control, Israeli security control (24% of total area of the West Bank).
  - Area C: full Israeli control, except over civilians.

<sup>1</sup> Ibid

<sup>2</sup> Hidden Economic Logic of Oslo. Retrieved November 21, 2006, from <http://www.odaction.org/economy.html>.

<sup>3</sup> Ahmad, Youssif Ahmad. *Oslo Ka'itar Lil Tassweya: Annathariyya wat Tatbeeq*. Op.cit, p. 23

<sup>4</sup> Jad, Emad. *Palestine..Al Ard Wa Asha'b Min Annakba ila Oslo*. Op.cit, p. 251

<sup>5</sup> Ahmad, Youssif Ahmad. *Oslo Ka'itar Lil Tassweya: Annathariyya wat Tatbeeq*. Op.cit, p. 23

<sup>6</sup> Jad, Emad. *Palestine..Al Ard Wa Asha'b Min Annakba ila Oslo*. Op.cit, p. 249

<sup>7</sup> Ibid, p. 250

5. Oslo gave Israel the Palestinian consent to become a parallel partner in the Palestinian self-determination decisions as Israel managed to change the territories occupied in 1967 from "occupied" territories to territories that are "disputed over" between the Palestinians and the Israelis, and so the Israeli occupation turned to be a legal existence,<sup>1</sup> and Israel had the right –equal to the Palestinians- to take decisions regarding it.
6. Oslo paved the way to normalizing the Israeli existence in the Arab world with a Palestinian consent. This was represented by forming many joint committees, especially in economy<sup>2</sup>.
7. The Accords changed the Palestinian cause from a dimensional conflict that has basic international pillars and governed by the international law, to a bilateral local conflict solved through direct negotiation between the parties directly related. Problems emerging from negotiating would be solved through joint arbitration without any external intervention. This led to freeing Israel from the moral dimension pressure<sup>3</sup>.
8. The Accords failed to address the fundamental power imbalance between Israel, a regional hegemony, and Palestinians, a stateless occupied population<sup>4</sup>.

Similarly, Al Jarabawi (1999) sees that Oslo Accords are the roots of the crisis for the following reasons:<sup>5</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Al Jarabawi, Ali. **Al Bo'd Al Felastini-Al Israeli Lil Sira' Montho Oslo Hatta Al'an-1998**. Op.cit, p. 166+167

<sup>2</sup> Ibid, p. 167

<sup>3</sup> Ibid, p. 167

<sup>4</sup> Cook, Catherine, Why There's No Peace in Palestine. Retrieved November 21, 2006, from [http://www.merip.org/newspaper\\_opdes/opde\\_cook092403.html](http://www.merip.org/newspaper_opdes/opde_cook092403.html).

<sup>5</sup> Al Jarabawi, Ali, (1999). Ro'ya fi Al Hal Al Felasteeny. In: Tawfeeq Abu Bakir (Ed.), **Al Quds wa Al Hal Al Felasteeny wa Qira'at fi Al Amn Al Qawmy Al Araby**. 1<sup>st</sup> ed. (pp. 79-85). Amman: Abdel Hameed Shouman Ins. p. 80+81

- a) The Oslo Accords are not an agreement of principles but an agreement of procedures; it includes dates and specific stages and phases as the interim and final stages are not related in any way.
- b) There is neither final clear end nor goal agreed on. If it were a principled agreement since the beginning, the final goal would be clear.
- c) There are no actual guarantees to apply Oslo.

As when signing any international agreement, reactions of the international community started to flow to the surface. Signing the Declaration of Principles did not bring drastic shocking reactions in the world nor the Arab World, because the multilateral base of Madrid Conference as a resumption of the peace process prepared the scene for some kind of agreement to be born, no matter public was or secret. It is not only the agreement itself but also the secrecy of the talks pre the agreement was that which caused a wave of anger among the Arab World, Palestinians in particular.

After signing the agreements, Israeli settlement expansion accelerated to five times its original rate leading to frustration among the Palestinians and a general distrust of the Accords and of the Israeli intentions<sup>1</sup>. On the other hand, the Israeli's trust in the Accords was undermined by the accelerated "terrorist attacks" against the Israelis at a time when they were expected to stop<sup>2</sup>.

To explain more, the Israeli society, after the Accords and as a reaction to them, started to split after having been unified in attitude regarding their conflict with the Arabs. That split in Israel was mainly into two streams:<sup>3</sup>

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
<sup>1</sup> Israeli-Palestinian conflict/ Oslo Accords. Retrieved November 10, 2006, from [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Oslo\\_Accords](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Oslo_Accords). Op.cit.

<sup>2</sup> Ibid

<sup>3</sup> Barakat, Nitham Mahmoud, *Assira' Al Araby-Al Israeli Montho Madrid Hatta Al'an: (Al Janib Assiyassy)*. Op.cit, p. 223

- 1- **The peace stream:** this stream meets with the Labor Party in Israel. It sees that there is a historical chance of peace in the region, and to take that chance, Israel has to agree on the withdrawal from the lands occupied in 1967 and the establishment of a Palestinian entity there, in addition to recognizing the Palestinian people's right to be separated from Israel.
- 2- **The hand stream (the power stream):** this stream clings to the saying "The Historical Israeli Territory" and refuses to concede its sovereignty over the occupied territories. It is represented by the right party –led by the Likud- and the religious parties, plus some extreme movements in the Israeli society. It sees that strong Israel is able to impose peace on Arabs without the need to concede neither territory nor concede the Palestinian self-rule under the umbrella of the Israeli sovereignty.

The remarkable thing was that some hopes of ending the Arab-Israeli wars appeared among the Israelis. Polls showed that in 1987, 57% of the Israelis thought of a probable war, and then it increased to 68% in 1990. Since that year the percentage retreated to 54% in 1992 then to 43% in 1994.<sup>1</sup>



• **Figure 3.2**

<sup>1</sup> Ibid, p. 224

However, this does not deny the fact that Oslo Accords caused a strong debate within Israel between the left wing which was supporting, and the right wing which was opposing. After a two-day discussion in the Knesset about the government proclamation in the issue of the Accords and exchange of the letters, on September 23, 1993, a vote of confidence was held in which 61 Knesset members voted for the decision, 50 voted against, and 8 abstained.<sup>1</sup>

These numbers show that such an international event like the multilateral negotiations in Madrid and Washington and then the revealing of the secret negotiation in Oslo could really affect the public opinion and could change the attitude of both parties about each other. Israel in this sense started to take the first step on the way to accepting Arafat as its "optional enemy."<sup>2</sup> On the other hand, it is important to notice that Israel did that when Arafat and his officials in Tunisia were having great disagreements with the PLO leaders in the occupied lands due to the decrease in financial supplies of the PLO in the aftermath of the Gulf War. The Israeli officials knew that Arafat was in his weakest positions and they took advantage of that. It is well-known that when Israel gives something, it takes many things in return.

As for Arabs, and since the 1990s, the Arabs' vision of their conflict with Israel started to change gradually favoring the political settlement process. All that was changed under the new international inputs and the desperate position of the Arabs. Generally, Barakat talked about the streams into which Arabs had split regarding their attitude of the conflict which became clear during Madrid Peace Conference 1991 and the following agreements<sup>3</sup>:

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<sup>1</sup> Israeli-Palestinian conflict/ Oslo Accords. Retrieved November 10, 2006, from [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Oslo\\_Accords](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Oslo_Accords). Op.cit.

<sup>2</sup> Victor Barbara, **Hanan Ashrawi: Asseera Wal Maseera**. Op.cit, p. 33

<sup>3</sup> Barakat, Nitham Mahmoud, **Assira' Al Araby-Al Israeli Montho Madrid Hatta Al'an: (Al Janib Assiyassy)**. Op.cit, p. 224

- **First Stream (pessimists):** those who see Israel strong and maintaining its supremacy. As a result, there is no other way but to accept that fact as it is. This stream represents the desperation of the Arabs and the imbalance of power favoring Israel, so -in their view- nothing prevents normalizing relations with Israelis unlimitedly, taking into consideration that it is the time for achieving interests while leaving political conflict behind.
- **Second Stream (optimists):** those who think that Israel lacks the basic needs to survive and its foreign support will not last forever. Also they think that Arabs enjoy all the cultural and economic qualifications to be winners, and so the Arabs have only to exploit power elements which they have and manage the conflict properly, the thing that would guarantee the elimination of the Israeli existence in Palestine. Consequently, this stream opposes political settlements and normalization of relations, and warns from the Israeli domination in the region.
- **Third Stream (in the middle):** those in the middle believe that in spite of the contradictions between the Arab Nation and Israel, both people can coexist under peace treaties concluded at that time. They also believe in the necessity of seizing the Israeli expansion at the moment while leaving the issue of balancing the balance of power in favor for Arabs and dealing with the Israeli existence to the coming generations to deal with under the new circumstances of the future. And so, this stream opposes going too far in normalizing the relations with the Israelis, yet it does not exaggerate the dangers of the Israeli domination in the region.

More specifically, the Palestinian reactions to the Accords were not homogeneous<sup>1</sup>: Fatah accepted the Accords while Hamas, the Palestinian Islamic Jihad

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<sup>1</sup> Israeli-Palestinian conflict/ Oslo Accords. Retrieved November 10, 2006, from [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Oslo\\_Accords](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Oslo_Accords). Op.cit.

and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, objected to the Accords since the groups completely denounce Israel's right to exist<sup>1</sup>. However, many members of the PLO propagated many excuses for why they accepted to negotiate with Israel and the "Gaza-Jericho First" agreement in spite of the drawbacks and gaps<sup>2</sup>:

- 1) Many international changes have happened, and the ally on which the PLO depended –the previous USSR- has dissolved and vanished, and the New World Order relies on one aspect that is the United States, so why not to try this new ally? This ally can affect Israel specially that the agreements were signed in Washington in Clinton's presence, and the Foreign Ministers of the European countries, Jordan and Egypt, who all were partners in the peace process.
- 2) The Gulf War had cracked the Arabs' role and nationalism which supported the Palestinians for a long time, especially when the Palestinians had lost more than \$12 millions as a consequence of the war because the Palestinian workers lost their jobs in Kuwait. Moreover, the financial support the PLO used to get from Kuwait had been suspended. Relying on other Arab countries was difficult in such case.

Nevertheless, those who opposed the agreement of Oslo were not convinced. They thought that the agreement did not find final solutions to some important issues like Israeli settlements, refugees, Jerusalem, and the Palestinian prisoners. Their argument was based on the fact that such important and urgent issues were put off to a later stage (the final stage after 3 years), and such long period may give Israel the excuse to do whatever it wanted in expanding the settlements especially that the settlements issue

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<sup>1</sup> Ibid

<sup>2</sup> Abdel Lateef, Salah. *Ma'ziq Assalam fi Al Mofawadat Al Felestinia Al Israelia*. Op.cit, p. 60



was the core disagreement during Washington negotiations<sup>1</sup>. Moreover, some members adopting nationalism in the PLO blamed its leadership for not including them and their opinions as partners in the secret negotiations which was restricted on members who adopt regionalism like Abbass, Qurai', and Dr. Nabeel Sha'ath<sup>2</sup>.

Similarly, the Israeli opposition objected Rabin and his government's right to negotiate with the PLO and called for consulting the Knesset and people about it<sup>3</sup>. The same did the Palestinian opposition by suspecting and objecting the authorities given to the executive committee to negotiate<sup>4</sup>.

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<sup>1</sup> Ibid, p. 61

<sup>2</sup> Ibid, p. 61

<sup>3</sup> The Knesset cast a vote of confidence to the agreement of the DOP on 23<sup>rd</sup> September, 1993

<sup>4</sup> Nofal, Mamdouh, **Qissat Itifaq Oslo-Arriwaya Al Haqeeqiya Al Kamila**. Op.cit, p. 118

*Part Three: Third Party Role in the Negotiation*

The third party intervention in any dispute could be necessary in order to solve it, especially when the parties related do not seem having the ability to resolve their dispute. The Arab-Israeli conflict has witnessed many trials of a third party intervention as it has been an ongoing long-lasting conflict which involved many complicated aspects of dispute over territories, settlements, refugees...etc.

If the Arab-Israeli conflict would not be addressed from the perspective of "occupation of a peaceful people's lands by an illegitimate force," many talked about "coexistence" and "peace between two peoples on one land." However, the Arab-Israeli conflict should not be treated from one perspective, but all considerations must be taken in order to find "a solution" or a settlement to create peace in the region. Was the third party aware of that? Answers may vary.

In the Oslo Accords, the United States of America and the USSR have started the initiative by convening Madrid Conference in 1991<sup>1</sup>, yet as everybody knows, the Soviet participation was just a mere formality and the only power which dominated the negotiations in Washington was the American power. That was due to a number of reasons which would be tackled later. In the secret channel in Oslo, the Norwegian role can not be easily ignored, too. What follows is an overview on how the third party—American, Soviet, and Norwegian- played its role in the negotiation.

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<sup>1</sup> It was mentioned earlier that the previous USSR had started the initiative with the U.S.A in October 1991, yet in December of the same year, the USSR collapsed and the Russian Federation, which replaced it, continued.

A. Russia (the late USSR):

Long time ago, the Cold War had marked the Arab-Soviet relations that took different shapes of aids and allies in order to maintain its strong existence in the region as an opponent to the American existence.

To maintain its position, the USSR provided the Arabs with weapons in their wars against Israel. Other than the financial and economic aids on which many Arab countries depended, the USSR offered an international support for Arabs' issues, for the Palestinians in their conflict with Israel in special. For example, when the PLO was attacked by the Israelis in Lebanon and their base camps were destroyed in southern Lebanon, the Soviets issued their usual rhetoric on the behalf of the Palestinian cause, and sent Yasser Arafat a telegram telling him that they were behind him one thousand percent<sup>1</sup>. Whether was the Soviet Union supporting the Palestinians against Israel – which was an American ally- as a part of its race with the United States or not, no body can deny that the Soviet Union violated the détente and supported the Egyptians and Syrians during the 1973 War by supplying an estimated 200,000 to 225,000 tons of military equipment and supplies.<sup>2</sup>

At a later stage, the Soviet Union started to experience economic difficulties which were a reflection of the long arm race and international aids deployed in making allies and building coalitions all over the world. It could be an outcome of its long Cold War with the United States who "won" after the collapse of the USSR.

As previously mentioned, the policies Gorbachev adapted to revive his country's bad economy failed causing the collapse of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in December 1991, after having ended the Cold War in 1989 with America and the Russian Federation replaced it.

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<sup>1</sup> Soviet-Egyptian Relations. Retrieved December 9, 2006, from <http://www.heritage.org/Research/RussiaansEurasia/bg291.cfm>

<sup>2</sup> Ibid

Under these circumstances, the Soviet Union's slow withdrawal from the international scene allowed America to glow and highlighted its power as hegemony in the world. It was mentioned that America found itself at that time free from its war commitments and paid more attention to the conflict in the Middle East.

Taking the lead in that role, America gave a little space for the USSR to participate in its initiative in settling the Arab-Israeli conflict, and later to the Russian Federation to sign whatever agreement or settlement could be reached to<sup>1</sup>. Thus, in Madrid Conference, the Soviet participation in October 1991 was just a formality and could be called a symbolic participation as the signing of the Declaration of Principles in 1993 was marked by a Russian mere "witnessing" (the USSR collapsed two months after Madrid Conference). This was due to the fact that the Soviet great power was minimized to the "poor-economy Russia" which strived to revive, and followed the American perspectives after having opposed the American perspectives. The USSR inaugurated Madrid Conference, but continued later in the negotiation which followed as the Russian Federation.

That change in the Russian attitude was clear in the speech of the Foreign Minister of Russia, Andrei Kozyrev at the ceremony of signing the Declaration of Principles in Washington D.C. 13 September 1993, in which such serious changes were apparent showing the applicability of Russian attitudes with those of America<sup>2</sup>.

Consequently, the Russian role in the Oslo Accords or the peace process can not be termed as a "third party role" due to the weak Russian (Soviet) position at that time and its weak input in the peace process itself, which caused the Arab friends of the late USSR move their attention to somewhere else which could help them accomplishing their interests; i.e. the U.S.A.

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<sup>1</sup> Jad, Emad. *Palestine..Al Ard Wa Asha'b Min Annakba ila Oslo*. Op.cit, p. 240

<sup>2</sup> Ibid, p. 240

### B. The United States of America:

As is well-known, the United States –since its emergence- has played many different roles in shaping the world, mostly noticeable during and after the Second World War.

As in other parts of the world, the Middle East had its share of influential American actions which really were significant in shaping the relations of Arabs –among each other- and with the international community. What makes the Middle East a special case for America is a combination of complicated aspects represented in the Arab-Israeli conflict, as the US has to maintain its relations with both poles of conflict for some particular reasons, and the Middle East being rich with oil –especially in the Arab World-, a pure economic interest. James Baker said about this in his memoirs: the Middle East is an active area for the American interests<sup>1</sup>.

As was previously said, the world witnessed two important events that influenced the American foreign policy performance in the Arab World towards the Arab-Israeli conflict in particular. One was the collapse of the Soviet Union which ended decades of a cold war that consumed huge amounts of arms, lives, and money. It was agreed that the Soviet withdrawal from the political scene as a vicious opponent to the Americans paved the way for the Americans to be a uni-polar power in the world which implied its control over international actions. The other was the Gulf War in which America had allied against Saddam Hussein with other states to liberate Kuwait from the Iraqi invasion. This clearly represents the authority the US gave itself to exercise power in the region.

After being victorious in the Gulf War, America became now freer to solve, or at least settle, the Arab-Israeli conflict. A question may be aroused here: why would a superpower like the United States intervene as a third party in the long-lasting,

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<sup>1</sup> James, Baker. *Siyasat Adiplomassiya*. Op.cit, p. 171

complicated, and sensitive conflict like the Arab-Israeli conflict? To answer this fairly, the relation with both sides must be addressed.

In his book, *The Other Walls*, Harold H. Saunders (1985) wrote about why the American President has to care for the peace process. He said that any superpower could play a decisive and dangerous role in the Middle East. For example, in the 1970s, President Sadat considered America as a "complete partner" and not just a mere mediator<sup>1</sup>. From here, the US role is regarded as very integral. Saunders explains why the United States should intervene<sup>2</sup>:

1. The continuous pressure to reach a just peaceful settlement would serve the American interests in the region.
2. Peace is possible.
3. After building up the political pillars, a peaceful settlement can not be achieved but through a well-prepared negotiation process.

For the Arabs, getting out of a devastating war like the Gulf War and the lack of finance and damaged economies due to the loss of their Soviet provider, finding the other bank of the river was a must. That safe bank was the American superpower. Having known that Arabs went to the United States for help, it is significant to mention that America needed the Arabs too to protect its interests. In this sense, there are two main reasons for that: oil and arms sales. It was an American interest to settle the Arab-Israeli conflict to maintain control over oil resources and guarantee that neither embargos nor other Arabian threats would threaten that treasure. It is well-known that "*several countries in the Middle East possess extraordinary petroleum reserves –more than any other region of the*

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<sup>1</sup>Saunders, H. Harold, (1985). **The Other Walls**. Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute for Public Research. p. 31 +32

<sup>2</sup>Ibid, p. 32

world" as Mark N. Katz (2002) says in his article *America and the Middle East*.<sup>1</sup> He continues: "Since petroleum is needed to fuel the world's economy, anything occurring in the Middle East affecting the production or pricing of petroleum has an enormous impact."

Besides the economic profits of the Arab petroleum and its quality, pricing oil in US dollars made countries around the world in need to maintain a certain level of US currency in the reserves of their central banks to finance their oil purchases.<sup>2</sup> It is an implication of the supremacy of the United States, of course. Thus, creating and maintaining peace in the region would serve the American interests 100% in keeping the oil flowing to the West and having a strong currency.

Another view opposes the view which is concerned with the benefits Americans may make by gearing peace in the Middle East. It says that some may make use of tensions in the Middle East by selling massive amounts of military hardware and technology to Arab dictators like Saddam Hussein<sup>3</sup>. Years later, when the dictator stops doing what he is required to do, the dictator becomes a "threat to regional stability" and containing him becomes a must. Bairman in his article *Why the Middle East Conflict Continues to Exist* introduced that idea using the term "foreigners" to refer to external powers that arm the dictator in the first place. "As no Arab country has a military industry," he says, "all weapons in the region are imported." In defending his point, he thinks if western nations were truly interested in bringing peace to the Middle East, they would have banned arms sales decades ago.<sup>4</sup> No one can deny the American military aids and arms sales to both Arabs and Israelis all along the way, igniting the conflict indirectly.

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<sup>1</sup> Katz, Mark N. (2002) *America and the Middle East* (Electronic version). **Remarks to the Open Forum**, Washington D.C.

<sup>2</sup> Bairman, Joel, *Why the Middle East Conflict Continues to Exist*. Retrieved December 9, 2006, from [http://www.joelbairman.com/articles/me\\_report.asp](http://www.joelbairman.com/articles/me_report.asp).

<sup>3</sup> Ibid

<sup>4</sup> Ibid

Talking about the American-Israeli relations will take us far to the heart of the relation that goes back to history. Noam Chomsky 1983 imaged the relation in a triangle, adding a third side to make up a fateful triangle: the US, Israel, and the Palestinians.<sup>1</sup>

Till the early 1990s, the American-Israeli relation had been mutual: America needed Israel to be an obstacle to the Soviet penetration in the Middle East, while Israel sought the American financial and economic help in the shape of loans. That mutual need was represented in the total US aid to Israel reaching approximately one-third of the American foreign-aid budget, even though Israel comprises just .001 % of the world's population and already has one of the world's higher per capita incomes.<sup>2</sup>

Ironically, the US direct and indirect military aid to Israel makes a total more than it gives to all the countries of Sub-Saharan Africa, Latin America, and the Caribbean put together, whose combined population is 1,054,000,000!<sup>3</sup>

Another aspect plays a decisive role in this sense. Katz says that the strong American support for Israel results from strong "domestic" political support for it in the US<sup>4</sup>. This is because of –according to Katz- the large influential Jewish population in the US, although –he continues- Jews comprise 2% of the American population. Rubner (1984) wrote that the nexus between the two powers is not just a mere result of the Israeli lobby's efforts in Washington<sup>5</sup> (AIPAC: American Israel Public Affairs Committee), but

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<sup>1</sup> Rubner, Michael, (1984). The Fateful Triangle: the United States, Israel and the Palestinians (Book Review), **American-Arab Affairs**, Spring 1984, (8), 131-133. p. 131

<sup>2</sup> Zunes, Stephen, The Strategic Function of U.S. Aid to Israel. Retrieved December 8, 2006, from [http://www.wrmea.com/html/us\\_aid\\_to\\_israel.htm](http://www.wrmea.com/html/us_aid_to_israel.htm).

<sup>3</sup> United States Aid to Israel: Funding the Occupation. Retrieved December 8, 2006, from [http://www.palestinemonitor.org/factsheet/US\\_Aid\\_to\\_Israel.htm](http://www.palestinemonitor.org/factsheet/US_Aid_to_Israel.htm).

<sup>4</sup> Katz, Mark N. (2002) America and the Middle East (Electronic version). **Remarks to the Open Forum**, Washington D.C. Op.cit

<sup>5</sup> Rubner, Michael. **The Fateful Triangle: the United States, Israel and the Palestinians (Book Review**, Op.cit, p. 131.



it is the majority of the Americans who support Israel by a 3 to 1 margin over those who support the Palestinian cause.<sup>1</sup> Katz sees that because:

- 1) The feeling of the Americans that Jews should have their own state as a compensation for "the barbaric treatment" they received by the Nazis.
- 2) Many see Israel as a democracy in the middle of authoritarian countries; a stable state in an unstable region.
- 3) Others see America and Israel as neutral allies against Islamic extremists.

Similarly, Nofal said in his book *The Story of Oslo*: it is true that the nature of the two great powers (U.S.A and the former USSR) was for decades a decisive element in many regional conflicts, but it is important not to ignore the Israeli-American relationship nature, especially Israeli's ability to influence the American policy towards the Middle East through its power in the Congress, the streets, and the American public opinion. All the successive American Administrations (republican or democratic) were sure to make all its moves and activities in the Middle East in accordance with the Israeli policies<sup>2</sup>.

After knowing that, the motivator of the American support to Israel is domestic rather than external, yet the fact that Israel functioned as an obstacle to the promotion of Soviet influence during the Cold War remains true.

That relation is really complicated. The American Foreign Policy has strong motivators for supporting Israel while seeking good relations with Arabs and Muslims at the same time. However, the American pro-Israeli attitude made it difficult for America to

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<sup>1</sup> Katz, Mark N. (2002) America and the Middle East (Electronic version). **Remarks to the Open Forum**, Washington D.C. Op.cit

<sup>2</sup> Nofal, Mamdoh, **Qissat Itifaq Oslo-Arriwaya Al Haqeeqiya Al Kamila**. Op.cit, p. 25

"develop and maintain" the relation with the Arabs<sup>1</sup>. This has created a wave of hostility to America and Americans among Arabs and Muslims all over the world.

With that review of the complicated relation, it is realized that the inevitability of the American initiative for peace in the Middle East is true. Katz wrote: *"If the Palestinian-Israeli conflict continues, every one will suffer."* Since both can not achieve peace, then the US must make it for them<sup>2</sup>. Baker said in his memoirs that the peace process is an element of the internal policies because of the American special relation with Israel and the political power the American-Israeli minority has<sup>3</sup>. Going back to the American role in the peace process, the end of the Gulf War represented a good start to the US to resume its previous steps towards peace in the Middle East as there were many American trials to open Palestinian-Israeli dialogues (as in 1989) which unfortunately failed, while during February and March 1990, the US Administration tried to get a modest Israeli suggestion of elections in the occupied territories. As they achieved some success with the Palestinians, all the American efforts were gone with the wind as the Israeli Prime Minister at that time Shamir had refused that initiative. Soon afterwards, all efforts crashed as Shamir rejected reaching a plan of conducting peace talks with a Palestinian delegation from the occupied lands<sup>4</sup>. This really demonstrates that the post Gulf War period was the best chance for the Americans to create peace in the region. The best way to do that is to take advantage of the moment and break the taboo of direct public negotiation since the establishment of the Israel in 1948<sup>5</sup>.

Scott Lasensky (2002) wrote: *"At the end of the 1991 Gulf War, Washington immediately returned to Arab-Israeli peace making, believing there was a window of opportunity to use*

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<sup>1</sup> Katz, Mark N. (2002) America and the Middle East (Electronic version). **Remarks to the Open Forum**, Washington D.C. Op.cit

<sup>2</sup> Ibid

<sup>3</sup> James, Baker. **Siyasat Adiplomassiya**. Op.cit, p. 172

<sup>4</sup> Ibid, p.172

<sup>5</sup> Ibid, p. 609

*political capital generated by the US victory to revitalize the Arab-Israeli peace process.*"<sup>1</sup>

Another reason cited by Avi Shlaim is that President Bush needed a diplomatic victory to "obscure" the inconclusive result of the war he had waged (the Gulf War II).<sup>2</sup>

And so it was. The American efforts were directed towards getting the Arabs and Israelis round the table in a significant multilateral event of peace. The peace initiative would include multilateral track and bilateral track in negotiation. The US efforts represented in shuttle trips by Baker in a trial to find an acceptable formula by all sides<sup>3</sup>. Getting both the Arabs and the Israelis to meet round the negotiating table was not an easy job, as Shamir was the "toughest nut to crack" due to his ideological commitment to Israel, making it very hard to compromise with Arabs.<sup>4</sup>

Yet, George Bush knew how to force the Israelis to sit to the negotiating table as he used the loan Israel asked the US to give to press Shamir to negotiate. The loan was of \$10 billion and Bush exploited that to the full<sup>5</sup>. Consequently, Madrid Peace Conference was convened in October 1991 with a well-managed American auspices, choosing the two negotiating tracks previously mentioned in a way to stop the Arabs' boycott to Israel, start normalizing relations with Israel, and initiate cooperative projects between Israel and Arabs without being affected by the results of the bilateral talks<sup>6</sup>.

Earlier that year, Bush stood before the Congress in March 6, 1991 to announce his country's attitude from the Arab- Israeli conflict, stressing that there is no substitute for diplomacy<sup>7</sup>. The American diplomacy during Madrid days came out of its feeling of control over others to accomplish its interest: Arabs were helpless after the Gulf War,

<sup>1</sup> Lasensky, Scott, (2002). Underwriting Peace in the Middle East: U.S. Foreign Policy and the Limits of Economic Inducements. **Middle East Review of International Affairs (MERIA)**, 6, (1).

<sup>2</sup> Avi, Shlaim, **When Bosh Comes to Shove: America and the Arab-Israeli Peace Process**. Op.cit.

<sup>3</sup> Lasensky, Scott. **Underwriting Peace in the Middle East: U.S. Foreign Policy and the Limits of Economic Inducements**. Op.cit.

<sup>4</sup> Avi, Shlaim, **When Bosh Comes to Shove: America and the Arab-Israeli Peace Process**. Op.cit.

<sup>5</sup> Ibid

<sup>6</sup> Jad, Emad. **Palestine..Al Ard Wa Asha'b Min Annakba ila Oslo**. Op.cit, p. 246

<sup>7</sup> Adajany, Hisham. **Al Edarat Al Amerikiya wa Israel**. Op.cit, p. 161

and Israelis were seeking loans which American took advantage of to force the Israelis to negotiate. Shlaim says in explaining that Baker followed the advice of Theodore Roosevelt by speaking softly and carrying a big stick. "*Baker also carried with him a few carrots,*" he continues<sup>1</sup>. With his carrots and sticks, in addition to a "skillful manipulation" of them, Baker eventually persuaded all parties to "attend the conference, his conference."<sup>2</sup> Shlaim ended his article by concluding that "for Arabs and Israelis to achieve peace without American intervention would be nothing short of a miracle."<sup>3</sup> This, history proved true.

Although the American role in Oslo secret negotiation was not direct and effective, yet the Israelis made sure that it was in compliance with the American policies. The Israeli-Palestinian agreement and the following agreements made the United States a partner in the peace process with its following stages. Such agreements enhanced the political and economic leverage of the American Administration in the region<sup>4</sup>. Nevertheless, by studying the other face of the DOP –that is its negatives on the participating and sponsoring parties-, it is clear that the total result is pure gains for the United States, which had not have any losses. Such result will stimulate America to continue sponsoring similar agreements as it realizes fully that the failure of Oslo will have negative reflections on its interests in the region<sup>5</sup>.

### C. Norway:

Norwegian secret diplomacy has played an important role in bringing about the tentative peace agreement between Israel and the PLO. It was considered as a "major

<sup>1</sup> Avi, Shlaim, **When Bosh Comes to Shove: America and the Arab-Israeli Peace Process**. Op.cit.

<sup>2</sup> Ibid

<sup>3</sup> Ibid

<sup>4</sup> Nofal, Mamdouh, **Qissat Itifaq Oslo-Arriwaya Al Haqeeqiya Al Kamila**. Op.cit, p. 276

<sup>5</sup> Ibid, p. 277

breakthrough" in the long deadlock situation<sup>1</sup>. The Norwegian initiative to gather the conflicting parties started with the Israeli party who accepted the principle of a back channel of negotiation with the Palestinians. The Norwegians played the role of gathering the conflicting parties in their homelands, and such initiative was new to neither the Israelis nor the Palestinians who had experienced many similar trials to gather them by many means and many countries like the Egyptians and the Russians. However, such initiatives were immature, but later the Norwegians took the chance at the suitable time, worked on it, and achieved it<sup>2</sup>. Mahmoud Abbass said that it was an impossible mission that required complete secrecy from the three parties (the Israelis, the Palestinians, and the Norwegians), yet the Norwegians have been more responsible to maintain secrecy, and they succeeded<sup>3</sup>.

The Norwegian Foreign Minister Johan Jorgen Holst and his team played an integral role in organizing the negotiations in Oslo, taking care of every detail to guarantee the negotiators' comfort and success. Abbass said in this sense that it was for the Palestinians' luck that the group which supervised the negotiations in Norway was very enthusiastic and caring, and most importantly had deep and real wishes for success. Abbass described Holst as the godfather of the negotiations<sup>4</sup>.

A question could be raised here: why Norway?

Norway –like other Scandinavian countries- was objective and had non-aligned tendency towards the Arab-Israeli conflict, so taking the initiative, suggesting that both parties meet on its territory, arranging the event, then witnessing the signing ceremony would not provoke any sensitive feelings from Arabs or the Israelis, or even the United States. Thus Norway, by accepting that role, was –to some people- looking for political

<sup>1</sup> Norwaves, (1993), Oslo Agreement – A Diplomatic Triumph. Norwaves, 1, (27). Retrieved February 17, 2007, from [http://www.norwaves.com/norwaves/Volume1\\_1993/v1nw27.html](http://www.norwaves.com/norwaves/Volume1_1993/v1nw27.html).

<sup>2</sup> Abbass Mahmoud, *Tareeq Oslo*. Op.cit, p. 163

<sup>3</sup> Ibid, p. 163

<sup>4</sup> Ibid, pp. 165+164

credit and international reputation, but to others, it was a self-motivator and true will to achieve peace in the Middle East. In this sense, Holst said: *"Our mission has been to mediate when the two sides felt the need for it."*<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Norwaves, (1993), Oslo Agreement – A Diplomatic Triumph. Norwaves, 1, (27). Retrieved February 17, 2007, from [http://www.norwaves.com/norwaves/Volume1\\_1993/v1nw27.html](http://www.norwaves.com/norwaves/Volume1_1993/v1nw27.html). Op.cit

*Part Four: The Impact of Personal Aspect*

It would be almost impossible to talk about a single personal aspect impact in Oslo Accords because of the absence of that personal aspect during the Washington talks or even before. This may be due to the sensitivity of the Palestinian issue that made the Palestinian representation in any international event symbolic. In Camp David 1978, the personal Aspect of President Sadat was so clear because of his charismatic influential character, and being the main negotiator in the Egyptian delegation to Camp David. This is what is lacked in Oslo.

First of all, Israel had not recognized the Palestinian Liberation Organization since its establishment in 1964 as a result of denying the Palestinian right of having an independent state, and because the PLO represented the Palestinians, Israel did not recognize it.

In spite of all the Palestinian trials (represented in the PLO) to enhance and support their state in Jordan once then in Lebanon, all trials came to failure the thing that resulted in moving the PLO headquarters to Tunisia. This instability threw its reflections on the Palestinian cause before the international community, too. In this sense, no one can ignore the role that the Late Palestinian President Yasser Arafat (born in Cairo, 1929) played to promote the Palestinian case to the world, before and during the PLO. Arafat's life was considered as a "constant travel"<sup>1</sup>, moving from one country to another to promote his people's case. Even in his youth, he used to smuggle arms to Palestine from Egypt (were he was living) to be used against the British and Jews around 1946<sup>2</sup>. Having believed in his case since that early age, Arafat continued

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<sup>1</sup>Arafat's Biography. Retrieved November 30, 2006, from [http://nobelprize.org/nobel\\_prizes/peace/laureates/1994/Arafat-bio.html](http://nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/peace/laureates/1994/Arafat-bio.html).

<sup>2</sup>Ibid

working through Fatah Organization and later the PLO to defend the Palestinian right of a perfect life on the Palestinian territories.

Unfortunately that personal aspect was absent when the peace process was revived in the aftermath of the Gulf War. The reasons for that could be summarized to:

1. During the Gulf War, the PLO headquarters were in Tunisia.
2. The PLO had backed Saddam Hussein at the Gulf War, and had lost its Soviet ally so it was made the weakest party in the peace process.
3. America's strong and sustained support for Israel added an extra load on the Palestinian cause before the world.
4. The decisive element in the absence during Madrid Conference 1991 was the Israeli insistence on not negotiating with an independent Palestinian delegation but with a joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation. This shows the Israeli refusal to deal with any clear Palestinian aspect in the negotiation.
5. Also Israel conditioned that the members of the Palestinian delegation must not have a direct relation with the PLO: they must be from the West Bank and Gaza Strip, as Israel had always been responding to the PLO militarily as a terrorist threat.<sup>1</sup>

What Israel was trying to do is to complicate the situation for the Palestinians using their foxy methods and cunning tracks to prolong the negotiation and consequently, like always, Palestinians lose everything and they win –at least something.

Even by going for secret talks with the Palestinians in Norway, Israel knew fully that it can manipulate the Palestinians according the Israeli conditions to come up with the

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<sup>1</sup> Fishman, Joel S. **Ten Years Since Oslo: the PLO's "People's War" Strategy and Israel's Inadequate Response.** Op.cit



agreement which seemed to be a final relief and a solution to the famous conflict, but from within, it was the Palestinian concessions maximizing the Israeli share. That was what Israel wanted by the secret negotiations: taking advantage of the Palestinian helplessness and separating them from other Arab countries that might have interfered in a way or another for the Palestinian benefit. And here, we do not ignore the personal aspect of the Palestinian negotiators who handled the negotiations both in Washington and in Oslo, but in comparison with the personal impact in Camp David represented in the President Sadat's character, it is realized that it is only Sadat who designed and implemented the scenario of the agreement, while in Oslo the role had been divided between many figures.

To conclude, it is true that the PLO could gain the official recognition of Israel and the world's support for their case by signing the DOP. The PLO, later, could prove its leadership in the President Arafat's character, but Israel will remain there as it used to be many decades ago to crumble those efforts all along the way.

## Chapter IV: Conclusions

After displaying the main events and aspects of the two famous agreements in the history of the Arab-Israeli conflict since its emergence (Camp David and Oslo), a comparison between both agreements is the concern of this chapter. This comparison is going to be based on the same perspectives as the previous chapters studied the agreements. They are:

1. The political circumstances of each agreement.
2. The agreement itself.
3. The third-party role.
4. The impact of the personal aspect.

The comparison will show the main differences and similarities in every aspect, and then a general conclusion will be drawn about which agreement was considered advancement in the Arab-Israeli relations. Mainly, it will try to answer the following question: which negotiation was better for the Arabs in general, the Palestinians and the Egyptians specifically, within the previous perspectives?

*Part I: Political Circumstances*  
*Similarities and Differences*

The importance of the political circumstances lies in the fact that there would be many significant decisions or international events that could direct any conflict to a specific direction, affecting thereby the nature of the conflict under the new circumstances taking place, and affecting the parties of the conflict in their attitudes, behaviours, and understanding of the issue as a whole. Furthermore, such circumstances could change the attitudes of the participants and their points of view. An example could be cited here of the previous USSR, whose attitude towards the Arabs in their conflict with Israel changed implicitly in accordance with the new political circumstances brought about by both the Camp David and Oslo agreements, although it was known that the Soviet attitude –and later the Russian- was pro-Arabs.

Before both agreements, the international scene was not that calm. The Middle East was experiencing hard conditions, especially the Arab World which was suffering from the Cold War prior to Camp David because it was a major interest and a hot spot that attracted the attention of the great main powers at that time, the USA and the previous USSR. Arabs also suffered from the Gulf War in 1990 that led them to bad economic and social situations, prior to the Oslo secret talks and then the agreement in 1993.

More specifically, prior to both agreements, the Arabs were living under the same conditions. Before Camp David, Arabs suffered severely from the consequences of the 1967 War with Israel, and lived in a desperate situation where all Arabs, especially the Egyptians under the leadership of Jamal Abdel Nasser, were burdened by Arab nationalism and the refusal to accept the Israeli existence in the heart of the Arab World, besides poverty and weak military and economic resources by the devastating losses in the Arabian

armies, weapons, and lives. The combination of grief over the loss of the lands occupied by Israel, desperation, bad economic consequences, weak financial and military resources (especially the weak support from the previous Soviet Union which was known as being an Arab ally at that time), and the moral and physical losses made the Arabs feel they were the weakest part in the international community while Israel's regional power was growing more and more with the support of its ally and friend, the United States of America.

Furthermore, the Cold War between the USA and the former USSR and their détente (avoiding direct East-West confrontations) in the 1970s brought tiring consequences for the Arabs in the field of persuading others to adopt an international position to support their issue against the Israeli power, as détente was just a mere cover to discreetly resume the competition in the region. As is known, the American power had emerged and had started to have its first influences in the world as a superpower before, during, and after the Second World War, competing with the Soviet power. In order to enhance its influences and beliefs in the potential of the Middle East as a strategic geographical point of the world, both Soviets and Americans strived to maintain their existence in the region by offering the Middle Eastern countries (mainly the Arab States) financial and military aids and subsidies in addition to their support internationally and regionally. The Soviet Union, having the older influence in the region, continued its support to the Arabs, facing the smart American support to the growing State of Israel in exactly the middle of the Arab World, the heart of the Soviet strategic interests.

Arms sales within the scope of the Cold War exhausted the Arabs' economic resources in order to maintain readiness for any potential Israeli attack, mainly Syria and Egypt, who were the main beneficiaries of the Soviet aids in the region. Meanwhile, Israel was enjoying the unlimited financial patronage of America in the form of arms technologies,

direct and indirect loans and aids (between 1948 and 1973, America had provided Israel with an average of \$122 million a year, or a total of \$3.1 billion for the entire period. More than \$1 billion of that amount consisted of loans for military equipment before and during the 1973 war<sup>1</sup>). Because of that, the continuous Arabs' need for weapons and loans exerted pressures on the former USSR, which the Soviets were slow to respond to the Arabs' demands, especially when the USSR itself needed a permanent flow of economic resources to maintain its position in the region, facing the American influence.

That imbalance between Israel and the Arabs created by the Cold War consequences had caused the Arabs to be in a confused state, and to have a general feeling of weakness, the thing that made them look for other options available at that time. This was what President Sadat (successor of Abdel Nasser) had realised and made him move his attention to the American power, ending the situation by signing a peace treaty with Israel under the American auspices later in Camp David, 1978.

However, Arabs regained some of their importance lost in 1967 by attacking the Israeli forces in the Egyptian Sinai in 1973, known as the October War, under the leadership of Mohammad Anwar Al Sadat, who took over after Abdel Nasser's death in 1970, and became the Egyptian President. With the October War, besides its moral results and physical gains, Sadat succeeded in strengthening his weak position and managed to open direct diplomatic channels with America, and by that, he changed the whole situation to be compatible with his own beliefs that peace with Israel was possible. Taking bold steps towards peace pushed Sadat to visit Jerusalem in 1977 which lead to negotiating with the Israelis and signing Camp David in Washington D.C., 1978.

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<sup>1</sup> Levin, Yuval, American Aid to the Middle East: A tragedy of Good Intentions. Retrieved February 7, 2007, from <http://www.iasps.org/stra11/strategic11.pdf>. p. 11

Similarly and before Oslo (late 1980s and early 1990s), Arabs' were suffering from a similar situation to that after the 1967 War. The Second Gulf War in 1990 through 1991 against Iraq caused the Arabs tremendous losses morally and physically. Morally a big crack was created in the Arabs' attitudes towards the war (8 Arab countries were pro-Iraqi while 12 were against the Iraqi invasion to Kuwait<sup>1</sup>) and in allowing an international coalition led by the United States to interfere and expel the Iraqi forces from Kuwait, and physically, some Arab forces suffered some military losses in their participation against or with Iraq, in addition to the elimination of the Iraqi role in the region as a powerful oil-producing Arab country. Besides that, the first Intifada (which started in 1987) in the occupied Palestinian lands facing the Israeli existence increased the burden as well as the awareness of the Israeli aggressiveness and oppressive policies against the Palestinians, not only in the Arab World, but also in the whole world.

That situation of depression among Arabs created again a feeling of weakness facing the American hegemony in the region especially when the former USSR had started to weaken and suffer from a damaged economy, the thing that affected the strategic positions of its Arab allies. Later in 1991, the USSR collapsed, leaving its Arab friends armless without any international support (especially the PLO in defending the Palestinian cause). This made the Arabs head for not look for the only available solution, that is, the United States of America. Consequently, and after the elimination of the old classical enemy of the United States, America enjoyed a complete hegemony over the Middle East without any competition and was encouraged to start its New World Order in March 1991 for the purposes of protecting the "weak and vulnerable" from "rogue elements of the

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<sup>1</sup> Jad, Emad. *Palestine..Al Ard Wa Asha'b Min Annakba ila Oslo*. Op.cit, p. 236

international community"<sup>1</sup>. Whether the United States had really meant to protect the weak against the roguish with its new order or within the frame of the Second Gulf War, it was enjoying its new position by supporting Israel. On the other hand, it was trying to gain some legitimacy by inviting parties of the Arab-Israeli conflict (Jordan, Syria, Lebanon, Israel, and the Palestinians) to convene a peace conference –similar to its trials in the 1970s to convene a Geneva Conference- to resume the trapped peace process in a context that suited the new political circumstances. Arabs were desperate for anything that could retrieve any of their lost issues in their conflict with Israel, especially the Palestinians who were seeking recognition for their right of existence and establishing a state.

Moreover, both agreements were preceded by the idea of resuming the peace process in the Middle East and settling the Arab-Israeli conflict by convening a multilateral conference. Before Camp David and after the October War, the USSR and the United States invited Egypt, Jordan, Syria, and Israel to a peace conference in Geneva, Switzerland, on December 21, 1973 in agreement with the UN Security Council Resolution 338 that was passed after the 1973 War. However, Syria refused to attend the conference and the PLO was not invited because of the Israeli and American opposition. No comprehensive agreement was reached as not a single word was exchanged between the Arab delegations and the Israelis. Attempts in later years to revive the conference failed.

Similarly, before the Oslo Accords, America and the former USSR invited Syria, Jordan, Lebanon, and the Palestinians<sup>2</sup> for a peace conference in the Spanish capital, Madrid, on October 30, 1991. The Madrid Conference followed both bilateral and multilateral tracks,

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<sup>1</sup> Murphy, Emma C., **The Arab-Israeli Conflict and the New World Order**. Op.cit, p. 82

<sup>2</sup> It is important to remember here that the Palestinians (represented by the PLO) negotiated in Madrid under the umbrella of the Jordanian delegation because of the Israeli rejection to negotiate directly with them. The full story is mentioned in Chapter III.

and it led to Washington negotiating bilaterally between the Israelis and the Palestinian delegation. The Madrid Conference was developed into bilateral talks in Washington, and then secret negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians. This took place at the same time when the Palestinian delegation was negotiating in Oslo in Norway with the Israelis as a response to the Norwegian initiative.

The two differences in this point were that the Geneva Conference did not result in any further agreement or negotiations while the Madrid Conference resulted in Washington talks, negotiations in Oslo, and then signing the Oslo Accords in 1993. The second difference was secrecy. It is true that the negotiations in Washington and the conference itself were not secret, but the Oslo channel was characterised by complete secrecy till the agreement was reached. In Geneva, things did not develop further to any important consequence.

As a result, it is remarkable how Arabs were in both cases in a state of detachment, confusion, and bad economic situation which is the thing that led them, the Egyptians in the case of Camp David and the Palestinians in Oslo, to change their perspectives of the United States, and accept to launch peace with the Israelis. Yet from a different perspective and within this ambience of similarities, the circumstances that surrounded both agreements had some differences, too.

To start with, it is important to note that during the 1960s and 1970s, Arab nationalism under Nasser was overwhelming the Arabs as the conflict with Israel was considered an Arab-Israeli conflict. However, the concept started to change with the developments in the international community as bilateralism marked the Arab-Israeli contacts for a long time. At the beginning, the Egyptians negotiated with the Israelis on the behalf of all Arabs



especially the Palestinians who refused and considered Sadat a traitor<sup>1</sup>. The Egyptians signed an agreement with the Israelis at Camp David, and later signed a bilateral peace treaty in 1979. In later stages, the Palestinians negotiated and signed an agreement with Israel in 1993, as the conflict was then considered a Palestinian-Israeli conflict only. The coming decades of the 1980s and 1990s were marked by bilateralism as bilateral talks took place between Israel and many other Arab States, resulting in the Oslo secret negotiations and agreement in 1993, and Jordan-Israel Peace Treaty in 1994. So, the change in the attitudes of the Arabs during all these years in addition to the Israeli's insistence on negotiating bilaterally with every Arab state as a strategic plan to separate the Arabs resulted in a shift from Arab multilateralism to unilateralism in international behaviour.

Other differences can also be cited. During the 1970s, the Cold War between the United States and the former USSR was accelerating the events in the Middle East due to the East-West confrontation. Obviously, the Soviet influence was somehow equal to the American influence in the Arab World if the Israeli alliance with Washington and the Arab alliance with Moscow are considered. This also created stability in the balance of power. However, in early 1990s, the Soviet Union started to weaken and collapsed a year later. This left the Middle East empty for the Americans to exert power which created a disparity in the balance of power favouring the Americans.

By that, and after its "victories" in the Second Gulf War and Cold War, the USA created a new world order that was in harmony with its new priorities in the region. That New World Order prevailed on the American relations with the Arab World while in the 1970s the

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<sup>1</sup> Studies Department in Palestine Al Mohtalla. **Camp David-'Ala Marahil Atta'amor 'Ala Asha'b Al Filasteeny.** Op.cit, p. 58

American policy was conducted within the frame of its Cold War with the former Soviet Union.

To sum up, the similarities in the political circumstances of both agreements (Oslo and Camp David) can be summarised in the following points:

1. Both agreements were preceded by a war (1967 War and the Gulf War 1990) as the Middle East was experiencing political disturbances.
2. In both cases, the Arabs in general were living in a state of confusion and depression on different levels; economic, social, and political.
3. Both were preceded by an international (multilateral) conference convened under the auspices of the United States of America and the former USSR (Geneva Conference 1973, and Madrid Conference 1991).
4. Arabs in both cases (and as a result of the difficult situation they faced) felt the need for finding a solution for their conflict with Israel. This was represented in accepting the idea of multilateral peace conferences.

On the other hand, the differences in the political circumstances of both cases can be summarised in the following points:

- 1) Before Camp David, there was a stable balance of power in the world with the eastern and western camps balancing each other. While before Oslo, that balance was disturbed with the collapse of the Soviet Union and the United States becoming the only superpower in the world.
- 2) In their conflict with Israel, the Arabs shifted from multilateralism in dealing with the conflict to bilateralism which started before Camp David was signed, and marked the period before Oslo was signed, too.

- 3) America treated the Arab-Israeli conflict in the 1970s through the "shuttle diplomacy" of Kissinger and in the scope of the Cold War with the previous USSR while it adopted a "New World Order" to govern its actions in the region.
- 4) The negotiations in Oslo between the Palestinians and the Israelis emerging from the Madrid Conference 1991 were secret and resulted in signing the DOP (Declaration of Principles) in 1993; while the Geneva Conference in 1973 did not have any further negotiations (neither public nor secret) and never led to any agreement, as all the tries to revive it came to failure.

In conclusion, the political circumstances of both agreements were similar although some differences existed. However, in both cases Arabs found themselves looking for a settlement, and they accepted to open diplomatic channels (no matter secret or public) with the Israelis, as seen in Sadat's courageous step toward visiting Israel in 1977 (for the Egyptians), and as seen in the Palestinians accepting to negotiate directly and secretly with the Israelis for the first time in their history in Oslo, 1992 and 1993. Such diplomatic channels paved the way to signing agreements of peace with Israel.

*Part II: The Agreements*  
*Similarities and Differences*

After considering the political circumstances which existed before the Camp David and Oslo Accords were signed and to serve the purposes of this thesis, it is necessary to study and analyse the similar and different details of both agreements to know how each agreement is differentiated from the other.

First of all, we came to know that Camp David and the Oslo Accords were the result of long negotiations and discussions between the Egyptians and the Israelis, and the Palestinians and the Israelis. What was common at that time between the accords is that Israel was a party to the both agreements. Palestinians and Egyptians were parties to Oslo and Camp David respectively (both were Arab countries) and America supervised the signing of the agreements.

The agreements of Camp David and Oslo represented a "partial peace" and not a "full peace". In this sense, it is important to differentiate between both to clarify the concept. A full peace is a peace that brings the conflict between the Israelis and the Palestinians to an end by an agreement in which both sides abandon all further claims against each other in return for what they get in the agreement<sup>1</sup>. A partial peace is an agreement to end particular forms of conflict for the time being even though one or both sides insists that it does not accept the current working agreements as just or permanent and reserves the right to make every effort to change them, except for the particular kinds of conflict that they agree to forego in the partial peace agreement. This can be applicable on both agreements. It is obvious that neither Camp David nor Oslo could solve the Arab-Israeli conflict as a whole. While it was true that Camp David and its following peace treaty managed to finish the

<sup>1</sup> The Difference between "Full Peace" and " Partial Peace". Retrieved February 17, 2006, from <http://www.biu.ac.il/SOC/besa/books/oslo/chap4.html>.

Israeli-Egyptian confrontation with the return of Sinai and the establishment of diplomatic relations between Israel and Egypt and could set a framework for guiding the subsequent negotiations on Palestinian self-governance and relationship to Israel<sup>1</sup>, it failed to accomplish the self-governance right for the Palestinians as was stated in the agreement. In addition to that, the Egyptians did not have the right to negotiate on the Palestinian behalf. Glad wrote: *"The Camp David Accords were a chance for one of the brightest moments in history. Sadly, Carter's expectations at the euphoric moment were never quite met, and today peace in the Middle East remains a distant hope."*<sup>2</sup>

Similarly, Oslo is considered a partial peace agreement because, in the first place, it could get some "small victories" for the Palestinians like the recognition of the PLO and the interim governing period, but on the other hand, it failed to create peace in the occupied territories as Israeli continued its settlements building and resumed its oppressive method to control the Palestinian people<sup>3</sup> (an example of this is Al Aqsa Intifada in 2000). As a result, the peace both agreements created was not a full one as full peace can be almost impossible in a conflict like the Arab-Israeli conflict.

It is important here to note that both parties (Egyptians and the Palestinians) had the willingness to negotiate with Israel. Sadat expressed his willingness for peace to the world with his famous speech before the Egyptian Parliament on 9<sup>th</sup> November 1977 by going to the Knesset for peace by announcing his desire to go anywhere to negotiate peace with the Israelis, and then by visiting Jerusalem in the same year<sup>4</sup>. In the same sense, the Palestinians had the desire to negotiate, knowing very well that such a chance would allow

<sup>1</sup> Glad, Betty, Carter's Greatest Legacy: The Camp David Negotiations. Retrieved February 17, 2007, from [http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/amex/carter/sfeatures/sf\\_glad.html](http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/amex/carter/sfeatures/sf_glad.html). Op.cit.

<sup>2</sup> Ibid

<sup>3</sup> Al Farra, Mohammad Ali. *Assalam Al Khadi': Ila Ain?* Op.cit, p. 254

<sup>4</sup> Al Sadat, Mohammad Anwar *Al Bahth Ann Athat, Qissat Hayaty*. Op.cit, p. 322

them to publicise their issue to the world and guarantee some international support to their case from other countries. On the regional level, Arabs would realise too that the Palestinians are now independent and capable of defending their rights. Nevertheless, Arafat probably saw in the Oslo channel (among other channels) a possible alternative to the conflict as he intended to follow whichever seemed the most promising at that time<sup>1</sup>.

When preparing for the accords, the Egyptians named their delegation that would negotiate in Camp David, and so did the United States and Israel. Revising the names, it would be realised that the positions of the figures in the delegation reflected how serious President Sadat was in going further in the negotiations, as he personally was the head of the negotiating team<sup>2</sup>. However, the story in Oslo was different.

As is well known, while the non-PLO delegation was negotiating with the Israelis in Washington within the bilateral track of the Madrid Conference, a PLO delegation was negotiating secretly in Oslo with another team of Israeli officials under Norwegian supervision. The non-PLO team in Washington consisted of distinguished Palestinian figures who worked hard to get what was possible for the Palestinians from the Israelis. The PLO team in Oslo consisted of a group of PLO members who also strived with the Israeli arrogance while drafting the accords. The difference here is that the Egyptian team consisted of ministers, ambassadors, and the President himself while both the Palestinian teams' members were only members in the PLO which was located in Tunisia at that time due to political reasons discussed earlier in Chapter III. Nevertheless, all members of both

<sup>1</sup> Discussion of the Oslo Declaration of Principles. Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies. Retrieved February 17, 2007, from <http://www.biu.ac.il/SOC/besa/books/oslo/osloap1.htm>, Op.cit.

<sup>2</sup> A full list of the Egyptian, Israeli, and American negotiating teams in Camp David is included in Chapter II, pages 86+87.

teams were working under the PLO President Yasser Arafat, and most of them ended up having governmental positions in the Palestinian State in later stages.

To speak more specifically, Camp David was preceded by serious but not secret negotiations between the Egyptian President Sadat and Israeli Prime Minister Begin in Camp David in the US which was recommended by the American President Carter for twelve days from 5 till 17 September, 1978. Oslo was preceded by twelve rounds and a final session of secret negotiations which lasted from 21<sup>st</sup> January till 20<sup>th</sup> August, 1993 between a Palestinian delegation from the PLO and some Israeli officials in Oslo in Norway.

From a different angle, both agreements were signed in Washington in the White House in a ceremonial event and under the American supervision in both cases: Camp David was signed on 17<sup>th</sup> September 1978 and Oslo on 13<sup>th</sup> September, 1993. Another similarity is that the Egyptian delegation when travelling to Washington to negotiate in Camp David arrived at Andrews Airbase<sup>1</sup> like the PLO negotiating team which arrived in Washington at the same Airbase for signing Oslo's DOP.

Both agreements focused on settling the Arab-Israeli conflict in an arrangement of articles that treated different issues. The Camp David Accords were titled “Framework for Peace in the Middle East” which dealt with the concept of peace and the future of the West Bank, Gaza Strip, and Egypt-Israel relations in three parts: the first was about an autonomous self-governing authority in the West Bank and Gaza; the second part talked about Egypt-Israel relations in two main points only, regulating the relations between them in cases of disputes, peace and negotiation, and stating a goal of concluding a peace treaty

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<sup>1</sup> Khoury, Tariq and Barmamt, Mohammad. *Min Al Mubadara ila Al Mu'ahada-Tataworat Al Ahdath wa Rodood Al Fi'l*. Op.cit, p. 61

within three months from the signing of the agreement; the third part, under the subtitle “Associated Principles”, dealt with declared principles that should apply to relations between Israel and all of its Arab neighbors<sup>1</sup>. They were mainly about regarding full recognition of Israel, economic boycotts and endorsing peace treaties. On the other hand, the Oslo Accords were called "Declaration of Principles on Self-Government Arrangements". It contained a set of "mutually agreed upon general principles" regarding a five year interim period of the Palestinian self-rule<sup>2</sup>, and the creation of the Palestinian Authority in the parts of Gaza Strip and West Bank from which the Israeli forces would withdraw. This withdrawal would be done in phases. The Palestinian rule would last for a five year interim period during which a permanent agreement would be reached to (beginning no later than May 1996)<sup>3</sup> to negotiate over the most contentious issues, like borders, refugees, Jerusalem, and the Israeli settlements. These issues were postponed to be discussed at a final stage. All this was concluded within a preamble, seventeen articles, four annexes, and the official minutes of the agreement.

It is worth mentioning here that by having Sadat sign a peace treaty with the Israelis, or at least negotiate with them, he automatically recognised Israel at a time when all Arabs were resisting the Israeli existence in the region. More explicitly, negotiations in Oslo included what is known as the "letters of recognition" exchanged by Yasser Arafat (for the Palestinian part) and Yitzhak Rabin (for the Israeli part) in which Arafat recognised the State of Israel and denounced terrorism, as Rabin recognised the PLO as the only

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<sup>1</sup> Camp David Accords. Retrieved July 8, 2006, from [http://www.en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Camp\\_David\\_Accords\\_\(1978\)](http://www.en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Camp_David_Accords_(1978)), Op.cit.

<sup>2</sup> Israel 1991 to Present. Retrieved November 10, 2006 from [http://palestinefacts.org/pf\\_1991to\\_now\\_oslo\\_accords.php](http://palestinefacts.org/pf_1991to_now_oslo_accords.php), Op.cit.

<sup>3</sup> Israeli-Palestinian conflict/ Oslo Accords. Retrieved November 10, 2006, from [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Oslo\\_Accords](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Oslo_Accords). Op.cit.



representative of the Palestinian people<sup>1</sup>. However, the fact that the PLO negotiated with Israel was a concession from its strategy aimed at eliminating the Zionist entity<sup>2</sup>.

Similarly, both agreements dealt with the future of the West Bank and Gaza Strip regarding the Israeli existence and withdrawal, and regarding a self-government authority within a specific period of time. Moreover, both agreements called for a future peace treaty in the case of Egypt (which actually took place in 1979), and a permanent agreement to negotiate the postponed issues like Jerusalem, the settlements, and refugees in the case of Oslo.

From a different perspective, the Oslo agreement required a Knesset vote of confidence because of its secret nature and negotiating team. A vote of confidence was held in which 61 Knesset members voted favouring the agreement, 50 voted against, and 8 abstained on the 23<sup>rd</sup> September, 1993<sup>3</sup>. On the other hand, the Camp David Accords were negotiated publicly and the negotiating team was under the chairmanship of Menachem Begin, the Israeli Prime Minister.

However, in both cases, Israel behaved arrogantly and tried to obstruct the negotiations in each case many times. For example, before signing the Camp David Accords, Sadat and Begin disagreed over the issue of Jerusalem. The American standpoint in this disagreement was that the Israeli position on east Jerusalem was illegitimate. At that point, Begin threatened that Israel would not sign the agreement unless the American party changed its proposal. Also during the negotiation in Washington, Israel conditioned that it would not negotiate with an independent Palestinian delegation. This created a problem solved only

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<sup>1</sup> Refer to Appendix 5 for the full lines of the letters.

<sup>2</sup> Discussion of the Oslo Declaration of Principles. Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies. Retrieved February 17, 2007, from <http://www.biu.ac.il/SOC/besa/books/oslo/osloap1.htm>, Op.cit.

<sup>3</sup> Israeli-Palestinian Conflict/ Oslo Accords. Retrieved November 10, 2006, from [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Oslo\\_Accords](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Oslo_Accords). Op.cit.

by forming a joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation after a whole week of discussions about this issue<sup>1</sup>.

Moreover, the Egyptians and Palestinians during their negotiation with Israel experienced many resignations of important figures. In Camp David, Mohammad Ibrahim Kamil, the Egyptian Foreign Minister, resigned from his position because of the concessions Egypt made to Israel regarding the Palestinian issue<sup>2</sup>. During the Oslo secret negotiations, members of the negotiating team in Washington, Hanan Ashrawy, Faisal Al Husseiny, and Sa'eb Oreikat resigned as they felt something was taking place in secrecy (referring to the negotiation in Oslo).

The reactions of the world towards both agreements varied slightly. The Arabs' reaction to Camp David was strong as they refused the agreement especially that part regarding Palestine as Sadat had no right to represent the Palestinians in his talks with the Israelis. As a result, the Arabs in the Arab World demonstrated in the streets, condemned the proceedings, and refused the agreement. Arabs also cut off their diplomatic relations with Egypt and boycotted it. In addition to that, the resolutions of the Baghdad Summit in November 1978 stated that the headquarters of the Arab League would be moved from Egypt to Tunisia, and Egypt's membership in the Arab League would be suspended.

The reactions to the Oslo Accords were a bit more accepting of the results because of the fact that negotiating with Israel was not a taboo any more, and the agreement, in general terms, was in a way legitimate as the Palestinians themselves were negotiating over their own issues, and no other party was representing them or negotiating on their behalf. So, the

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<sup>1</sup> Al Majaly, Abdel Salam. **Rehlat Al Omor, Min Beit Asha'ar ila Siddat Al Hokm.** Op.cit, p. 206

<sup>2</sup> Riyad, Mahmoud. **Mahmoud Riyad Autobiography (1948-1978).** Op.cit, p. 583

Arabs generally were split into three groups: those who were pro, those who were against, and those who were in the middle<sup>1</sup>.

There were negatives and positives for each agreement. The main negatives of Camp David were disassociating Egypt from the rest of the Arab World, and creating a disproportion in the balance of power in favour of Israel against the Arabs (represented by Egypt), while the main positive was that a new horizon in the Arab-Israeli communication was started by Sadat's peace initiatives at Camp David. Oslo's main positive aspect was the Israeli recognition of the PLO as the legitimate representative of all Palestinians while the main negatives were that the State of Israel's existence was recognised, and that many important issues which should have been settled were put off for a final stage which has kept the situation unstable, fragile, and irresolvable.

To sum up, Camp David and Oslo shared -as peace treaties signed between the famous rivalries in the history of the Middle East- the following points:

- 1- The Camp David and Oslo Accords were aimed at reaching peace between Israel and Egypt on the one hand and the Israelis and Palestinians on the other.
- 2- Such peace created between both parties was "partial" and not full. Camp David managed to create peace between Egypt and Israel as no more wars between them took place and a peace treaty followed. Furthermore, Oslo failed to create a full peace between the Israelis and the Palestinians because it left completely open the question of what should happen after five years (like Jerusalem and the refugees' issues).
- 3- Both agreements were a result of long discussions and negotiations.

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<sup>1</sup> Barakat, Nitham Mahmoud, *Assira' Al Araby-Al Israeli Montho Madrid Hatta Al'an: (Al Janib Assiyassy)*. Op.cit, p. 223

- 4- Both were signed in Washington and witnessed by an American President.
- 5- Both dealt with some Palestinian issues but tended to put others off for future treaties to handle like Jerusalem.
- 6- Both included a recognition of the State of Israel (in Oslo direct and clear, but in Camp David it was already understood).
- 7- The Camp David and Oslo negotiations witnessed a number of resignations by some Egyptian and Palestinian officials.
- 8- In both cases, the Arabs were dealing directly with the Israeli's hard positions and arrogance which threatened the process of negotiations many times.
- 9- Both agreements opened the doors for further agreements to be signed by Arab parties and Israel like the Jordan-Israel Peace Treaty in 1994 and the Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty in 1979.
- 10- Israel, in both cases, had achieved a strategic aim. In Camp David, it managed to separate Egypt from the rest of the Arab World with the restrictions the peace treaty of 1979 imposed on Egypt as it thought that other Arab countries may follow the Egyptian model and sign other bilateral peace treaties with it. In Oslo, Israel got, for the first time, an official recognition of its existence from its enemy the PLO. In addition to that, Israel managed to change the perception of the world that Israel was against peace, and by signing the agreement, it made it possible for the Gulf and Maghreb States to move toward open recognition and trade with Israel<sup>1</sup>.

<sup>1</sup> Discussion of the Oslo Declaration of Principles. Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies. Retrieved February 17, 2007, from <http://www.biu.ac.il/SOC/besa/books/oslo/osloapl.html>. Op.cit.

11- Israel, in both cases, accomplished a security benefit: the reduction of the long-term possibility that those Arabs who want to destroy Israel will at some time in the future be able to build a coalition of Arab States to attack Israel<sup>1</sup>.

Although both agreements came within the same framework of settling the Arab-Israeli conflict, there are some differences between each agreement as follows:

- 1) Camp David was basically directed at creating peace between Israel and Egypt (already existing states which have complete sovereignty, territory, and people) while Oslo aimed at establishing a state within a state and coexistence between two peoples (the Palestinian State had an authority but an occupied territory and scattered people).
- 2) The Egyptian negotiating team was headed in one track by the Egyptian President Sadat, who directed the flow of the process while the Palestinians were negotiating on two tracks in Washington and Oslo with two separate teams at the same time. The negotiating teams consisted of PLO and non-PLO figures that were in constant communication with the PLO leadership in Tunisia.
- 3) The reactions to the agreements varied in the world generally and in the Arab World in specific. Arabs refused the Camp David Accords because they represented the first Arab-Israeli treaty at a time when contacting Israel was a taboo, and because the Egyptians decided on the Palestinian issue without being authorised to do so. On the other hand, the international reaction to Camp David was mostly in favour for the agreement as many countries believed if they want to maintain their interest in the region, peace must prevail. However, the case in Oslo is different. Because the Oslo initiative was started in a multilateral frame (represented in the Madrid Conference),

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<sup>1</sup> Ibid.

the Accords were somehow more acceptable to the Arabs than was Camp David mainly because they were the Palestinians themselves who were negotiating for themselves whether the negotiations were secret or public. The world welcomed Oslo as an outline for peace in the Middle East especially being under the auspices of the world's superpower, the United States.

- 4) The reactions of the Israeli people were not too much different from that of the Arabs. After Camp David, some Israelis, especially the extremists, refused any peace treaty with the Arabs as they continued to call them "terrorists" while in later years and after the changes which took place on the political level in the Middle East, some of that extremism started to change. Some Israelis were pro-peace with the Arabs, believing in coexistence and peace between the Arabs and the Israelis.
- 5) Because Egypt was the first concern of Sadat (restoring Sinai) while negotiating in Camp David, the framework for peace in the Middle East was drafted and signed from an Egyptian perspective, even the Palestinian issue was addressed from the same perspective, too. The Oslo Accords were all about Palestine: the interim period, elections, redeployment of the Israeli forces in the West Bank and Gaza...etc. This was because the Palestinians were negotiating for themselves and chose what seemed suitable for them at that time in accordance with the international political circumstances.

In conclusion, the two agreements are similar in that they both involved the parties of the famous Arab-Israeli conflict in peace treaties which regulated the relations between them and arranged for coming treaties and events to take place at a later stage. However, attitudes do change due to the change which occurs in the surrounding ambience. This

means that both parties, the Arabs and the Israelis, developed a concept of accepting the other and negotiating with each other, which was very new in the case of Camp David and more well-established in Oslo. It is clear that this attitude was consolidated at a later stage after Camp David (signing the Egyptian-Israeli Peace treaty in 1979), and after Oslo (the Jordanian-Israeli Peace Treaty in 1994).

Nevertheless and as agreed before, it is true that both agreements were directed to create peace, but such peace was partial as it succeeded in only establishing a set of arrangements to regulate the relations between Israelis and Arabs (Egypt and the Palestinians) but it did not bring their conflict to an end. On the contrary, clashes between the Palestinians and Israelis continued, and Israel, signed Camp David and the peace treaty and guaranteed that Egypt would not interfere, bombed the Palestinians in Lebanon and occupied Beirut.

*Part III: Third-Party Role*  
*Similarities and Difference*

As it has been mentioned earlier, the third party role becomes important when parties to the conflict seem unable to solve or settle their conflict by themselves, and an outside help is needed to make the parties able to bring closer their points of view on the way of finding a solution to the conflict<sup>1</sup>.

In the case of the Arab-Israeli conflict, and regarding signing the peace treaties, Camp David and Oslo, the third party intervention seemed very important in both cases because of the complicated nature of the conflict itself as ways to communication between the parties to the conflict (Arabs and Israelis) were almost impossible. As a result, history has proved that in such conflict the third party role was important.

In talking about the Camp David and Oslo peace agreements, the third party role was the United States of America and the former USSR (the Russian Federation at later stages). Moreover, in Oslo, especially the secret negotiations, the Norwegian role can not be ignored. In this sense, every third party role in one agreement will be presented and compared to its role in the other agreement.

Starting with the USSR role and before Camp David Accords were signed, the Soviet Union was so involved in the Cold War with the United States as previously mentioned, and that involvement required that the former USSR must take a part in the events of the world as a superpower in the bi-polar system. One of the most important events was the Arab-Israeli conflict in the Middle East. Because its enemy, the United States, was supporting Israel in that conflict, the USSR supported the Arabs for a long time with

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<sup>1</sup> For more information about the details of the third-party intervention in any conflict, please refer to Chapter I, pp. 60:62



weapons and provided them with financial aid, besides its support to the Arabs on the international levels<sup>1</sup>. As a superpower, the USSR took a part in convening the Geneva Conference of 1973<sup>2</sup> with the United States, inviting Egypt, Jordan, Syria, and Israel to negotiate a solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict. Although the world hoped that such a conference would find a formula for settling the conflict, all efforts were brought to failure, and no agreement was reached.

The years from 1973 till 1978 (the signing of Camp David) witnessed a more active American role in the region than that of the Soviets, who were not responding to Sadat's calls for supplying weapons which is what pushed Sadat towards more American involvement.

Under these circumstances and after Sadat's hints to his willingness of negotiation and peace, the US President Carter invited Sadat and Begin to negotiate in Camp David, eliminating the Soviet role from the whole process. This caused a drastic reaction from the Soviets, who refused the Camp David Accords and considered it a trick in which the Israelis won and the Arabs lost rather than being a settlement<sup>3</sup>. However, the case in Oslo was a bit different.

In the late 1980s, however, the Soviet Union started to experience many economic difficulties due to its long arms race during the Cold War with the United States. In consequence, the Soviet role in the Middle East started to weaken and retreat, giving more and more space to the United States to exert more influence on the region. In 1989, it was announced that the Cold War had ended between the United States of America and the

<sup>1</sup> Soviet-Egyptian Relations. Retrieved December 9, 2006, from <http://www.heritage.org/Research/RussiaansEurasia/bg291.cfm>. Op.cit.

<sup>2</sup> There were many Geneva conferences before that one: in 1927, 1932, 1954, 1955, and 1958.

<sup>3</sup> Assayed Hussein, Adnan. **Camp David Itar Litasweyya**. Op.cit, p. 73+108

Soviet Union, minimising the Soviet's role more and more because of its weak position due to the internal economic, political, and social difficulties, and maximising the American share of the Middle East. Based on these facts, the Soviet participation in any international event started to be more marginal than before, as the United States was handling all the issues more successfully.

After ending the Cold War, the United States announced the resumption of the peace process in the Middle East, and so, with a nominal participation of the USSR, the US called for convening the Madrid Conference in October 1991. Two months later, the USSR collapsed (December 1991) and was replaced by the Russian Federation. That peace initiative of Madrid was started with the USSR's participation and ended by signing the Oslo Agreement in 1993 as a witness only as the Russian Federation.

The American role in both agreements was – for sure - more effective due to its political position in the international community as a superpower since the 1970s. It is important to mention here that the 1970s era witnessed many presidential periods and many presidents, starting with Nixon (Republican) for two presidential periods from 1969 to 1973 and from 1973 to 1974 (resigned), Ford (Republican) from 1974 to 1976, and then Carter (Democrat) from 1977 to 1980<sup>1</sup>.

During the 1970s, the American role in the Middle East was active, as seen in Kissinger's shuttle diplomacy and efforts to create peace and end the famous conflict, especially since the US was taking a tough position in the Cold War with the USSR. The American efforts brought back the results it was wishing for when convening the Geneva Conference, and then when the American invitation to Sadat and Begin to Camp David was accepted.

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<sup>1</sup>Adajany, Hisham. *Al Edarat Al Amerikiya wa Israel*. Op.cit, p. 5

The American interest in the Middle East was a part of the Cold War because of the Middle East's strategic location and oil. The superpowers had worked hard to consolidate their existence there and to hinder the other party's expansion. That is why the USSR supported the Arabs as a response to the American support to Israel.

In addition to that, it was known that President Carter and President Sadat were good friends, as Carter was –unlike previous US Presidents- sympathetic with the Arabs, especially about the Palestinian issue. Because of that America was eager that a peace treaty would be signed between Israel and Arabs. Moreover and during the negotiations in Camp David, Carter played an important role in resuming the talks when Begin and Sadat seemed to reach a deadlock in their discussions.

The American role did not stop at just inviting the conflicting parties, but it arranged a place and accommodations to the parties. Furthermore, the American delegation, which consisted of a high level of important officials under US President Carter, helped in drafting letters, gathering information, and preparing the files for the other negotiators. After the agreement was reached, the United States organised the signing ceremony at the White House, and President Carter signed the agreement as a witness with Begin and Sadat.

The American role during the early 1990s was even stronger. In 1989 America and the USSR had ended their Cold War, finishing decades of competition. Moreover, the USSR collapsed in 1991, increasing the American chance to move into the region. The American role at that time was marked by launching the Second Gulf War on Iraq and a new world order, reorganising the region in accordance with the new changes taking place. America became the world hegemony with the obvious Soviet withdrawal from the Middle East which gave the United States the superiority and control.

In addition, the Americans decided to resume the peace process by convening the Madrid Conference in participation with the nominal Soviet Union (before collapsing). After the collapse, the United States continued in leading the peace process in the Middle East by receiving the negotiations of the bilateral track of Madrid in Washington and supervising it. Nevertheless, the Americans did not object when they knew about the secret talks taking place in Oslo, Norway between the Israelis and the Palestinians.

Finally, the signing ceremony took place again in Washington D.C. at the White House and was witnessed by the United States of America and the Russian Federation. It is important to mention that this period witnessed two different presidential terms: George Bush (Republican) from 1988 to 1992, and Bill Clinton (New Democrat) from 1993 to 2001, who witnessed the DOP signing in September 1993.

Norway played an important role in reaching the Oslo Accords by starting an initiative of a back channel of negotiations between the Palestinians and the Israelis while the peace negotiations in Washington were taking place. The Norwegians offered that the meetings between the Palestinian and Israeli officials would be held in Oslo and offered all the facilities they needed, besides maintaining the secrecy of the talks as required by the Palestinians and the Israelis. As a result, it could be said that without the Norwegian effort, the DOP would not have been reached.

How the Soviet role in both agreements changed can be summarised in the following points:

- a. In the 1970s, the USSR was a counterpart to America in the world while in the early 1990s, its role started to weaken because its leadership was busy in solving the internal crises of the economy which affected the balance of power.

- b. The American superpower marginalised the Soviet then the Russian role in participating in the Middle East peace process by eliminating the USSR's role in the case of Camp David and in signing the Oslo Accords.
- c. The Soviets participated in the Geneva Conference (1973) but they did not have any input in the signing of Camp David. They also participated in Madrid Conference (1993) and again they (the Russians) were completely eliminated from the negotiations in Oslo.

The American role in both agreements was to some extent the same, as follows:

- 1- In both cases America had the upper hand in inviting and convening two peace conferences to find a solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict.
- 2- In both cases, America was the strongest supporter for the State of Israel by supporting it with weapons, loans, and financial grants.
- 3- The signing of both agreements took place in Washington D.C. and at the White House.
- 4- The Americans were supportive to any peace-making trial between the Israelis and the Palestinians which would be under its auspices and would not threaten its interests.
- 5- The Americans eliminated the Soviet role in Camp David and then the Russians in the signing at Oslo.
- 6- The United States had all the means and capabilities to play the role as a third party in the conflict politically, financially, socially, and economically and enjoyed a good level of confidence by both Arabs and Israelis in both agreements.

However, there were some differences in the American performance as follows:

- A) In Camp David, the Americans helped in drafting the accords but in Oslo the case was different in that the Palestinians and the Israelis worked on drafting their agreement.
- B) In Camp David, the Americans accommodated the stay of both the Egyptian and the Israeli negotiating teams, but they had no input in the secret negotiations in Oslo although it was taking place with the American knowledge.
- C) The negotiations in Camp David were started and finished and the agreement was signed under the American president Carter, who had supervised the whole thing since the beginning while in Oslo, the initiative started when George Bush was the president (convening the Madrid Conference), but the signing took place and was witnessed by President Clinton.
- D) America had named its negotiating team in Camp David and formed it from active staff which consisted of the President, Vice President, ambassadors, Secretary of State, and more. All American participants worked hard to bring the negotiations to success while in Oslo, and because of the secrecy which surrounded the talks, the Americans only supervised the signing.

On the other hand, the case of Oslo, as previously mentioned, involved another third party intervention different from that of the USSR or the United States. It is the Norwegian role which was characterised by the following features:

- 1- The Norwegians offered the Palestinians and the Israelis a chance to meet and discuss the difficult issues from the Washington negotiations which no other country managed to do.

- 2- The Norwegians were capable of controlling the event by bringing two enemies to the negotiating table and making them meet many times over many months, and then reach an agreement.
- 3- Norway was a non-aligned country that seemed very convenient and acceptable for both the Palestinians and the Israelis.
- 4- No matter why Norway did what it did, it was a courageous step in which the Norwegians succeeded.
- 5- The Norwegians were very skillful at handling the negotiations in Oslo and maintaining the secrecy of the talks for a long time.
- 6- As a result of the DOP, the Norwegians gained the international credit and reputation they wanted as peace-makers.

To conclude, the third-party role in the Camp David Accords and Oslo Accords was so important because of the impossibility of gathering both enemies in one place to negotiate their issues. It has been noticed that without such effort, there would not have been any agreement reached in both cases.

The follower of how the Camp David story started may realise that it was true that President Sadat had his input by showing his desire to negotiate, but the most important thing was the attentiveness of the Americans who sensed that will and worked with it.

It has always been the United States of America who moved the scenes and managed to have both the Israelis and the Arabs met at a negotiating table. The Americans were the most successful in doing that although the Soviets had tried to do something similar, yet their success was not as sharp as in the cases of Oslo and Camp David where the

participation of the Soviets was either symbolic – not exceeding mere witnessing - or ignored by the Americans.

At the end, the third party role in this famous conflict was mostly American in general. The Soviet (Russian) role in the peace negotiations in the Middle East can not be considered as a third party intervention. However, the Norwegian initiative in Oslo and the role the Norwegians played in bringing the points of view of the difficult, arrogant, and tough Israeli negotiators with those of the less-experienced Palestinian negotiators together, and making them meet, negotiate, and then reach an agreement at a time when similar efforts had failed, can be considered an effective and excellent third party role.



*Part IV: The Impact of Personal Aspect  
Similarities and Differences*

The personal aspect in any incident can affect the actions of the people involved in that incident. Consequently, the character of the people can play an important role in shaping the events and directing them to the wished direction. It is not only the character but also a package of social background, education, and psychological aspect that has the upper hand in any conflict. In addition to the surrounding influences and sufficient understanding of the issue at stake, the performance of any person in any event, especially negotiators in talks, can be determined.

Building on that, it is obvious that Egyptian President Sadat's character supported him in his negotiations with the Israelis as it offered him a large scale of movement due to his understanding of the issue and other aspects like insistence, power, vast knowledge, and more. All that made Sadat to some extent a hard negotiator with the Israelis as he defended some of his points against the Israeli refusal and he threatened to walk away and cut off the negotiation in Camp David. On the other hand, Sadat made a mistake by revealing his interests far too early as he exposed his bottom line to both the Americans and Israelis. This made him make many concessions<sup>1</sup>.

No one can deny that his charismatic character helped him to add his direct input to the whole process of negotiating with the Israelis. Moreover, it was his friendship and loyalty to the late President Abdel Nasser as he worked next to him for many years that enhanced his dedication to the Arabs and the Palestinian issue, and made him feel how necessary peace was to find a solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict.

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<sup>1</sup> Camp David Day by Day. Retrieved August 24, 2006, from <http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/Peace/cddays.html>. Op.cit.

Because of the previous aspects in Sadat's character, he was determined to achieve some kind of a peace treaty or a framework with the Israelis. As a result, he believed in the American role in accomplishing that and developed friendly relationships with the Americans, especially Carter, who in his turn, had a great sympathy to the Palestinian issue<sup>1</sup> and sent direct and indirect signals everywhere to announce his willingness to negotiate for peace<sup>2</sup>. These efforts resulted in Sadat's announcement of his intention to visit Jerusalem and deliver a speech before the Israeli Knesset in 1977 in search for peace.

When the last signal succeeded, Sadat accepted Carter's invitation to meet with the Israeli Prime Minister in Camp David in the United States to negotiate, and he headed the negotiating team himself. He even negotiated with Begin personally and signed the agreement by himself, too. All that made his input in Camp David very remarkable, and could force some to think that the whole situation might have changed if it was not for President Sadat's inputs.

From another perspective, the situation in Oslo was totally different. A direct personal aspect was absent during the negotiations in Washington, Oslo, and even when the agreement was drafted. Here we are talking about a different personal aspect which comes from combining many characters and many influences in the atmosphere of the negotiation. As is well known, the PLO was the legitimate representative of the Palestinians scattered all over the world after their Diaspora, and since its establishment in 1964, it had undertaken the Palestinian cause as its main concern and defended the Palestinian right to live on freed lands. Nevertheless, the PLO was not recognised by all of the world's

<sup>1</sup> Adajany, Hisham. *Al Edarat Al Amerikiya wa Israel*. Op.cit, p. 117

<sup>2</sup> Naf'a, Hassan. *Misr Wa Assira' Al Araby Al Israeli-Min Assira' Al Mahtoom ila Attasweya Al Mostaheelah*. Op.cit, p. 50

countries which made it difficult for the Palestinian officials to represent their country in any international event.

Under these difficult conditions, the PLO had worked and took advantage of every chance to talk about the Palestinians yet such difficult circumstances did not allow the creation of a single figure that excelled in the same aspects as Sadat excelled in. However, late President Arafat had his influence although not directly as Sadat did.

From Tunisia, where the PLO headquarters were, Arafat followed his negotiating team in Washington, and before that in the Madrid Conference. It was true that the Israelis conditioned to negotiate with non-PLO members, but these members had their connection with the leadership in Tunisia<sup>1</sup>, as Yasser Arafat was sure to follow their steps and dictate to them how to perform. The Washington negotiating team was loyal and made all possible efforts to face the barriers Israel was putting before them.

When the Oslo channel appeared, and another negotiating team of PLO members was formed secretly to negotiate at the same time while the others were negotiating in Washington, Arafat's attention was directed to Oslo because of his strong determination to reach a settlement through the Norwegian channel.

Influencing both teams, Arafat directed the negotiators to act. As the Israelis were placing barriers before the Palestinians in Washington and the negotiators were struggling to resume the suspended negotiations, and as the Oslo channel seemed brighter, Arafat by his decisions hindered the Washington talks and concentrated on Oslo<sup>2</sup>. This hindrance, to those who did not know about the secret talks in Oslo, seemed so confusing and careless,

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<sup>1</sup> Victor Barbara, **Hanan Ashrawi: Asseera Wal Masseur**. Op.cit, p. 31 and Nofal, Mamdouh, **Qissat Itifaq Oslo-Arriwaya Al Haqeeqiya Al Kamila**. Op.cit, p. 57

<sup>2</sup> Nofal, Mamdouh, **Qissat Itifaq Oslo-Arriwaya Al Haqeeqiya Al Kamila**. Op.cit, p. 59

and caused many figures of the Washington team to resign<sup>1</sup>. Many members of the PLO resigned (either before or after this stage) because of Arafat's refusal to cooperate regarding the financial crisis the PLO suffered<sup>2</sup>. This shows that Arafat was stubborn at some stages which affected the performance of some of his staff.

Arafat's insistence to reach something with the Israelis made him so tough in his decisions and so adamant to maintain the secrecy of the talks and accomplish the settlement he wanted for the Palestinians. Because of his position in the PLO and the difficult circumstances the PLO and the Palestinians were living, it was hard for Arafat to negotiate face to face with the Israelis. But Oslo opened a different door for them, a door that guaranteed their existence as Palestinians and as the PLO.

After the secret rounds of Oslo, the PLO team flew to Washington to sign the DOP with Arafat signing for the PLO and representing the Palestinians.

To summarise the previous discussion, it is important to note that:

- a- Sadat's personal input in the Camp David peace process was clear, direct, and decisive while Arafat's personal input was limited and indirect.
- b- Sadat was the head of the Egyptian negotiating team in Camp David while there were two different Palestinian negotiating teams in Washington and Oslo at the same time with different negotiators.
- c- Sadat trusted and befriended the Americans more than he should have while the Palestinians were suspicious about the Israeli officials' credibility in Oslo<sup>3</sup>.
- d- Both Arafat and Sadat signed their agreements.

<sup>1</sup> Ibid, p. 99

<sup>2</sup> Ibid, p. 113

<sup>3</sup> Abbass, Mahmoud, **Tareeq Oslo**. Op.cit, p. 196

- e- Both leaders had the intention and determination to reach a settlement, and both dealt with the Israeli arrogance and manipulation in his own way.
- f- Some policies both leaders followed caused some resignations within their staff which reflects how strong and decisive their characters were.

To conclude, the personal aspect in Camp David was clearer than that in Oslo because in Camp David, the personal aspect was concentrated in President Sadat's character while in Oslo, the personal aspect was split between many different figures due to the nature of the whole agreement.

Late President Arafat's character was forceful in some cases, but in comparison with that of Sadat, it was not present all the time. In this sense, it is realized that it was only Sadat who designed and implemented the scenario of the agreement in Camp David while in Oslo the role had been divided between many figures.

We conclude that between the Camp David and Oslo Accords there are no similarities in the impact of the personal aspect, but the only difference is that the impact in Camp David was concentrated in a single direct character while in Oslo it was divided and indirect.

*Part V: General Conclusion*

As has been said earlier, the objective of this thesis is to highlight the negotiations between the Arabs and the Israelis in the Middle East, and to find out which party, the Palestinian or the Egyptian, has been more successful than the other.

If we go back to the beginning, it is clear that both agreements shared some general characteristics although they both were signed in different periods of time, different circumstances and conditions, and by different people. What remains the same is the conflict itself with its complicated nature and the Israeli arrogance and harshness all along the way. All the long years of confrontation between the Arabs and Israelis were a repetition of the peace and war game, in which the Arabs were always the weak, and the Israelis were always the strong. Although in some wars the Arabs have won, but that "winning" was temporary and short.

Talking more specifically, it is important to look for what the Palestinians and the Egyptians wanted by seeking peace with Israel. In the case of Egypt, the Egyptians wanted to restore Sinai and do something for the Palestinians regarding their self-governance right. They may have accomplished something, but what they had lost was even larger. The Palestinians were seeking recognition and the right of self-determination which were both accomplished, but what came later of events and political decisions by Israel showed that Israel did not respect what it had signed.

By studying Camp David and Oslo, both agreements showed that negotiating to create peace in such conflicts is good to some extent. Negotiations are good because they make the parties to the conflict sit at the negotiating table, reconsider the conflict, revise their options, and bring their points of view closer in order to reach a final agreement or a

settlement. In the Arab-Israeli conflict, negotiations were the only way that made Arabs and Israelis develop a certain language between them, a language that is different from blood and guns, the hallmarks of the Arab-Israeli conflict for a long time.

The Camp David negotiations and Accords and the following Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty (1979) were successful in stopping the blood-shed and wars between Egypt and Israel, so the negotiations here are to be considered a good means to settle – but not solve - the conflict with Israel because the conflict is not about Egypt alone, but it involves complicated aspects that are related to many Arab neighbouring states. In return, Egypt lost some of its strength as a leading country in the Arab World and Africa.

The Palestinians, on the other hand, could get an official recognition of the PLO, and create a self-autonomy authority to organise the Palestinians' lives in the occupied lands. It is true they achieved much, but in return, recognition of the State of Israel was conceded by the Palestinians, accentuating again the Israeli supremacy over the Arabs. So in that case, negotiation was a good method to create "temporal arrangements" for regulating the relations between Israel and the Palestinians, and to get an official recognition of the PLO, the organisation which Israel has always considered as a "terrorist organisation".

What we get out of that is negotiations were good to accomplish certain close aims, but not effective in finding a final settlement to the conflict to create complete peace on the long run in both cases.

From a different perspective, the Egyptian performance seemed more stable than that of the Palestinians. The Egyptians were negotiating in one team under the Egyptian president's leadership which created more confidence among the negotiators who were supported by their President. The case was not the same with the Palestinians. First of all, they were negotiating in two teams, one of which did not know about the other. This

created confusion among the negotiators because of Arafat's double decisions. Second, the communication between the negotiators and the PLO leadership in Tunisia caused the negotiators to double the effort and time. Third, the general situation of the Palestinians in the world and their lack of negotiating experience did not help them much in performing easy negotiations. Forth, the manipulating Israeli negotiator gave the Palestinian negotiator a hard time. Fifth, the negotiating team in Oslo was not sure till later stages of the legitimacy of the Israelis they were negotiating with and how much they were related to the Israeli government. All these previous elements indicate that the Egyptian performance in the negotiation with Israel was better than that of the Palestinians due to the general ambience and the case of each state.

It is incorrect to say that both agreements, Camp David and Oslo, had achieved all the desired goals. Some goals remained unachievable in spite of being discussed and included in the agreement. Moreover, putting off some issues for future negotiations, like refugees and settlements in the Oslo negotiation, and the Jerusalem question in the Camp David Accord, made the agreements incomprehensive. Thus, this peace achieved by the agreements is a partial peace due to:

1. Egypt failed to create a state of complete peace in the region as Israel succeeded in establishing a paralysed Egypt in the Middle East by putting it in the frame of the Peace Treaty of 1979. For example, in June, 1981, Israel's air force bombed the nuclear reactor facility being built in Iraq. Egypt did not take any step other than to denounce the attack although such attack constituted an act of war against a



member of the Arab League requiring other League members to come to the defence of the country under attack<sup>1</sup>.

2. Oslo also failed in creating the complete peace although the agreement seemed promising. The "coexistence" and "dignity" in the preamble of the accord was not moved into reality as continuous clashes between the Palestinians and the Israelis, building settlements, demolishing houses, and torturing during interrogation were the main characteristics of the Israeli-Palestinian relations in the aftermath of Oslo.
3. Both agreements left some important issues, mainly Jerusalem, for a later stage to be solved or settled.
4. Neither agreement could find a complete perfect solution or settlement to the Arab-Israeli conflict.

As a result, the hypothesis of this thesis which says that "the Camp David negotiations and the Oslo negotiations were successful in achieving all the goals of the Egyptian and Palestinian sides and thus, created peace and found a settlement to the conflict" has been proved to be wrong and untrue.

No one can say that the Egyptian and Palestinian negotiations were 100% successful because success if measured with what has happened later in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict and what is taking place now, would not be considered success, but failure.

In conclusion, no agreement has managed to make peace in the Middle East possible. Maybe the Arabs are to be blamed or the Israelis, or maybe it is the circumstances. No one can tell.

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<sup>1</sup> Ginat Rami, (2005). Egypt and Involvement in the Disengagement Process: Strategic, Regional and International Aspects (Electronic version). **BESA Center for Strategic Studies**, September 1, 2005.

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## Appendix I

### The Camp David Accords

#### The Framework for Peace in the Middle East

Muhammad Anwar al-Sadat, President of the Arab Republic of Egypt, and Menachem Begin, Prime Minister of Israel, met with Jimmy Carter, President of the United States of America, at Camp David from September 5 to September 17, 1978, and have agreed on the following framework for peace in the Middle East. They invite other parties to the Arab-Israel conflict to adhere to it.

#### Preamble

The search for peace in the Middle East must be guided by the following:

- The agreed basis for a peaceful settlement of the conflict between Israel and its neighbors is United Nations Security Council Resolution 242, in all its parts.
- After four wars during 30 years, despite intensive human efforts, the Middle East, which is the cradle of civilization and the birthplace of three great religions, does not enjoy the blessings of peace. The people of the Middle East yearn for peace so that the vast human and natural resources of the region can be turned to the pursuits of peace and so that this area can become a model for coexistence and cooperation among nations.
- The historic initiative of President Sadat in visiting Jerusalem and the reception accorded to him by the parliament, government and people of Israel, and the reciprocal visit of Prime Minister Begin to Ismailia, the peace proposals made by both leaders, as well as the warm reception of these missions by the peoples of both countries, have created an unprecedented opportunity for peace which must not be lost if this generation and future generations are to be spared the tragedies of war.
- The provisions of the Charter of the United Nations and the other accepted norms of international law and legitimacy now provide accepted standards for the conduct of relations among all states.
- To achieve a relationship of peace, in the spirit of Article 2 of the United Nations Charter, future negotiations between Israel and any neighbor prepared to negotiate peace and security with it are necessary for the purpose of carrying out all the provisions and principles of Resolutions 242 and 338.
- Peace requires respect for the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every state in the area and their right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force. Progress toward that goal can accelerate movement toward a new era of reconciliation in the Middle East marked by cooperation in promoting economic development, in maintaining stability and in assuring security.

- Security is enhanced by a relationship of peace and by cooperation between nations which enjoy normal relations. In addition, under the terms of peace treaties, the parties can, on the basis of reciprocity, agree to special security arrangements such as demilitarized zones, limited armaments areas, early warning stations, the presence of international forces, liaison, agreed measures for monitoring and other arrangements that they agree are useful.

## Framework

Taking these factors into account, the parties are determined to reach a just, comprehensive, and durable settlement of the Middle East conflict through the conclusion of peace treaties based on Security Council resolutions 242 and 338 in all their parts. Their purpose is to achieve peace and good neighborly relations. They recognize that for peace to endure, it must involve all those who have been most deeply affected by the conflict. They therefore agree that this framework, as appropriate, is intended by them to constitute a basis for peace not only between Egypt and Israel, but also between Israel and each of its other neighbors which is prepared to negotiate peace with Israel on this basis. With that objective in mind, they have agreed to proceed as follows:

### A. West Bank and Gaza

1. Egypt, Israel, Jordan and the representatives of the Palestinian people should participate in negotiations on the resolution of the Palestinian problem in all its aspects. To achieve that objective, negotiations relating to the West Bank and Gaza should proceed in three stages:
  - a. Egypt and Israel agree that, in order to ensure a peaceful and orderly transfer of authority, and taking into account the security concerns of all the parties, there should be transitional arrangements for the West Bank and Gaza for a period not exceeding five years. In order to provide full autonomy to the inhabitants, under these arrangements the Israeli military government and its civilian administration will be withdrawn as soon as a self-governing authority has been freely elected by the inhabitants of these areas to replace the existing military government. To negotiate the details of a transitional arrangement, Jordan will be invited to join the negotiations on the basis of this framework. These new arrangements should give due consideration both to the principle of self-government by the inhabitants of these territories and to the legitimate security concerns of the parties involved.
  - b. Egypt, Israel, and Jordan will agree on the modalities for establishing elected self-governing authority in the West Bank and Gaza. The delegations of Egypt and Jordan may include Palestinians from the West Bank and Gaza or other Palestinians as mutually agreed. The parties will negotiate an agreement which will define the powers and responsibilities of the self-governing authority to be exercised in the West Bank and Gaza. A withdrawal of Israeli armed forces will take place and there will be a redeployment of the remaining Israeli forces into specified security locations. The agreement will also include

arrangements for assuring internal and external security and public order. A strong local police force will be established, which may include Jordanian citizens. In addition, Israeli and Jordanian forces will participate in joint patrols and in the manning of control posts to assure the security of the borders.

- c. When the self-governing authority (administrative council) in the West Bank and Gaza is established and inaugurated, the transitional period of five years will begin. As soon as possible, but not later than the third year after the beginning of the transitional period, negotiations will take place to determine the final status of the West Bank and Gaza and its relationship with its neighbors and to conclude a peace treaty between Israel and Jordan by the end of the transitional period. These negotiations will be conducted among Egypt, Israel, Jordan and the elected representatives of the inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza. Two separate but related committees will be convened, one committee, consisting of representatives of the four parties which will negotiate and agree on the final status of the West Bank and Gaza, and its relationship with its neighbors, and the second committee, consisting of representatives of Israel and representatives of Jordan to be joined by the elected representatives of the inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza, to negotiate the peace treaty between Israel and Jordan, taking into account the agreement reached in the final status of the West Bank and Gaza. The negotiations shall be based on all the provisions and principles of UN Security Council Resolution 242. The negotiations will resolve, among other matters, the location of the boundaries and the nature of the security arrangements. The solution from the negotiations must also recognize the legitimate right of the Palestinian peoples and their just requirements. In this way, the Palestinians will participate in the determination of their own future through:
    - i. The negotiations among Egypt, Israel, Jordan and the representatives of the inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza to agree on the final status of the West Bank and Gaza and other outstanding issues by the end of the transitional period.
    - ii. Submitting their agreements to a vote by the elected representatives of the inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza.
    - iii. Providing for the elected representatives of the inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza to decide how they shall govern themselves consistent with the provisions of their agreement.
    - iv. Participating as stated above in the work of the committee negotiating the peace treaty between Israel and Jordan.
2. All necessary measures will be taken and provisions made to assure the security of Israel and its neighbors during the transitional period and beyond. To assist in providing such security, a strong local police force will be constituted by the self-governing authority. It will be composed of inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza. The police will maintain liaison on



internal security matters with the designated Israeli, Jordanian, and Egyptian officers.

3. During the transitional period, representatives of Egypt, Israel, Jordan, and the self-governing authority will constitute a continuing committee to decide by agreement on the modalities of admission of persons displaced from the West Bank and Gaza in 1967, together with necessary measures to prevent disruption and disorder. Other matters of common concern may also be dealt with by this committee.
4. Egypt and Israel will work with each other and with other interested parties to establish agreed procedures for a prompt, just and permanent implementation of the resolution of the refugee problem.

#### B. Egypt-Israel

1. Egypt-Israel undertake not to resort to the threat or the use of force to settle disputes. Any disputes shall be settled by peaceful means in accordance with the provisions of Article 33 of the U.N. Charter.
2. In order to achieve peace between them, the parties agree to negotiate in good faith with a goal of concluding within three months from the signing of the Framework a peace treaty between them while inviting the other parties to the conflict to proceed simultaneously to negotiate and conclude similar peace treaties with a view the achieving a comprehensive peace in the area. The Framework for the Conclusion of a Peace Treaty between Egypt and Israel will govern the peace negotiations between them. The parties will agree on the modalities and the timetable for the implementation of their obligations under the treaty.

#### C. Associated Principles

1. Egypt and Israel state that the principles and provisions described below should apply to peace treaties between Israel and each of its neighbors - Egypt, Jordan, Syria and Lebanon.
2. Signatories shall establish among themselves relationships normal to states at peace with one another. To this end, they should undertake to abide by all the provisions of the U.N. Charter. Steps to be taken in this respect include:
  - a. full recognition;
  - b. abolishing economic boycotts;
  - c. guaranteeing that under their jurisdiction the citizens of the other parties shall enjoy the protection of the due process of law.
3. Signatories should explore possibilities for economic development in the context of final peace treaties, with the objective of contributing to the atmosphere of peace, cooperation and friendship which is their common goal.
4. Claims commissions may be established for the mutual settlement of all financial claims.
5. The United States shall be invited to participated in the talks on matters related to the modalities of the implementation of the agreements and working out the timetable for the carrying out of the obligations of the parties.
6. The United Nations Security Council shall be requested to endorse the peace treaties and ensure that their provisions shall not be violated. The permanent



members of the Security Council shall be requested to underwrite the peace treaties and ensure respect or the provisions. They shall be requested to conform their policies an action with the undertaking contained in this Framework.

For the Government of the Arab Republic of Egypt:

Muhammed Anwar al-Sadat

For the Government of Israel:

Menachem Begin

Witnessed by:

Jimmy Carter, President of the United States of America

## Appendix II

### Framework for the Conclusion of a Peace Treaty between Egypt and Israel

In order to achieve peace between them, Israel and Egypt agree to negotiate in good faith with a goal of concluding within three months of the signing of this framework a peace treaty between them:

It is agreed that:

- The site of the negotiations will be under a United Nations flag at a location or locations to be mutually agreed.
- All of the principles of U.N. Resolution 242 will apply in this resolution of the dispute between Israel and Egypt.
- Unless otherwise mutually agreed, terms of the peace treaty will be implemented between two and three years after the peace treaty is signed.
- The following matters are agreed between the parties:
  1. the full exercise of Egyptian sovereignty up to the internationally recognized border between Egypt and mandated Palestine;
  2. the withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from the Sinai;
  3. the use of airfields left by the Israelis near al-Arish, Rafah, Ras en-Naqb, and Sharm el-Sheikh for civilian purposes only, including possible commercial use only by all nations;
  4. the right of free passage by ships of Israel through the Gulf of Suez and the Suez Canal on the basis of the Constantinople Convention of 1888 applying to all nations; the Strait of Tiran and Gulf of Aqaba are international waterways to be open to all nations for unimpeded and non-suspendable freedom of navigation and overflight;
  5. the construction of a highway between the Sinai and Jordan near Eilat with guaranteed free and peaceful passage by Egypt and Jordan; and
  6. the stationing of military forces listed below.

#### Stationing of Forces

- No more than one division (mechanized or infantry) of Egyptian armed forces will be stationed within an area lying approximately 50 km. (30 miles) east of the Gulf of Suez and the Suez Canal.
- Only United Nations forces and civil police equipped with light weapons to perform normal police functions will be stationed within an area lying west of the international border and the Gulf of Aqaba, varying in width from 20 km. (12 miles) to 40 km. (24 miles).
- In the area within 3 km. (1.8 miles) east of the international border there will be Israeli limited military forces not to exceed four infantry battalions and United Nations observers.

- Border patrol units not to exceed three battalions will supplement the civil police in maintaining order in the area not included above.
- The exact demarcation of the above areas will be as decided during the peace negotiations.
- Early warning stations may exist to insure compliance with the terms of the agreement.
- United Nations forces will be stationed:
  1. in part of the area in the Sinai lying within about 20 km. of the Mediterranean Sea and adjacent to the international border, and
  2. in the Sharm el-Sheikh area to insure freedom of passage through the Strait of Tiran; and these forces will not be removed unless such removal is approved by the Security Council of the United Nations with a unanimous vote of the five permanent members.
- After a peace treaty is signed, and after the interim withdrawal is complete, normal relations will be established between Egypt and Israel, including full recognition, including diplomatic, economic and cultural relations; termination of economic boycotts and barriers to the free movement of goods and people; and mutual protection of citizens by the due process of law.

### **Interim Withdrawal**

Between three months and nine months after the signing of the peace treaty, all Israeli forces will withdraw east of a line extending from a point east of El-Arish to Ras Muhammad, the exact location of this line to be determined by mutual agreement.

For the Government of the Arab Republic of Egypt:

Muhammed Anwar al-Sadat

For the Government of Israel:

Menachem Begin

Witnessed by:

Jimmy Carter,  
President of the United States of America

## Appendix III

### Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements (13 September 1993)

*The Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements is the main agreement signed between Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organisation. It was signed on White House lawn amid much fanfare in September 1993.*

#### Preamble

The Government of the State of Israel and the Palestinian team representing the Palestinian people agree that it is time to put an end to decades of confrontation and conflict, recognize their mutual legitimate and political rights, and strive to live in peaceful coexistence and mutual dignity and security to achieve a just, lasting and comprehensive peace settlement and historic reconciliation through the agreed political process. Accordingly, the two sides agree to the following principles.

#### **Article 1:** Aim of the Negotiations

The aim of the Israeli Palestinian negotiations within the current Middle East peace process is, among other things, to establish a Palestinian Interim Self-Government Authority, the elected Council, (the "Council") for the Palestinian people in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, for a transitional period not exceeding five years, leading to a permanent settlement based on Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338.

It is understood that the interim arrangements are an integral part of the whole peace process and that the negotiations on the permanent status will lead to implementation of Security Council Resolution 242 and 338.

#### **Article II:** Framework For The Interim Period

The agreed framework for the interim period is set in this declaration of principles.

#### **Article III:** Elections

1. In order that the Palestinian people in the West Bank and Gaza Strip may govern themselves according to democratic principles, direct, free and general political elections will be held for the Council under agreed supervision and international observation, while Palestinian police will insure public order.

2. An agreement will be concluded on the exact mode and conditions of the elections in

accordance with the protocol attached as Annex I, with the goal of holding the elections not later than nine months after the entry into force of this Declaration of Principles.

3. The elections will constitute a significant interim preparatory step toward the realization of the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people and their just requirements.

#### **Article IV: Jurisdiction**

Jurisdiction of the Council will cover West Bank and Gaza territory, except for issues that will be negotiated in the permanent status negotiations. The two sides view the West Bank and Gaza Strip as a single territorial unit, whose integrity will be preserved during the interim period.

#### **Article V: Transitional Period and Permanent Status Negotiations**

1. The five-year transitional period will begin upon the withdrawal from the Gaza strip and Jericho area.

2. Permanent status negotiations will commence as soon as possible, but not later than the beginning of the third year of the interim period between the Government of Israel and the Palestinian people representatives.

3. It is understood that these negotiations shall cover remaining issues, including: Jerusalem, refugees, settlements, security arrangements, border, relations and cooperation with their neighbors, and other issues of common interest.

4. The two parties agreed that the outcome of the permanent status negotiations should not be prejudiced or preempted by agreements reached for the interim period.

#### **Article VI: Preparatory Transfer of Powers and Responsibilities**

1. Upon the entry into force of this Declaration of Principles and withdrawal from the Gaza and Jericho area, a transfer of authority from Israeli military government and its Civil Administration to the authorized Palestinians for this task, as detailed herein, will commence. This transfer of authority will be of preparatory nature until the inauguration of the Council.

2. Immediately after the entry into force of this Declaration of Principles and the withdrawal from the Gaza Strip and the Jericho area, with the view of promoting economic development in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, authority will be transferred to the Palestinians on the following spheres: education and culture, health, social welfare, direct taxation, and tourism, the Palestinian side will commence in building the Palestinian police, as agreed upon. Pending the inauguration of the Council, the two parties may negotiate the transfer of additional powers and responsibilities, as agreed upon.

### **Article VII: Interim Agreement**

1. The Israeli and Palestinian delegations will negotiate an agreement on the interim period (the "Interim Agreement").
2. The Interim Agreement shall specify, among other things, the structure of the Council, the number of its members, and the transfer of powers and responsibilities from the Israeli military government and its Civil Administration to the Council. The Interim Agreement shall also specify the Council's executive authority, legislative authority in accordance with Article IX below, and the independent Palestinian judicial organs.
3. The Interim Agreement shall include arrangements, to be implemented upon the inauguration of the Council, for the assumption by the Council of all of the powers and responsibilities transferred previously in accordance with Article VI above.
4. In order to enable the Council to promote economic growth, upon its inauguration, the Council will establish, among other things, a Palestinian Electricity Authority, a Gaza Sea Port Authority, a Palestinian Development Bank, a Palestinian Export Promotion Board, a Palestinian Environmental Authority, a Palestinian Land Authority and a Palestinian Water Administration Authority, and any other authorities agreed upon, in accordance with the Interim Agreement that will specify their powers and responsibilities.
5. After the inauguration of the Council, the Civil Administration will be dissolved, and the Israeli military government will be withdrawn.

### **Article VIII: Public Order and Security**

In order to guarantee public order and internal security for the Palestinians of the West Bank and Gaza Strip, the Council will establish a strong police force, while Israel will continue to carry the responsibility for defending against external threats, as well as the responsibility for overall security of Israelis for the purpose of safeguarding their internal security and public order.

### **Article IX: Laws and Military Orders**

1. The Council will be empowered to legislate, in accordance with the Interim Agreement, within all authorities transferred to it.
2. Both parties will review jointly laws and military orders presently in force in remaining spheres.

### **Article X: Joint Israeli-Palestinian Liaison Committee**

In order to provide for a smooth implementation of this Declaration of Principles and any

subsequent agreements pertaining to the interim period, upon the entry into force of this Declaration of Principles, a Joint Israeli-Palestinian Liaison Committee will be established in order to deal with issues requiring coordination, other issues of common interest, and disputes.

**Article XI: Israeli-Palestinian Cooperation in Economic Fields**

Recognizing the mutual benefit of cooperation in promoting the development of the West Bank, the Gaza Strip and Israel, upon the entry into force of this Declaration of Principles, an Israeli- Palestinian Economic Cooperation Committee will be established in order to develop and implement in a cooperative manner the programs identified in the protocols attached as Annex III and Annex IV.

**Article XII: Liaison and Cooperation with Jordan and Egypt**

The two parties will invite the Governments of Jordan and Egypt to participate in establishing further liaison and cooperation arrangements between the Government of Israel and the Palestinian representatives on one hand, and the Governments of Jordan and Egypt, on the other hand, to promote cooperation between them. These arrangements will include the constitution of a Continuing Committee that will decide by agreement on the modalities of admission of persons displaced from the West Bank and Gaza Strip in 1967, together with necessary measures to prevent disruption and disorder. Other matters of common concern will be dealt with by the Committee.

**Article XIII: Redeployment of Israeli Forces**

1. After the entry into force of this Declaration of Principles, and not later than the eve of elections for the Council, a redeployment of Israeli military forces in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip will take place, in addition to withdrawal of Israeli forces carried out in accordance with Article XIV.
2. In redeploying its military forces, Israel will be guided by the principle that its military forces should be redeployed outside populated areas.
3. Further redeployments to specified location will be gradually implemented commensurate with the assumption of responsibility for public order and internal security by the Palestinian police force pursuant to Article VIII above.

**Article XIV: Israeli Withdrawal from the Gaza Strip and Jericho Area**

Israel will withdraw from the Gaza Strip and Jericho area, as detailed in the protocol attached as Annex II.

**Article XV: Resolution of Disputes**

1. Disputes arising out of the application or interpretation of the Declaration of Principles, or any subsequent agreements pertaining to the interim period, shall be resolved by negotiations through the Joint Liaison Committee to be established pursuant to Article X above.

2. Disputes which cannot be settled by negotiations may be solved by a mechanism of conciliation to be agreed upon by the parties.

3. The parties may agree to submit to arbitration disputes relating to the interim period, which cannot be settled through reconciliation. To this end, upon the agreement of both parties, the parties will establish an Arbitration Committee.

**Article XVI: Israeli-Palestinian Cooperation Concerning Regional Programs**

Both parties view the multilateral working groups as an appropriate instrument for promoting a "Marshall Plan," the for the West Bank and Gaza Strip, as indicated in the protocol attached as Annex IV.

**Article XVII: Miscellaneous Provisions**

1. This Declaration of Principles will enter into force one month after its signing.

2. All protocols annexed to this Declaration of Principles and Agreed Minutes pertaining thereto shall be regarded as an integral part hereof.



## Appendix IV

### U.N Security Council Resolution 242 November 22, 1967

Following the June '67, Six-Day War, the situation in the Middle East was discussed by the UN General Assembly, which referred the issue to the Security Council. After lengthy discussion, a final draft for a Security Council resolution was presented by the British Ambassador, Lord Caradon, on November 22, 1967. It was adopted on the same day.

This resolution, numbered 242, established provisions and principles which, it was hoped, would lead to a solution of the conflict. Resolution 242 was to become the cornerstone of Middle East diplomatic efforts in the coming decades.

#### **The Security Council,**

**Expressing** its continuing concern with the grave situation in the Middle East,

**Emphasizing** the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war and the need to work for a just and lasting peace in which every State in the area can live in security,

**Emphasizing** further that all Member States in their acceptance of the Charter of the United Nations have undertaken a commitment to act in accordance with Article 2 of the Charter,

1. Affirms that the fulfillment of Charter principles requires the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East which should include the application of both the following principles:
  - Withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict;
  - Termination of all claims or states of belligerency and respect for and acknowledgement of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every State in the area and their right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force;
2. Affirms further the necessity
  - For guaranteeing freedom of navigation through international waterways in the area;
  - For achieving a just settlement of the refugee problem;
  - For guaranteeing the territorial inviolability and political independence of every State in the area, through measures including the establishment of demilitarized zones;
3. Requests the Secretary General to designate a Special Representative to proceed to the Middle East to establish and maintain contacts with the States concerned in order to promote agreement and assist efforts to achieve a peaceful and accepted settlement in accordance with the provisions and principles in this resolution;
4. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Security Council on the progress of the efforts of the Special Representative as soon as possible.

## Appendix V

### U.N Security Council Resolution 338 October 22, 1973

In the later stages of the Yom Kippur War -- after Israel repulsed the Syrian attack on the Golan Heights and established a bridgehead on the Egyptian side of the Suez Canal -- international efforts to stop the fighting were intensified. US Secretary of State Kissinger flew to Moscow on October 20, and, together with the Soviet Government, the US proposed a cease-fire resolution in the UN Security Council. The Council met on 21 October at the urgent request of both the US and the USSR, and by 14 votes to none, adopted the following resolution:

#### **The Security Council,**

1. Calls upon all parties to present fighting to cease all firing and terminate all military activity immediately, no later than 12 hours after the moment of the adoption of this decision, in the positions after the moment of the adoption of this decision, in the positions they now occupy;
2. Calls upon all parties concerned to start immediately after the cease-fire the implementation of Security Council Resolution 242 (1967) in all of its parts;
3. Decides that, immediately and concurrently with the cease-fire, negotiations start between the parties concerned under appropriate auspices aimed at establishing a just and durable peace in the Middle East.

## Appendix VI

### President Sadat's Speech to the Israeli Knesset

November 20, 1977

In the name of God, Mr. Speaker of the Knesset, ladies and gentlemen, allow me first to thank deeply the Speaker of the Knesset for affording me this opportunity to address you....

I come to you today on solid ground to shape a new life and to establish peace. We all love this land, the land of God, we all, Moslems, Christians and Jews, all worship God....

I do not blame all those who received my decision when I announced it to the entire world before the Egyptian People's Assembly. I do not blame all those who received my decision with surprise and even with amazement, some gripped even by violent surprise. Still others interpreted it as political, to camouflage my intentions of launching a new war.

I would go so far as to tell you that one of my aides at the presidential office contacted me at a late hour following my return home from the People's Assembly and sounded worried as he asked me: "Mr. President, what would be our reaction if Israel actually extended an invitation to you?"

I replied calmly: "I would accept it immediately. I have declared that I would go to the end of the earth. I would go to Israel, for I want to put before the people of Israel all the facts...." No one could have ever conceived that the president of the biggest Arab state, which bears the heaviest burden and the main responsibility pertaining to the cause of war and peace in the Middle East, should declare his readiness to go to the land of the adversary while we were still in a state of war.

We all still bear the consequences of four fierce wars waged within 30 years. All this at the time when the families of the 1973 October war are still mourning under the cruel pain of bereavement of father, son, husband and brother.

As I have already declared, I have not consulted as far as this decision is concerned with any of my colleagues or brothers, the Arab heads of state or the confrontation states.

Most of those who contacted me following the declaration of this decision expressed their objection because of the feeling of utter suspicion and absolute lack of confidence between the Arab states and the Palestine people on the one hand and Israel on the other that still surges in us all.

Many months in which peace could have been brought about have been wasted over differences and fruitless discussions on the procedure of convening the Geneva conference. All have shared suspicion and absolute lack of confidence.

But to be absolutely frank with you, I took this decision after long thought, knowing that it constitutes a great risk, for God Almighty has made it my fate to assume responsibility on behalf of the Egyptian people, to share in the responsibility of the Arab nation, the main duty of which, dictated by responsibility, is to exploit all and every means in a bid to save my Egyptian Arab people and the pan-Arab nation from the horrors of new suffering and destructive wars, the dimensions of which are foreseen only by God Himself.

After long thinking, I was convinced that the obligation of responsibility before God and before the people make it incumbent upon me that I should go to the far corners of the world, even to Jerusalem to address members of the Knesset and acquaint them with all the facts surging in me, then I would let you decide for yourselves....

Ladies and gentlemen, there are moments in the lives of nations and peoples when it is incumbent upon those known for their wisdom and clarity of vision to survey the problem, with all its complexities and vain memories, in a bold drive towards new horizons.

Those who like us are shouldering the same responsibilities entrusted to us are the first who should have the courage to make determining decisions that are consonant with the magnitude of the circumstances. We must all rise above all forms of obsolete theories of superiority, and the most important thing is never to forget that infallibility is the prerogative of God alone.

If I said that I wanted to avert from all the Arab people the horrors of shocking and destructive wars I must sincerely declare before you that I have the same feelings and bear the same responsibility towards all and every man on earth, and certainly towards the Israeli people.

Any life that is lost in war is a human life be it that of an Arab or an Israeli. A wife who becomes a widow is a human being entitled to a happy family life, whether she be an Arab or an Israeli.

Innocent children who are deprived of the care and compassion of their parents are ours. They are ours, be they living on Arab or Israeli land.

They command our full responsibility to afford them a comfortable life today and tomorrow.

For the sake of them all, for the sake of the lives of all our sons and brothers, for the sake of affording our communities the opportunity to work for the progress and happiness of man, feeling secure and with the right to a dignified life, for the generations to come, for a smile on the face of every child born in our land, for all that I have taken my decision to come to you, despite all the hazards, to deliver my address.

I have shouldered the prerequisites of the historic responsibility and therefore I declared on Feb. 4, 1971, that I was willing to sign a peace agreement with Israel. This was the first declaration made by a responsible Arab official since the outbreak of the Arab- Israeli

conflict. Motivated by all these factors dictated by the responsibilities of leadership, on Oct. 16, 1973, before the Egyptian People's Assembly, I called for an international conference to establish permanent peace based on justice. I was not heard.

I was in the position of a man pleading for peace or asking for a cease-fire. Motivated by the duties of history and leadership, I signed the first disengagement agreement, followed by the second disengagement agreement at Sinai.

Then we proceeded, trying both open and closed doors in a bid to find a certain road leading to a durable and just peace.

We opened our heart to the peoples of the entire world to make them understand our motivations and objectives and actually to convince them of the fact that we are advocates of justice and peacemakers. Motivated by all these factors, I also decided to come to you with an open mind and an open heart and with a conscious determination so that we might establish permanent peace based on justice....

Ladies and gentlemen, let us be frank with each other. Using straightforward words and a clear conception with no ambiguity, let us be frank with each other today while the entire world, both East and West, follows these unparalleled moments, which could prove to be a radical turning point in the history of this part of the world if not in the history of the world as a whole.

Let us be frank with each other, let us be frank with each other as we answer this important question.

How can we achieve permanent peace based on justice? Well, I have come to you carrying my clear and frank answer to this big question, so that the people in Israel as well as the entire world may hear it....

Before I proclaim my answer, I wish to assure you that in my clear and frank answer I am availing myself of a number of facts that no one can deny.

- The first fact is that no one can build his happiness at the expense of the misery of others.
- The second fact: never have I spoken, nor will I ever speak, with two tongues; never have I adopted, nor will I ever adopt, two policies. I never deal with anyone except in one tongue, one policy and with one face.
- The third fact: direct confrontation is the nearest and most successful method to reach a clear objective.
- The fourth fact: the call for permanent and just peace based on respect for United Nations resolutions has now become the call of the entire world. It has become the expression of the will of the international community, whether in official capitals where policies are made and decisions taken, or at the level of the world public opinion, which influences policymaking and decision-taking.
- The fifth fact and this is probably the clearest and most prominent, is that the Arab nation, in its drive for permanent peace based on justice, does not proceed from a

position of weakness. On the contrary, it has the power and stability for a sincere will for peace. The Arab declared intention stems from an awareness prompted by a heritage of civilization, that to avoid an inevitable disaster that will befall us, you and the whole world, there is no alternative to the establishment of permanent peace based on justice, peace that is not swayed by suspicion or jeopardized by ill intentions.

In the light of these facts, which I meant to place before you the way I see them, I would also wish to warn you, in all sincerity I warn you, against some thoughts that could cross your minds.

Frankness makes it incumbent upon me to tell you the following:

- First, I have not come here for a separate agreement between Egypt and Israel. This is not part of the policy of Egypt. The problem is not that of Egypt and Israel. An interim peace between Egypt and Israel, or between any Arab confrontation state and Israel, will not bring permanent peace based on justice in the entire region. Rather, even if peace between all the confrontation states and Israel were achieved in the absence of a just solution of the Palestinian problem, never will there be that durable and just peace upon which the entire world insists.
- Second, I have not come to you to seek a partial peace, namely to terminate the state of belligerency at this stage and put off the entire problem to a subsequent stage. This is not the radical solution that would steer us to permanent peace. Equally, I have not come to you for a third disengagement agreement in Sinai or in Golan or the West Bank. For this would mean that we are merely delaying the ignition of the fuse. It would also mean that we are lacking the courage to face peace, that we are too weak to shoulder the burdens and responsibilities of a durable peace based upon justice.

I have come to you so that together we should build a durable peace based on justice to avoid the shedding of one single drop of blood by both sides. It is for this reason that I have proclaimed my readiness to go to the farthest corner of the earth.

Here I would go back to the big question.

How can we achieve a durable peace based on justice? In my opinion, and I declare it to the whole world, from this forum, the answer is neither difficult nor is it impossible despite long years of feuds, blood, faction, strife, hatreds and deep-rooted animosity....

You want to live with us, in this part of the world.

In all sincerity I tell you we welcome you among us with full security and safety. This in itself is a tremendous turning point, one of the landmarks of a decisive historical change. We used to reject you. We had our reasons and our fears, yes.

We refused to meet with you, anywhere, yes.

We were together in international conferences and organizations and our representatives did not, and still do not, exchange greetings with you. Yes. This has happened and is still happening.

It is also true that we used to set as a precondition for any negotiations with you a mediator who would meet separately with each party.

Yes. Through this procedure the talks of the first and second disengagement agreements took place.

Our delegates met in the first Geneva conference without exchanging a direct word, yes, this has happened.

Yet today I tell you, and I declare it to the whole world, that we accept to live with you in permanent peace based on justice. We do not want to encircle you or be encircled ourselves by destructive missiles ready for launching, nor by the shells of grudges and hatreds.

I have announced on more than one occasion that Israel has become a fait accompli, recognized by the world, and that the two superpowers have undertaken the responsibility for its security and the defense of its existence. As we really and truly seek peace we really and truly welcome you to live among us in peace and security.

There was a huge wall between us that you tried to build up over a quarter of a century but it was destroyed in 1973. It was the wall of an implacable and escalating psychological warfare.

It was a wall of the fear of the force that could sweep the entire Arab nation. It was a wall of propaganda that we were a nation reduced to immobility. Some of you have gone as far as to say that even for 50 years to come, the Arabs will not regain their strength. It was a wall that always threatened with a long arm that could reach and strike anywhere. It was a wall that warned us of extermination and annihilation if we tried to use our legitimate rights to liberate the occupied territories.

Together we have to admit that that wall fell and collapsed in 1973. Yet, there remains another wall. This wall constitutes a psychological barrier between us, a barrier of suspicion, a barrier of rejection; a barrier of fear, or deception, a barrier of hallucination without any action, deed or decision.

A barrier of distorted and eroded interpretation of every event and statement. It is this psychological barrier that I described in official statements as constituting 70 percent of the whole problem.

Today, through my visit to you, I ask why don't we stretch out our hands with faith and sincerity so that together we might destroy this barrier? Why shouldn't our and your will meet with faith and sincerity so that together we might remove all suspicion of fear, betrayal and bad intentions?



Why don't we stand together with the courage of men and the boldness of heroes who dedicate themselves to a sublime aim? Why don't we stand together with the same courage and daring to erect a huge edifice of peace?

An edifice that builds and does not destroy. An edifice that serves as a beacon for generations to come with the human message for construction, development and the dignity of man.

Ladies and gentlemen, to tell you the truth, peace cannot be worth its name unless it is based on justice and not on the occupation of the land of others. It would not be right for you to demand for yourselves what you deny to others. With all frankness and in the spirit that has prompted me to come to you today, I tell you you have to give up once and for all the dreams of conquest and give up the belief that force is the best method for dealing with the Arabs.

You should clearly understand the lesson of confrontation between you and us. Expansion does not pay. To speak frankly, our land does not yield itself to bargaining, it is not even open to argument....

We cannot accept any attempt to take away or accept to seek one inch of it nor can we accept the principle of debating or bargaining over it.

I sincerely tell you also that before us today lies the appropriate chance for peace. If we are really serious in our endeavor for peace, it is a chance that may never come again. It is a chance that if lost or wasted, the resulting slaughter would bear the curse of humanity and of history.

What is peace for Israel? It means that Israel lives in the region with her Arab neighbors in security and safety. Is that logical? I say yes. It means that Israel lives within its borders, secure against any aggression. Is that logical? And I say yes. It means that Israel obtains all kinds of guarantees that will ensure these two factors. To this demand, I say yes.

Beyond that we declare that we accept all the international guarantees you envisage and accept. We declare that we accept all the guarantees you want from the two superpowers or from either of them or from the Big Five or from some of them. Once again, I declare clearly and unequivocally that we agree to any guarantees you accept, because in return we shall receive the same guarantees.

In short then, when we ask what is peace for Israel, the answer would be that Israel lives within her borders, among her Arab neighbors in safety and security, within the framework of all the guarantees she accepts and that are offered to her.

But, how can this be achieved? How can we reach this conclusion that would lead us to permanent peace based on justice? There are facts that should be faced with courage and clarity. There are Arab territories that Israel has occupied and still occupies by force. We insist on complete withdrawal from these territories, including Arab Jerusalem.

I have come to Jerusalem, the city of peace, which will always remain as a living embodiment of coexistence among believers of the three religions. It is inadmissible that anyone should conceive the special status of the city of Jerusalem within the framework of annexation or expansionism. It should be a free and open city for all believers.

Above all, this city should not be severed from those who have made it their abode for centuries. Instead of reviving the precedent of the Crusades, we should revive the spirit of Omar Ibn al-Khattab and Saladin, namely the spirit of tolerance and respect for right.

The holy shrines of Islam and Christianity are not only places of worship but a living testimony of our interrupted presence here. Politically, spiritually and intellectually, here let us make no mistake about the importance and reverence we Christians and Moslems attach to Jerusalem.

Let me tell you without the slightest hesitation that I have not come to you under this roof to make a request that your troops evacuate the occupied territories. Complete withdrawal from the Arab territories occupied after 1967 is a logical and undisputed fact. Nobody should plead for that. Any talk about permanent peace based on justice and any move to ensure our coexistence in peace and security in this part of the world would become meaningless while you occupy Arab territories by force of arms.

For there is no peace that could be built on the occupation of the land of others, otherwise it would not be a serious peace. Yet this is a foregone conclusion that is not open to the passion of debate if intentions are sincere or if endeavors to establish a just and durable peace for our and for your generations to come are genuine.

As for the Palestine cause, nobody could deny that it is the crux of the entire problem. Nobody in the world could accept today slogans propagated here in Israel, ignoring the existence of a Palestinian people and questioning even their whereabouts. Because the Palestine people and their legitimate rights are no longer denied today by anybody; that is nobody who has the ability of judgment can deny or ignore it. It is an acknowledged fact, perceived by the world community, both in the East and in the West, with support and recognition in international documents and official statements. It is of no use to anybody to turn deaf ears to its resounding voice, which is being heard day and night, or to overlook its historical reality.

Even the United States of America, your first ally, which is absolutely committed to safeguard Israel's security and existence and which offered and still offers Israel every moral, material and military support. I say, even the United States has opted to face up to reality and admit that the Palestinian people are entitled to legitimate rights and that the Palestine problem is the cause and essence of the conflict and that so long as it continues to be unresolved, the conflict will continue to aggravate, reaching new dimensions.

In all sincerity I tell you that there can be no peace without the Palestinians. It is a grave error of unpredictable consequences to overlook or brush aside this cause.

I shall not indulge in past events such as the Balfour Declaration 60 years ago. You are well acquainted with the relevant text. If you have found the moral and legal justification to set up a national home on a land that did not all belong to you, it is incumbent upon you to show understanding of the insistence of the people of Palestine for establishment once again of a state on their land. When some extremists ask the Palestinians to give up the sublime objective, this in fact means asking them to renounce their identity and every hope for the future.

I hail the Israeli voices that called for the recognition of the Palestinian people's right to achieve and safeguard peace.

Here I tell you, ladies and gentlemen, that it is no use to refrain from recognizing the Palestinian people and their right to statehood as their right of return. We, the Arabs, have faced this experience before with you. And with the reality of the Israeli existence, the struggle that took us from war to war, from victims to more victims, until you and we have today reached the edge of a horrible abyss and a terrifying disaster unless, together, we seize this opportunity today of a durable peace based on justice.

You have to face reality bravely, as I have done. There can never be any solution to a problem by evading it or turning a deaf ear to it. Peace cannot last if attempts are made to impose fantasy concepts on which the world has turned its back and announced its unanimous call for the respect of rights and facts....

Direct confrontation and straightforwardness are the shortcuts and the most successful way to reach a clear objective. Direct confrontation concerning the Palestinian problem and tackling it in one single language with a view to achieving a durable and just peace lie in the establishment of that peace. With all the guarantees you demand, there should be no fear of a newly born state that needs the assistance of all countries of the world.

When the bells of peace ring there will be no hands to beat the drums of war. Even if they existed, they would be stilled.

Conceive with me a peace agreement in Geneva that we would herald to a world thirsting for peace. A peace agreement based on the following points.

- Ending the occupation of the Arab territories occupied in 1967.
- Achievement of the fundamental rights of the Palestinian people and their right to self-determination, including their right to establish their own state.
- The right of all states in the area to live in peace within their boundaries, their secure boundaries, which will be secured and guaranteed through procedures to be agreed upon, which will provide appropriate security to international boundaries in addition to appropriate international guarantees.
- Commitment of all states in the region to administer the relations among them in accordance with the objectives and principles of the United Nations Charter. Particularly the principles concerning the nonuse of force and a solution of differences among them by peaceful means.
- Ending the state of belligerence in the region.

Ladies and gentlemen, peace is not a mere endorsement of written lines. Rather it is a rewriting of history. Peace is not a game of calling for peace to defend certain whims or hide certain admissions. Peace in its essence is a dire struggle against all and every ambition and whim.

Perhaps the example taken and experienced, taken from ancient and modern history, teaches that missiles, warships and nuclear weapons cannot establish security. Instead they destroy what peace and security build.

For the sake of our peoples and for the sake of the civilization made by man, we have to defend man everywhere against rule by the force of arms so that we may endow the rule of humanity with all the power of the values and principles that further the sublime position of mankind.

Allow me to address my call from this rostrum to the people of Israel. I pledge myself with true and sincere words to every man, woman and child in Israel. I tell them, from the Egyptian people who bless this sacred mission of peace, I convey to you the message of peace of the Egyptian people, who do not harbor fanaticism and whose sons, Moslems, Christians and Jews, live together in a state of cordiality, love and tolerance.

This is Egypt, whose people have entrusted me with their sacred message. A message of security, safety and peace to every man, woman and child in Israel. I say, encourage your leadership to struggle for peace. Let all endeavors be channeled towards building a huge stronghold for peace instead of building destructive rockets.

Introduce to the entire world the image of the new man in this area so that he might set an example to the man of our age, the man of peace everywhere. Ring the bells for your sons. Tell them that those wars were the last of wars and the end of sorrows. Tell them that we are entering upon a new beginning, a new life, a life of love, prosperity, freedom and peace.

You, sorrowing mother, you, widowed wife, you, the son who lost a brother or a father, all the victims of wars, fill the air and space with recitals of peace, fill bosoms and hearts with the aspirations of peace. Make a reality that blossoms and lives. Make hope a code of conduct and endeavor....

I have chosen to set aside all precedents and traditions known by warring countries. In spite of the fact that occupation of Arab territories is still there, the declaration of my readiness to proceed to Israel came as a great surprise that stirred many feelings and confounded many minds. Some of them even doubted its intent.

Despite all that, the decision was inspired by all the clarity and purity of belief and with all the true passions of my people's will and intentions, and I have chosen this road, considered by many to be the most difficult road.

I have chosen to come to you with an open heart and an open mind. I have chosen to give this great impetus to all international efforts exerted for peace. I have chosen to present to

you, in your own home, the realities, devoid of any scheme or whim. Not to maneuver, or win a round, but for us to win together, the most dangerous of rounds embattled in modern history, the battle of permanent peace based on justice.

It is not my battle alone. Nor is it the battle of the leadership in Israel alone. It is the battle of all and every citizen in all our territories, whose right it is to live in peace. It is the commitment of conscience and responsibility in the hearts of millions.

When I put forward this initiative, many asked what is it that I conceived as possible to achieve during this visit and what my expectations were. And as I answer the questions, I announce before you that I have not thought of carrying out this initiative from the precepts of what could be achieved during this visit. And I have come here to deliver a message. I have delivered the message and may God be my witness....

## Appendix VII

### Camp David Invitation Letter from President Carter to Prime Minister Begin

August 3, 1978

To Prime Minister Begin

This is a private and personal letter, and I would appreciate your honoring its confidentiality. I want to express myself frankly and directly to you personally.

During the past year under your leadership of Israel we have made remarkable progress toward peace. The boldness and leadership qualities exhibited by you and President Sadat have contributed to a new and better relationship between Israel and Egypt which was not anticipated by the rest of the world. In my opinion, you are the leader who, in the foreseeable future, can and must continue this progress. You have a strong hold on the government, loyalty among your associates, and the well deserved confidence of the people of your country.

It is imperative that every effort be made to capitalize on this unprecedented opportunity to consummate a definitive peace treaty between Israel and Egypt and then to match this achievement with other agreements between your nation and your other neighbors.

Although the recent discussions have produced minimal progress, broad areas of agreement do exist, providing a basis for sustained hope. Unless we take advantage of this opportunity now, however, those of us who presently serve as leaders of our respective nations may not again have such a chance to advance the cause of peace in the Middle East.

After hours of detailed discussions on several occasions with both you and President Sadat, in private and in group sessions, I am convinced of your mutual desire for peace. That desire is obviously shared by the people of both nations. Nevertheless, the high hopes of last winter have now been dissipated, with potentially serious consequences.

It is time, therefore, for a renewed effort at the highest level. My hope is that during this visit by Secretary Vance to the Middle East progress and harmony will be indicated by positive statements and the avoidance of public disputes.

Then, as soon as is convenient, I would like to meet personally with you and President Sadat to search for additional avenues toward peace.

Secretary Vance can discuss with you the arrangements for a time and place. Unnecessary delay would be a mistake. I have no strong preference about the location, but Camp David is available. My hope is that the three of us, along with our top advisors, can work together in relative seclusion. Maximum direct contact between you and President Sadat is very important.

To create the best climate for our meeting, public statements should be constructive and positive, expectations should not be raised too high, and quiet and mutual preparations should lay a foundation for optimum progress.

It is important that this proposal be kept completely confidential. President Sadat is being similarly approached. A time for announcement can be mutually set after we have fixed the date. Secretary Vance is familiar with my schedule, and I hope that through him you will send to me your ideas and advice.

I look forward to an early opportunity to consider with you again one of the most important and challenging issues ever decided by political leaders.

Please remember that you have my continuing friendship and personal best wishes as we work together as partners in a common search for peace.

Sincerely,

Jimmy Carter

## Appendix VIII

### Letters of Recognition

#### 1. Letter from Yasser Arafat to Prime Minister Rabin

September 9, 1993

Yitzhak Rabin

Prime Minister of Israel

Mr. Prime Minister,

The signing of the Declaration of Principles marks a new era...I would like to confirm the following PLO commitments: The PLO recognizes the right of the State of Israel to exist in peace and security. The PLO accepts United Nations Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338. The PLO commits itself...to a peaceful resolution of the conflict between the two sides and declares that all outstanding issues relating to permanent status will be resolved through negotiations...the PLO renounces the use of terrorism and other acts of violence and will assume responsibility over all PLO elements and personnel in order to assure their compliance, prevent violations and discipline violators...the PLO affirms that those articles of the Palestinian Covenant which deny Israel's right to exist, and the provisions of the Covenant which are inconsistent with the commitments of this letter are now inoperative and no longer valid. Consequently, the PLO undertakes to submit to the Palestinian National Council for formal approval the necessary changes in regard to the Palestinian Covenant.

Sincerely,

Yasser Arafat.

Chairman: The Palestine Liberation Organization.



## 2. Letter from Chairman Arafat to Norway's Foreign Minister

September 9, 1993

His Excellency: Johan Jorgen Holst  
Foreign Minister of Norway.

Dear Minister Holst,

I would like to confirm to you that, upon the signing of the Declaration of Principles, the PLO encourages and calls upon the Palestinian people in the West Bank and Gaza Strip to take part in the steps leading to the normalization of life, rejecting violence and terrorism, contributing to peace and stability and participating actively in shaping reconstruction, economic development and cooperation.

Sincerely,

Yasser Arafat.

Chairman: The Palestine Liberation Organization.

## 3. Letter from Prime Minister Rabin to Chairman Yasser Arafat

September 9, 1993

Yasser Arafat  
Chairman: The Palestinian Liberation Organization.

Mr. Chairman,

In response to your letter of September 9, 1993, I wish to confirm to you that, in light of the PLO commitments included in your letter, the Government of Israel has decided to recognize the PLO as the representative of the Palestinian people and commence negotiations with the PLO within the Middle East peace process.

Yitzhak Rabin.

Prime Minister of Israel.

# المفاوضات في الشرق الأوسط: كامب ديفيد وأوسلو

## دراسة مقارنة

إعداد

**ميس عوني بدر البدر**

المشرف

**الدكتور عمر الحضرمي**

### ملخص

ارتبطت المفاوضات في الشرق الأوسط بالصراع العربي الإسرائيلي لفترة طويلة، إذ إن كل الجهود الدبلوماسية التي بذلت من قبل أطراف النزاع و الأطراف الدولية الأخرى قد هدفت إلى إيجاد تسوية لهذا النزاع، و بشكل خاص المفاوضات في كامب ديفيد بين مصر وإسرائيل والمفاوضات في أوسلو بين الفلسطينيين وإسرائيل أيضاً.

إن الهدف من هذه الدراسة هو معرفة ما إذا كانت المفاوضات في كلتا الحالتين وسيلة جيدة للوصول إلى حل لهذا النزاع، ومعرفة أي الفريقين - المصري أو الفلسطيني - كان أداءه أفضل، من خلال تعريف المفاوضات وإستراتيجياتها و دراسة وتحليل مفاوضات كامب ديفيد وأوسلو، ومن ثم مقارنة النتائج للوصول إلى الاستنتاجات. ودراسة المعلومات التي تم الحصول عليها من المصادر الرئيسية والثانوية عن الاتفاقيتين، فإن معالجة المعلومات قد تمت باستخدام تكتيكات وصفية وتحليلية وأخرى للمقارنة للتوصل إلى الاستنتاجات.

وعلى الرغم من أن كلتا الاتفاقيتين قد اشتركتا في بعض الصفات العامة، إلا أنه من الجدير ذكره أن كل اتفاقية كانت تتميز بعدة خصائص جعلتها حالة مختلفة بحد ذاتها، فبعد مقارنة نقاط الاختلاف والتشابه بين الاتفاقيتين من

خلال منظور الظروف السياسيّة، والاتفاقيّة نفسها، ودور الطرف الثالث، مع أثر العنصر الشخصي في المفاوضات، توصلت الدراسة إلى النتيجة التي مفادها أن إحدى الاتفاقيتين لم تتوصل إلى حل لهذا النزاع بما أن كل ما وصلنا إليه كان اتفاقاً جزئياً استطاع خلق سلام مؤقت في بعض القضايا، تاركاً قضايا أخرى ذات أهمية بلا حل. فالدراسة تعرض تلك الاختلافات والتشابهات لتصل إلى النتيجة المذكورة.

إن فرضية الدراسة القائلة أن تسويتا كامب ديفيد وأوسلو كانتا ناجحتين في الوصول إلى الأهداف الفلسطينية والمصرية لم تثبت صحتها، ذلك أنهما لم تحققا جميع تلك الأهداف بل بعضها، كما أنها ضيقت الخناق على الطرفين المصري والفلسطيني لمصلحة إسرائيل. وبالنتيجة، فإن الاتفاقيتين لم تكونا ناجحتين مئة بالمئة.